Behavioural robustness and the distributed mechanisms hypothesis by Fernandez-Leon, Jose A
 
 
 
A University of Sussex DPhil thesis  
Available online via Sussex Research Online:  
http://eprints.sussex.ac.uk/ 
This thesis is protected by copyright which belongs to the author. 
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the Author 
 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the Author 
 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the 
author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
 
Please visit Sussex Research Online for more information and further details 
  
Behavioural robustness and the distributed 
mechanisms hypothesis 
Jose A. Fernandez-Leon 
Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (DPhil) 
University of Sussex, UK 
Submitted: August 2010; Defended: December 2010 
  ii 
 
Declaration 
I hereby declare that this thesis has not been submitted, either in the same or different form, to this 
or any other university for a degree. 
 
 
 
 
Signature: 
  iii 
 
Preface 
The work reported in this thesis is my own work. Some of the material in this work has been 
published before the submission of the thesis in international journals and peer-reviewed 
conference proceedings. The work developed in [Fernandez-Leon & Di Paolo, 2007] and 
continued in [Fernandez-Leon & Di Paolo, 2008] encompasses analyses and discussions given in 
Chapter 5. The work in [Fernandez-Leon & Froese, 2010] and [Fernandez-Leon, sub. 2010c] is 
extended in Chapter 8. Discussions and experiments described in Chapter 7 have been published 
in a peer reviewed Journal (see [Fernandez-Leon, 2011]). Work in Chapter 6 is awaiting 
evaluation in another peer reviewed Journal (see [Fernandez-Leon, sub. 2010a]). Finally, 
discussions in [Fernandez-Leon, sub. 2010b] are intended for furthering the overall understanding 
of various bio-inspired-phenomena reported here. All seven articles, experiments, analyses and 
work not already published but reported for this thesis have been carried out during my doctoral 
studies.  
The ‘Dynamica’ software package developed by Randall Beer was used for part of the dynamical 
analyses. This package is available on-line from Beer’s website. 
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Behavioural robustness and the distributed 
mechanisms hypothesis 
Jose A. Fernandez-Leon 
Summary 
A current challenge in neuroscience and systems biology is to better understand properties that 
allow organisms to exhibit and sustain appropriate behaviours despite the effects of perturbations 
(behavioural robustness). There are still significant theoretical difficulties in this endeavour, 
mainly due to the context-dependent nature of the problem. Biological robustness, in general, is 
considered in the literature as a property that emerges from the internal structure of organisms, 
rather than being a dynamical phenomenon involving agent-internal controls, the organism body, 
and the environment. Our hypothesis is that the capacity for behavioural robustness is rooted in 
dynamical processes that are distributed between agent ‘brain’, body, and environment, rather than 
warranted exclusively by organisms’ internal mechanisms. Distribution is operationally defined 
here based on perturbation analyses. 
Evolutionary Robotics (ER) techniques are used here to construct four computational models to 
study behavioural robustness from a systemic perspective. Dynamical systems theory provides the 
conceptual framework for these investigations. The first model evolves situated agents in a goal-
seeking scenario in the presence of neural noise perturbations. Results suggest that evolution 
implicitly selects neural systems that are noise-resistant during coupling behaviour by 
concentrating search in regions of the fitness landscape that retain functionality for goal 
approaching. The second model evolves situated, dynamically limited agents exhibiting minimal-
cognitive behaviour (categorization task). Results indicate a small but significant tendency toward 
better performance under most types of perturbations by agents showing further cognitive-
behavioural dependency on their environments. The third model evolves experience-dependent 
robust behaviour in embodied, one-legged walking agents. Evidence suggests that robustness is 
rooted in both internal and external dynamics, but robust motion emerges always from the system-
in-coupling. The fourth model implements a historically dependent, mobile-object tracking task 
under sensorimotor perturbations. Results indicate two different modes of distribution, one in 
which inner controls necessarily depend on a set of specific environmental factors to exhibit 
behaviour, then these controls will be more vulnerable to perturbations on that set, and another for 
which these factors are equally sufficient for behaviours. Vulnerability to perturbations depends 
on the particular distribution.  
In contrast to most existing approaches to the study of robustness, this thesis argues that 
behavioural robustness is better understood in the context of agent-environment dynamical 
couplings, not in terms of internal mechanisms. Such couplings, however, are not always the full 
determinants of robustness. Challenges and limitations of our approach are also identified for 
future studies. 
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“(…) as soon as I had finished the entire course of study, at the close of which it is 
customary to be admitted into the Doctor degree, I completely changed my opinion. 
For I found myself involved in so many doubts and errors that I was convinced I had 
advanced no further in all my attempts at learning, than the discovery at every turn of 
my own ignorance.”  
René Descartes, Discourse on Method, 1637 
 
   
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
“… lo voy a pre-estudiar.” 
 
Nicolás Fellenz 
 
 
“In an open system, such as our bodies represent, compounded of unstable 
material and subjected continuously to disturbing conditions, constancy is itself 
evidence that agencies are acting or ready to act, to maintain this constancy.” 
 
Walter B. Cannon, 1939 (from Ashby, 1960, p. 64). 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Overview of this thesis 
Organisms’ surroundings certainly play an important role in shaping actions, while behaviour is 
by no means solely defined internally. The responses to particular situations in the environment 
(e.g. the presence of poisoned food where the organism cannot sense the involved risk of eating 
it), for instance, cannot be explained only in terms of stimuli involved or internal structure on 
dynamics. The very same living being may behave in completely different ways when presented 
with seemingly identical stimuli at two different moments or places [Beer, 2004a]. In one case, the 
food may be hungrily consumed, while in a different moment the organism may avoid the food 
because it has learnt the risk involved [Beer & Chiel, 1990]. As Beer and Chiel (1990) indicate, to 
account for these differences behavioural scientists hypothesize internal states or drive which 
changes an organism’s response to its environment. Maturana and Varela (1987) also point out 
that the ability of an organism to draw distinctions through its selective response to perturbations 
is a hallmark of cognitive behaviour.  
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The aim of this thesis is to understand behaviours that greatly outlast any initiating stimulus 
as processes that arise from agent-environment dynamics. The purpose of this understanding is 
to examine how behavioural patterns emerge and how we can control them. More specifically, 
this work analyses the dynamical coupling between modelled control systems (brain), bodies, 
and environments under the influence of internal and external factors (perturbations) disturbing 
the exhibition of behaviours, i.e. actions of an agent in the environment.  
Because an agent is not just an assembly of components defining a static structure, the study 
of properties of the coupled agent-environment system may have an impact on future theories 
on how biological organisms reach robustness [Kitano, 2004a, 2006, 2007]. This thesis is 
different from other works in theoretical neuroscience and systems biology in that it promotes a 
change of perspective on robustness from being solely internally generated (i.e. a property of the 
internal structure of organisms) towards a dynamical phenomenon involving agent-internal 
control (or inner control), the agent body and the environment. The following section gives a 
brief description of the context of this thesis. 
1.1.1 A holistic understanding of robustness 
Despite the lack of a formal definition, robustness usually refers to the continuation of function 
in the presence of perturbations [Kitano, 2004a, 2007]. Robustness is a systemic property 
commonly attributed to living organisms [Stelling et al., 2004]. When an organism performs a 
task, components or mechanisms in the organism cooperate to exhibit the appropriate actions. If 
internal and external factors negatively affect these mechanisms, then malfunctions in organism 
actions and tasks occur. A main goal of systems biology [Alon, 2006] and neuroscience is to 
elucidate principles that explain how living systems remain mostly functional despite 
perturbations. By functional, we mean in this thesis organisms or agents that are capable of 
fulfilling a purpose (e.g. a task), where the counterpart is non-functionality.  
Systemic robustness usually is contextualized based on mechanisms promoting resistance to 
certain factors (or perturbations) that do not spread throughout agent-environment (including 
body) as a whole as we previously indicated. There are many definitions of mechanisms in the 
philosophy of science and biology. One influential characterization of neuro-biological 
mechanisms is: “mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that they are productive 
of regular changes from start to termination conditions” [Machamer et al., 2000]. From an 
epistemic perspective, this definition implies that mechanisms are dynamic producers of 
phenomena. The conception of mechanisms that we want to highlight in this thesis is at a 
dynamical level, which ideally can be quantitatively related to behavioural robustness. These 
dynamical mechanisms can easily be framed using dynamical systems theory in neural-based 
systems controlling an agent’s body in the environment through the evolution of robust and 
adaptive behaviour. In fact, Kitano (2004a) indicates: “[biological robustness] is considered to 
be a fundamental feature of complex evolvable systems.” 
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Figure 1.1 – Approaches to explaining robust and adaptive behaviour of the nervous system-body-
environment system. Different dynamical loops (grey circles) contribute to behavioural robustness 
despite internal malfunctions and external perturbations (black thick arrows). [A] The usual 
understanding of behavioural robustness in neural systems, defined as the inner-based mechanistic 
approach. [B] The adaptive behaviour approach proposes that the nervous system (NS) is embedded 
within a body, which in turn is embedded within the environment. NN represents a neural network. [C] A 
systemic view of behavioural robustness in which the internal activity of an agent is dependent on and 
continuously perturbed by dynamical cycles between internal-control, body, and environment, with no 
necessarily separable inner mechanisms producing robustness (see [von Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 106]). 
Behavioural robustness as well as adaptive behaviour emerges from the interactions of all three sub-parts 
(nervous system, body, and environment), where the highly recursive and integrated activities of these 
parts are in constant flux and open to body and environment dynamics (dashed lines in [C]). Figures 
adapted and extended from [Chiel & Beer, 1997] and [Barandiaran, 2004].  
Some structural and organizational properties of the nervous system like modularity and 
redundancy are thought to ensure robust performance (see [Kitano, 2004a, 2007][Krakauer, 
2005][Lesne, 2008] for descriptions of these mechanisms; also see [Csete & Doyle, 2002, 2004] 
and [Godzik et al., 2004] for descriptions of more complex mechanisms). Following definitions 
in [Maturana & Varela, 1987], by organization we consider “those relations that must exist 
among the components of a system for it to be member of a specific class”; while by structure, 
we refer to “the components and relations that actively constitutes a particular unity, and makes 
its organization real”. In particular, neuroscience and cognitive science focus on the role of the 
nervous system in robust and adaptive behaviour, where by ‘adaptive behaviour’ we mean the 
actions in the environment of an organism that enhances its survival opportunities [Chiel & Beer, 
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1997]. It is also well known in neuroscience that most behaviours are modulated by external 
factors and previous experience of interacting with the environment. Therefore, it seems 
inappropriate to formulate behavioural robustness rooted only to the inner structure of 
organisms (see Figure 1.1-C for a graphical representation of this point). 
A completely internal-mechanism-based explanation of robustness (Figure 1.1-A) creates the 
illusion of division between robustness mechanisms and other behavioural mechanisms, and 
separates the properties at coupled system level. From a theoretical viewpoint, Kitano (2002) 
suggests that this traditional perspective hinders understanding of the mechanistic, system-wide, 
basis of robustness. He argues that it is crucial to examine the structure and dynamics of living 
systems in a holistic way (rather than the characteristics of isolated parts of organisms) in order 
to have a clearer understanding of robust traits. 
Similarly, recent works in theoretical and experimental neuroscience suggest that the division 
between behavioural mechanisms and mechanisms generating robust traits is not 
straightforward. For instance, robustness in a neural context is largely associated with a 
distributed and integrated property named ‘degeneracy’: the ability of elements that are 
structurally different to perform the same function or yield the same output [Tononi et al. 
1999][Edelman & Gally, 2001][Macía & Solé, 2008][Whitacre, 2010] (section 2.3). Some 
studies in cognitive science have also discussed the role of brain, body, and environment in 
behaviour, rather than only concentrating on the nervous system as the sole ‘behaviour 
producer’ (Figure 1.1-B). 
In the context of adaptive behaviour, Chiel and Beer (1997) (also [Chiel et al., 2009]) discuss 
that the nervous system cannot process information not transduced by the body, or control 
movements are physically impossible for the body. The converse idea suggests that properties of 
the body may simplify complex neural processing and control problems by using different body 
dynamics and sensorimotor information (e.g. to keep our torso stable and conserve energy, we 
swing our arms backwards and forwards, and engaging in a swing/stance cycle of our legs while 
walking based on feet and equilibrium feedbacks). Going further, new evidence that ‘the body 
shapes the way we think’ [Pfeifer & Bongard, 2006], indicates that the full experience of the 
body-environment coupled dynamics continuously shapes cognitive and behavioural abilities as 
well as their respective mechanisms (Figure 1.1-C). Despite this broad hypothesis, we have very 
little idea about how internal controls in artificial and biological organisms managing the effects 
of perturbations are (or can be) realized at a dynamical level. Studying these mechanisms in 
Evolutionary Robotics (ER) [Nolfi & Floreano, 2000] can inform our understanding of what to 
look for in natural systems and how to build better artificial examples (see also [Floreano & 
Mondada, 1998]). 
1.1.2 A distributed view of robustness 
The accepted understanding of behavioural robustness (i.e. ability to generate a core behaviour 
despite perturbations) and adaptive behaviour is gradually changing from being generated by 
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isolated control mechanisms within organisms towards dynamical process occurring over 
multiple and distributed systemic components (see [Kitano, 2002][Calcott, 2010]). However, the 
word distributed in neuroscience and Artificial Intelligence (AI), for instance, still means 
distributed within the brain (i.e. like distributed parallel computation in neural networks).  
A ‘holistic’ approach also involves behavioural and cognitive mechanisms which suggests that 
organisms obtain information from the coupled system dynamics in a way no dedicated, internal 
control system could possibly emulate [Scheier et al., 1998][Pfeifer & Scheier, 2001][Pfeifer & 
Bongard, 2006][Espenschied et al., 1996]. Combining this observation and those from section 
1.1.1, however, how we can establish that distribution is not just a ‘shorthand’ for brain-body-
environment coupling? This thesis emphasizes that distribution is a more precise context in 
which to discuss behavioural robustness, because we propose that if the processes that sustain 
behaviours are distributed (rather than centralized in the brain), a flow of information is possible 
between brain-body-environment processes with no two parts performing the same function.  
Our hypothesis is that the more distributed the behavioural mechanisms are between brain, 
body, and environment, the more chance an organism has to remain functional in the presence of 
perturbations affecting dynamical processes that sustain behaviours. This hypothesis opens the 
question of how one measures a behavioural control system as being more distributed than 
another. In fact, there are different manners to account for the distribution of a control system, 
which depends on diverse ways in which we hypothesize that processes split between brain-body-
environment. In section 2.4, we attempt ourselves to define a distribution criterion by discussing 
the role of functional dependencies between an agent’s (inner) control system and (outer) 
environmental dynamics (including the body). These dependencies are coupled dynamics that 
emerge from organisms’ evolution and are conceptually required for behaviour modulation (see 
also [Chiel & Beer, 1997]). The method developed in this thesis to address the distribution of 
behavioural mechanisms allows us to investigate in what specific ways the system-with-coupling 
can be robust. More explicitly, distribution is operationally defined in this work based on 
perturbation analyses as the use of environmental and body factors by internal (neural) control to 
determine agents own robust behaviour. However, further questions remain to be answered such 
as: does distribution always happen? If not so, when can we identify such a distribution? Finally, 
how to induce the distribution of behavioural mechanisms in small (artificial) systems to explore 
our hypothesis? In Chapter 2 we discuss possible answers from the perspective of embodied, 
situated, and dynamical agents (Chapter 3), looking for foundations of the distribution of 
mechanisms in literature. 
1.1.3 Robustness and distributed behaviour in Evolutionary Robotics 
One effort to understand how the distribution of behavioural mechanisms works comes from ER 
— a research methodology introduced by Husbands and Harvey (1992) with the aim of evolving 
and analysing dynamical neural networks in agents acting in the environment [Nolfi & Floreano, 
2000] (Chapter 4). In ER and related works in embodied cognitive science, researchers focus on 
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organism-environment interactions to obtain behaviourally fit agents. Traditionally the emphasis 
has been on the emergence of adaptive behaviour and cognitive processes [Clark, 1997][Chiel & 
Beer, 1997][Pfeifer & Scheier, 2001]. Unfortunately, as Ziemke et al. (2004, p. 340) note, the 
explicit investigation of cognitive processes distributed over organism and environment 
(distributed cognition) has received less attention. Distributed cognition implies cognition as 
‘smeared across’ material environment and the dynamics of the whole coupled system that an 
agent uses to achieve behaviour [Hutchins, 1995] (see also [Clark, 2008]).  
Because the aim of ER is the production of existence proofs [Harvey et al., 2005, p. 84], it 
seems appropriate to use this methodology for studying the relation between the emergence of 
robust behaviour and distributed mechanisms. By requiring fewer assumptions than most other 
synthetic approaches [Izquierdo, 2008], ER also has the potential to address experimental 
discussions by understanding in dynamical terms the capacity for behavioural robustness that 
emerges at coupled system level. Even if these exact mechanisms are not observed in the 
biological realm, we will be developing conceptual and practical tools to guide theoreticians in 
the understanding of behavioural robustness in biological systems (see [Silverman & Ikegami, 
2010] for experimental examples and [Weisberg, 2005] for related discussions rooted on 
perturbation analyses). 
1.2 Thesis proposal 
After the above discussions about brain-body-environment dynamics and distributed 
behavioural mechanisms, we now reintroduce the main direction of this work in more detail. 
The purpose of this thesis is to understand how minimal ER models can demonstrate robust 
behaviour. These minimal models are a computational tool to explore the simplest possible 
conditions for obtaining a feature of interest in evolved ER agents [Jakobi, 1998b][Harvey et al., 
2005]. ER experiments allow us to refute or defend our working hypotheses by demonstrating an 
existence proof for behavioural robustness given conditions we have supposed are necessary. In 
this respect, we attempt to introduce as few assumptions as possible about the nature of robust 
behaviour. The issue is that there are not direct studies about behavioural robustness in 
autonomous robotics and ER. This is also noted by Hubert et al. (2009): “Robustness has not 
been the center topic of research in robotics. Many studies mention robustness, but only as a 
property assigned to the system they present rather than as the main object of study. 
Unfortunately, no work has given a complete account of the robustness of their controller 
outside the realm of their own experience” (see also [Silverman & Ikegami, 2010]).  
An agent in our experiments has an embedded brain-like control system (neurocontroller) 
evolving in a body. Agents exploit behavioural opportunities by using dynamically engaged 
features in different scenarios. We study how minimal, embodied, and situated ER agents 
(Chapter 3) sustain behaviours during interactions with the environment over an agent’s 
lifetime. The behavioural control systems evolved are analysed for functional dependencies via 
coupled dynamics, which are required in the production of robust and adaptive behaviours in 
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our experiments. Dynamical systems theory (section 3.2.3) is employed as a mathematical tool 
to discuss how behaviours are exhibited. This and the central concepts for understanding 
robustness of behaviours (behavioural robustness forehand) are defined and explained in 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. Further motivation for each experimental study and some lessons are 
given in section 1.3 and 1.4 alongside a brief description of models, respectively.  
The main contribution of this thesis is the methodological study of behavioural robustness in 
environmentally coupled ER agents, focusing on agents’ distributed behavioural control (see 
section 2.5 for some observations from literature supporting this clain). Following current work 
in the ER field (section 4.1), we use non-linear neuron-like units and define a neural-network 
control system as agents’ nervous system (brain). The network is structurally fixed in all of our 
experiments, but evolves in simulation for a particular body and environmental constraints (e.g. 
the presence of particular objects in the surrounding of agents triggering specific actions). 
Proceeding this way, we try to encourage the emergence of dynamical mechanisms in agent’s 
body-environment systems while demonstrating robust and adaptive behaviour. 
This thesis is exploratory, aimed largely at investigating robustness from a behavioural point 
of view, and our motivations are conceptual as well as practical. Our discussions in the rest of 
this thesis present evidence that behavioural robustness may be better defined in terms of 
coupled system dynamics, rather than only as the product of mechanisms inside agents.  
1.3 Thesis organization 
In order to introduce the reader to the wide scope of robustness research, we begin the thesis 
with an account of robustness as a property demonstrated through coupled dynamics. Figure 1.2 
(based on Figure 1.1-C) shows a schematic representation of the chapters’ organization. Each 
chapter provides details of the motivations, objectives, methods, implications, and consequences 
of the proposed investigation and associated discussions. 
Chapter 2 presents a selection of the most representative works studying robustness from an 
organism-lifetime perspective. The chapter starts with a discussion of what it means when we 
say that biological and artificial agents are ‘robust’. It is expected that by the end of Chapter 2, 
the reader will be able to understand the motivations that guide robustness research in biological 
and bio-inspired contexts. Chapter 2 includes some remarks based on our literature review (state 
of the art) and our distributed account of robustness in section 2.4. However, this chapter does 
not explain the main conceptual frameworks used as the basis of our discussions in experimental 
chapters. That is the goal of the following chapter. 
Chapter 3 discusses some aspects of the main conceptual framework used in this thesis: 
embodied, situated, and dynamical systems. A brief description of distributed cognition is also 
given with emphasis on ER field. Several examples of related work from the literature are 
introduced.  
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Figure 1.2 – Schematic representation of the chapters’ organization in this thesis to study the emergence 
of robust behaviours in embodied, situated, and dynamical agents. [A] Black dots represent the place 
where the experimental study applies analysing certain aspects of the coupled dynamical system. In 
general, experimental chapters discus the dynamical interactions between nervous system (NS) through 
an associated neural network (NN), the body of an agent, and the environment We analyse the system as 
different dynamical loops that contribute to robust behaviour despite internal malfunctions and external 
perturbations (thick arrows). [B] Plot relating descriptions of the implemented model-agent in each 
experimental chapter (outer labels) and dependencies of agents to brain-body environmental factors 
(intermediate labels). Inner labels specify induced dynamics or structural features at neurocontroller 
level. Plot [B] also represents the transition that this thesis wants to highlight from robustness promoted 
by the internal structure of agents to a dynamical phenomenon involving inner controls, body, and 
environment. 
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Chapter 4 explains the main features of ER for evolving minimal models. A brief account of 
genetic algorithms and neural networks are also presented. This chapter serves to introduce 
experimental methodologies across the ER field.  
The following chapters show results from four experimental scenarios analysing the 
behaviour of sets of agents and the best-evolved ones using dynamical systems theory (section 
3.2.3). In most of the experiments, we discuss the ability of agents to maintain or flexibly switch 
between behaviours that a particular task requires. Most of the experimental evidence has been 
published in international journals and conference proceedings, or is under review (see Preface 
of this thesis). These articles are similar to associated experimental chapters but reduced in 
content.  
Chapter 5 gives an initial discussion as to what agents develop robustness ‘against.’ Using an 
evolutionary search of parameter space [Jakobi, 1998b], this chapter proposes that the presence 
of certain level of noise in the activities of neurons (neurocontroller level) leads to further 
behavioural robustness during agents’ lifetimes. Results are compared in a goal seeking 
(phototaxis) task between high noise, medium, low and noiseless situations. Behavioural 
analyses show that robustness emerges from coupled brain, body, and environment interactions 
via evolution in best-evolved agents. In dynamical terms, results also suggest that behaviourally 
robust agents require internal dynamics that are resistant to non-functional bifurcation under 
neural noise perturbations. The discussion emphasizes the role of dynamical engagement in 
combination with internal-control dynamics in the production of robust behaviours. Chapter 5 is 
based on work published in [Fernandez-Leon & Di Paolo, 2007, 2008]. 
Chapter 6 proposes experiments that help to understand both ‘in which way’ agents use their 
situated condition to exhibit expected behaviours, and ‘how’ perturbations affect the production of 
a minimal cognitive task (categorical perception). We evolve agents that demonstrate basic 
internal dynamics, namely mono- and bistability [Strogatz, 1994], when they do not receive 
stimuli from the environment. More explicitly, the proposed analyses show that studied 
neurocontrollers are globally stable around one fix-point (monostable) or reveal the presence of 
two fixed-point attractors (bistable) within the intrinsic dynamics of analysed successful agents. 
The model requires that agents, despite their limited internal dynamics (one or two internal states), 
exploit opportunities from brain, body, and environment to accomplish the task. We observe a 
slight but significant tendency toward better task performance in the presence of sensorimotor, 
structural, and mutational perturbations in monostable agents. This is made in comparison to 
bistable agents with less environmental dependence. Chapter 6 emphasizes the role of agent 
situatedness in the production of robust behaviours contrasting the intuitive feeling that an agent 
with more internal states would be more ‘sophisticated’ and more adaptive than a dynamically 
simpler agent. More sophisticated in the sense that a bistable agent could exhibit different 
behaviours and it could ‘switch’ between internal states due to the effects of perturbations and 
external changes. 
Previous chapters research on the use of model features, internal agent dynamics, and 
situatedness for the exhibition of robust behaviours. In Chapter 7 we investigate the role of 
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agent experiences in shaping or tuning the sensory mechanisms used to generate behaviour. The 
emergence of dynamical engagements for a one-legged walking task is investigated in the 
presence of high and medium noise perturbations, and a noiseless situation. The tuning of 
incoming signals is implemented through the evolution of ‘sensory offsets’ (further explained in 
Chapter 7). Results indicate a positive relation between robust behaviour in more complex 
environments in the face of sensory noise and the capacity of agents to fine-tune signals via 
multiple sensory offsets. However, having multiple sensory offsets is not always beneficial for 
behavioural robustness; it depends on the complexity of incoming signals: the more complex the 
incoming sensing is, the more convenient the use of multiple sensory offsets is for one-leg 
walking behaviour. 
Chapter 8 explores the role of an agent’s history of interactions with the environment in 
generating robust behaviour. When using a model that is primarily governed by the history of 
agent-environment interactions (mobile object-tracking task), we show that not all types of 
dynamical dependence between brain, body, and environment lead to behavioural robustness. 
Analyses indicate that perturbations of behavioural mechanisms can be (i) detrimental, if they 
are mostly grounded on factors that are necessary for the behaviour, or (ii) beneficial, if they are 
mainly based on factors that are sufficient for the behaviour. Examples of these factors are 
detailed in section 8.3.3.  
The thesis concludes in Chapter 9 suggesting that the ability of environmentally coupled 
agents to behave robustly can be seen as rooted in distributed control mechanisms based on 
coupled functional dependencies of the nervous system (brain), body, and environmental 
dynamics, and cannot be solely attributed to mechanisms in an agent’s internal environment 
(i.e. agent neurocontroller). 
1.4 Summary of contributions 
This section summarises the main achievements of this work (see also section 2.5 for further 
remarks in relation to our literature review). This thesis demonstrates that adding a certain level of 
noise to neural activities increases the chances that evolutionary search will find robust agents; i.e. 
behavioural robustness to most neural and sensorimotor perturbations in the face of noisy signals. 
We show that neural networks with noisy neurons can be evolved to control agents that robustly 
perform an expected task (goal approaching). Agents with these controllers use dynamical 
coupling to achieve robust behaviour. Results suggest that evolution implicitly selects neural 
systems that are noise-resistant during coupling behaviour by concentrating search in regions of 
the state landscape far from non-functional bifurcations. That is, the effects of perturbations at 
neurocontroller level do not seriously affect the production of behaviours because 
neurocontroller’s dynamics remain most of the time functional allowing the agent still to perform 
goal approaching by using its environmental coupling. We provide an asymptotic explanation for 
how fitness is maintained high despite neural noise, where those controllers evolved with enough 
noise undergo fewer long-term dysfunctional bifurcations because of noise.  
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This thesis proposes that it is not appropriate to assume a capacity for behavioural robustness 
derived from the internal dynamical limitations of situated agents. We provide two examples of 
dynamically limited neurocontrollers (i.e. having one or two internal states) in order to support 
this claim. Agents with these controllers exhibit minimally cognitive behaviours that demand 
some state by exploiting their inner dynamics coupled with one of two different types of objects in 
the environment. We provide analysis where agents showing further cognitive-behavioural 
dependency to their environments obtain a small but significant tendency toward better fitness 
under most sensorimotor, structural, and mutational perturbations. This observation again 
reinforces the idea that behavioural robustness cannot be deduced directly from internal structure 
itself, a common belief in literature; rather it must be observed in the context of coupled dynamics 
arising from the brain-body-environment.  
This thesis shows that agents with the capacity to make their own stimuli (i.e. finding their own 
‘reference’ in how to process body signals based on agent-environment history of interactions) do 
not necessarily develop fully internal control in a task that requires repetitive body movements in 
the environment. We show that behavioural control can also emerge from periodic sensory stimuli 
from agent bodies. Furthermore, after bifurcation analyses, we realize that the coupled dynamics 
allow neurocontrollers to work far from non-functional bifurcations (i.e. no walking behaviour). 
This behavioural control emerges as a combination between neurocontroller attractor landscape, 
body, and environment couplings. 
Finally, this thesis experimentally demonstrates that successfully evolved agents can use a 
combination of both internal dynamics and their history of interaction with the environment to 
exhibit robust, yet adaptive coupled behaviour. We show that successfully evolved agents can 
emerge with at least two different modes of exhibiting behaviour, one in which inner controls 
necessarily depend on a set of specific environmental factors (i.e. the presence of a responsive 
agent), and another for which these factors are equally sufficient for behaviours (i.e. a responsive 
‘or’ non-responsive agent). We show that the first mode is more vulnerable to perturbations on 
that set, suggesting that robust agents will exploit behavioural opportunities rooted in external 
factors when available. We provide another concrete example of how behavioural robustness is a 
capacity of the coupled agent-environment system, rather than warranted exclusively by agents’ 
internal mechanisms. 
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“It should be noted that from now on 'the system' means not the nervous 
system but the whole complex of the organism and the environment. Thus, if 
it should be shown that 'the system' has some property, it must not be 
assumed that this property is attributed to the nervous system: it belongs to 
the whole; and detailed examination may be necessary to ascertain the 
contributions of the separate parts.” 
 
W. Ross Ashby, 1960 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is a comprehensive overview of the motivation of our study mainly from a systems 
biology perspective. It divides into two main parts: a survey of the state of art on robustness (from 
section 2.1 to section 2.3) and our relatively novel approach to robustness research (section 2.4). 
We contextualize current studies as background for understanding systemic robustness with the 
focus on essential aspects of such phenomenon in biological systems. Our survey shows that most 
of previous approaches examine isolated parts of an organism in order to explain robust traits, 
rather than promoting a holistic understanding, an emerging tendency in current systems biology 
[Kitano, 2002]. This chapter emphasizes instead on the coupled dynamical nature of robustness 
and extracts from prior work the arguments that support it. Work here also introduces discussions 
from two different perspectives: robustness during organism evolution and robustness over 
organism lifetime. We mainly focus this chapter on the latter idea, however.  
We begin with a summary of attempts to address robustness from systems biology with 
emphasis in neurosciences. An initial mapping of the basic concepts of robustness into the 
language of dynamical systems is introduced and associated literature underpinning this work is 
described (from section 2.1 to section 2.3). In section 2.4 we introduce our definition of robustness 
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in order to use the term consistently throughout. Section 2.4.1 describes our approach to 
understand behavioural robustness and provides some focused discussion around open questions. 
We remark on important points in this chapter in section 2.5 and section 2.6. These foundations 
are given below. 
2.1 Approaches to robustness 
Understanding the origin of some behavioural properties such as robustness and adaptivity in 
biological organisms is a delicate task [Ashby, 1960, 1958b]. It is relatively easy to produce 
simple artificial organisms exhibiting particular behaviour, but identifying similar processes in 
living organisms is not generally trivial, as been observed with cognitive processes [Beer, 2000, 
2004a, 2004b, 2008]. In fact, Di Paolo’s (2009) discussion implies that cognition is a relational 
phenomenon of brain, body, and environment, and thereby is not localizable (see [Ashby, 1960, p. 
70]). Another difficulty arises in that the number of concurrent behavioural processes in most 
biological organisms is usually considerably higher than those in artificial systems. For instance, 
complex visual sensory information and body signals from different organs in a mammal are 
combined to produce motion movements; whereas in artificial agents simple configurations like 
sensor-motor connections can show similar behaviours as discussed in [Braitemberg, 1986].  
The problem of how biological organisms exhibit normal behaviours in the presence of 
perturbations has much room for new ideas. Von Neumann (1956) noted the complexity of such a 
problem by opening debates on ‘the synthesis of reliable organisms from unreliable components’. 
Reliability in this context refers to the ability of artificial or biological organisms to maintain its 
capacities (functionalities) in normal situation, as well as under unexpected internal or external 
factors (see [Ashby, 1960] and [Stebbing, 2009]). Factors like these generally are referred in 
literature as ‘perturbations’ to systems’ functionalities [Kitano, 2004a]. Since that time, questions 
have been raised about how biological organisms and comparable artificial agents (like mobile 
robots) can deal with component failures in robust ways.  
Discussions about the nature of robustness have largely focused on stability [Jen, 2003] and 
robust design [Jen, 2005]. For example, since Harry Nyquist (1932) provided the first two 
measures of robustness (gain margin and phase margin), while working at Bell Telephone 
Laboratories, robustness has been an increasing topic of interest also from an artificial viewpoint 
[Cogan, 2006]. In closed-loop control systems [Healey, 1975], phase margin indicates relative 
stability − the tendency to oscillate during damped response to an input change. Gain margin 
refers to absolute stability and the degree to which the system will oscillate without limit given 
any disturbance [Horowitz & Hill, 1989]. Von Neumann (1951, 1956, 1966) in addition started 
discussions about robustness, among other issues, related to the problem of self-replicating 
systems. His notion of ‘one robot building another robot’ is known as the von Neumann’s 
kinematic model of self-reproduction. As he developed this design, von Neumann came to realize 
the difficulty of modelling realistic robots. However, his idea of a universal constructor has never 
been subject to physical implementation [Friedman, 1996] because the fragility of the modelled 
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mechanisms against unavoidable perturbations was drastic in more natural kinematic settings: 
“[A] universal constructor should be robust per se, […]. Thus, the system should be able to deal 
with more or less continuous physical entities that inevitably involve fluctuations and uncertainty. 
In such settings, the system itself is responsible for the robustness of its workings.” [Sayama, 
1996, p. 2]. This example illustrates the interest in the study of robustness in robots from an 
internal-mechanism-based standpoint. 
Biological organisms and robots are similar in that they both may be placed under conditions 
requiring robust behaviours. The main difference between these types of systems is that in the 
former case designers impose internal and external requirements that robots must obey (e.g. the 
generation of moving home actions when the level of robots’ batteries are low). Organisms instead 
are guided mostly by what their metabolism dictates (in [Boden, 1999] it is discussed this last 
point further). Metabolic (internal) requirements usually help to contextualize the emergence of 
actions in the environment that biological organisms exhibit to remain themselves alive. 
Homeostasis, as an example of an internal requirement in biological organisms, indicates a 
specific way that an inner state can vary, but the state in the end remains relatively constant and 
must be maintained. Cannon (1939) proposed the concept of homeostasis as organisms’ self-
regulating mechanisms that enable the organism to preserve essential physiological variables (e.g., 
body temperature) in a state of dynamic balance. Note, on the other hand, that homeostasis only 
maintains a physiological state and not necessarily full systemic functionality [Kitano, 2004a]. 
The continuation of organism functionality implies an active and flexible control in the presence 
of perturbations [Kitano, 2004a, 2007]. Despite current insights on this matter, it is still under 
debate how to approach to robustness from an artificial context and in the natural realm (see 
[Hubert et al., 2009] and [Silverman & Ikegami, 2010] for a bio-inspired perspective, and 
[Weisberg, 2005] from a perturbation analysis approach).  
Section 2.1.2 discusses how to research on robustness with some detail after we introduce a 
clarification about ‘what a system is’ in the next section. 
2.1.1 A brief explanation of the notion of system 
Different, but connected definitions of ‘system’ appear in General Systems Theory [von 
Bertalanffy, 1968] and Cybernetics [Ashby, 1956]. To exemplify, a system is: 
“[…] a set of interacting or interdependent parts forming an integrated whole” [von 
Bertalanffy, 1968]. 
“[...] any set of variables that (the observer or experimenter) selects from those 
available on the real machine” [Ashby, 1960, p. 16].  
The last definition suggests an important feature of ‘what a system is’, where it emphasizes the 
role of the observer or experimenter, who is supposed to select the variables and whose 
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intervention implies that any system is a mere abstraction. Despite differences in definitions, 
systems in general share some common characteristics [von Bertalanffy, 1968], including:  
• systems have structure, defined by parts and their composition;  
• systems exhibit behaviour, which involves inputs, processing, and outputs of 
information; 
• systems have interconnectivity, where the various parts have functional as well as 
structural relationships between each other. 
In the context that we want to focus this thesis (i.e. the interaction of an organism or agent with 
the environment), we can ask whether it is reasonable to assume than the environment is part of 
the system under study, or if it represents another part that only influences the organism’s 
decisions as a system (Figure 2.1). If one assumes the environment as the entire universe minus 
the agent, we presume that the system under study is the organism, ignoring the rest [Beer, 1997]. 
For example, as Beer (1997, p. 264) exemplifies: “[…] out of the blue, a door could suddenly 
open, and a complete stranger could walk into the door. Therefore, for purists, we can extend our 
model of the environment as a dynamical system with additional time varying inputs that model 
this nonlawful behaviour.” His example suggests that focusing on agents’ internal structures (as a 
system) does not necessarily involve the outside environment (i.e. the dynamics that affect agent 
local environment).  
 
 
Agent
(agent’s inner structure)
Environment
(agent’s surrounding)
Boundary
(agent’s body)
Agent system
(agent’s inner structure)
Environment system
(agent’s surrounding)
Body system
(agent’s body)
system-environment perspective agent-environment system perspective
system system
 
[A]                                           [B] 
Figure 2.1 – Schematic representation of a closed system and its boundary. [A] The agent-based 
idealization of a system, and [B] the agent-environment system perspective. Dotted-line squares 
represent two different notions of system, which this work uses to address discussions. The [B] approach 
is mainly concerned with this thesis. Plots based on interpretations from [Beer, 1997], [Chiel & Beer, 
1997], and [von Bertalanffy, 1968]. 
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The internal structure of an agent, its body, and its environment can be a rich, complicated, 
highly structured coupled dynamical system, and behaviour emerges from the interactions of all 
three systems [Beer, 1997] (Figure 2.1-B). This understanding of ‘brain-body-environment 
system’ certainly makes dynamical analysis complete, yet more complicated because the agent-
environment coupling is non-autonomous. In this thesis, we follow Beer’s philosophy defining a 
system under study as agent and environment (agent-environment system), discriminating inner-
system when necessary to refer to agent internal features (Figure 2.1). 
2.1.2 Systemic robustness: how to approach it? 
Definitions of robustness have been a primary topic of discussion in biological and engineering 
fields (see [Jen, 2003], [Calcott, 2010], and [Lesne, 2008] for related discussions). In a metabolic 
context, the concept of robustness is associated with limited phenotypic variation across large 
changes in kinetic parameters [Hurst & Randerson, 2000][Westerhoff et al., 1984]. In cell biology, 
robustness is used in one sense to describe cell fate decisions remaining constant while 
transcription regulation is stochastic [Kepler & Elston, 2001]. These examples hardly connect 
each other. Krakauer (2005, p. 186) also proposes that: 
“Robustness relates to two critical properties of complex biosystems: the long-term 
limits to evolutionary change and the short-term persistence of system function. Put 
differently, robustness mechanisms are one of the bridges connecting the dynamics 
of ontogeny with the dynamics of phylogeny by limiting phenotypic variation and 
also providing some means of exploring alternative genotypes without 
compromising the phenotype.”  
Despite the context dependence of his observation, Krakauer (2005) suggests an important 
distinction that we wish to emphasize in this section: genotypic and environmental (lifetime) 
robustness. In the former, perturbations (e.g. gene mutations) are inherited [de Visser et al., 2003], 
whereas in the latter case (e.g. environmental change) they are not [Hagen & Hammerstein, 2005]. 
In particular, environmental robustness (i.e. the maintenance of functionality despite perturbations 
from the environment) can be achieved through mechanisms that emerge from organisms’ 
evolution acting over agent lifetime. An example is phenotypic plasticity [Krakauer, 2005] — 
ability of an organism to change its phenotype in response to changes in the environment [Price et 
al., 2003]. Robustness therefore can be defined in terms of interactions between an organism and 
its environment.  
Krakauer and Plotkin (2005) have also described three principles though which we can 
understand the evolutionary response to mutations in robust systems: the principle of canalization, 
the principle of neutrality, and the principle of redundancy. They extend the discrimination of 
principles to include feedback, modularity, spatial compartmentalization, distributed processing, 
and the extended phenotype. Other authors further consider degeneracy [Fernandez & Solé, 2004] 
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and distributed robustness [Wagner, 2005] as promoters of robustness. For an extensive 
discussion of genotypic robustness based on evolution see [Wagner, 2007] and for further 
descriptions of robust principles see [Krakauer, 2005] and [Kitano, 2004a]. Our brief account of 
principles and structural properties of robust systems at organism level suggests an intrinsic value 
to exploring and understanding biological features: it will provide insights into overall rules that 
both simple and highly complex (evolvable) systems follow [Kitano, 2002].  
Scientific fields like systems biology ground research on mathematical simulation of biological 
systems to clarify some complex aspects and hypothesized foundations of robust systems. From a 
biological context, the systems biology approach integrates well with adaptive systems theory, 
since the former is an inter-disciplinary study that focuses on holistic interactions, as opposed to 
reductionism. According to Kitano (2007), the exploration and the study of particular systems 
through theoretical and mathematical models have the potential to define general properties of 
biological robustness. Such an approach also has an impact on the design of artificial systems with 
robust properties. In this respect, again, the study of specific instances of dynamical systems 
shaped by structural, environmental, and evolutionary constraints can help us to discover the 
conceptual basis of robustness (see [Alon, 2006] and [Kitano, 2004b] for examples of studies in 
the systems biology field).  
Summarising the above perspectives, most researchers in robustness accept a phenomenological 
taxonomy of internal and structural features observed in natural organisms that support robust 
organization (e.g. redundancy, feedback, modularity, spatial compartmentalization, distributed 
processing, control systems, decoupling, and the extended phenotype). A new tendency in 
robustness research aims to uncover mechanisms promoting the persistence of functionality, both 
from an organism-based point of view. Case studies in literature normally illustrate the ubiquity of 
specialized robustness mechanisms in biological systems. However, robustness as a concept 
makes sense in each context only if we precisely define and localize the phenomenon under study. 
The following section focuses with some detail on the differentiation of robustness (genotypic and 
non-genotypic) that we have introduced in this sections. 
2.1.3 Genetic vs. non-genetic mechanisms for robustness 
We can use different approaches to understand robustness in one particular system. For example, 
one approach can be emphasized dividing a system into parts, guiding division on functional 
requirements (what a system is supposed to do). A division based on non-functional requirements 
might define, by contrast, how a system is supposed to be. To exemplify, the second perspective 
can approach the phenomenon of robustness by understanding the statistical effects of genes in 
fitness and the role of genes during organism lifetime. Both the division by functional and non-
functional criterion provides important perspectives that usually complete each other in the study 
of exhibited robust traits [Wagner, 2007][Krakauer, 2005] (see also [Hansen, 2006]). However, 
the common point shared by both approaches is that mostly the study of lifetime robustness 
addresses a number of interesting and important properties of biological systems that are widely 
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recognized as robust [Kitano, 2006, p. 133] (e.g. behavioural robustness during organism 
lifetime). 
[A]  
[B]  
Figure 2.2 – Schematic representation of a landscape characterised by peaks of high fitness (z-axis) but 
low robustness, and other ones of low fitness with high neutrality (robustness) The x and y axes represent 
sequence space. The coloured dark grey surface is the fitness plane. Black dots stand for solutions in the 
fitness surface. Plots show [A] the control case and [B] the situation after increasing in mutation rate on 
solutions (e.g. genotypes). Plots arbitrarily represent the size and shape of the dark grey fitness surfaces 
and are presented solely for illustration. Figures adapted from [Burch & Chao, 2000].  
Most of this thesis focuses on lifetime robustness concentrating on the whole organism-
environment dynamics, rather than focusing on functional divisions of isolated parts and their 
dynamics. This decision avoids drawbacks of studying robustness at the evolutionary level, since 
during evolution the coupled interactions of agents with their environments are difficult to 
explore. Let us to exemplify this point by giving an example from the genetic context: suppose 
that we have found two different control strategies after evolution in two different organisms 
(phenotypes) from the same population. We discover that both phenotypes show quantitatively 
similar fitness under the same experimental circumstance. After inducing mutational changes 
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(variations in their genes), we measure a decrease in fitness in one of them, which indicates less 
resilience to these variations. The way that the negatively affected phenotype behaves suggests a 
decrease in fitness in response to the same amount of mutation than the phenotype exhibiting no 
decay in fitness. Following Burch and Chao (2000) arguments, we can indicate that such 
differentiation in fitness is caused by variations in where the mutated phenotype is placed in the 
multidimensional fitness landscape. The phenotypes showing decay in performance after inducing 
mutation are in fitness peaks (Figure 2.2). The phenotype showing no decay of fitness will be in a 
flatter region of the fitness surface with relatively equal fitness to its non-mutated genotypic 
expression. A phenotypic expression of the non-affected genotype therefore is more robust with 
respect to induced mutations than the another phenotype because a mutational change will not 
produce significant changes in fitness [Wilke et al., 2001][Elena & Sanjuán, 2003](see also 
[Wilke & Adami, 2003]). Our example shows an implicit association between the emergence of 
robustness during the evolutionary phase and robustness during lifetime based on fitness. In fact, 
“Robustness is the fundamental organising principle of evolving dynamic systems 
such as biological systems. One could say that robustness allows evolution to 
happen and that evolution favours robustness.” [Cogan, 2006, p. 20] (from a 
general biological context). 
“Dating back to at least Waddington, it has been suggested that mutational 
robustness may be related to the requirement to withstand environmental or 
stochastic perturbations. […] This means that selection during evolution for 
environmental or stochastic robustness (also referred to as canalization) may 
frequently have the side effect of increasing genetic robustness. A dynamic 
environment may therefore promote the evolution of phenotypic complexity […].” 
[Lehner, 2010] (from a molecular biology context). 
Although the study of robustness during evolution is insightful in many respects, the goal of this 
thesis is to discover mechanisms for behavioural robustness that emerge from evolutionary 
processes by means of Darwinian selection and are exhibited during agent lifetime, rather than in 
evolutionary aspects of agents with robust capacities. 
2.2 Maintenance of lifetime functionality in systems 
It is well known that biological organisms use adaptive actions as a way to maintain functionality 
after component failures. Adaptivity is frequently attributed to the capacity of an organism to 
regulate itself within the boundaries of its own internally defined properties [Di Paolo, 2005, p. 
429]. In this respect, not only internal adaptation can take place, but also adaptive behaviour. 
Ashby gives a mechanistic definition: “behaviour is adaptive if it maintains the essential variables 
within physiological limits” [Ashby, 1960, p. 58] (see also [Umpleby, 2009]). This capacity is 
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commonly discussed in the context of the nervous system co-developing with body and the 
dynamics of the environment [Chiel & Beer, 1997][Gallagher, 2005].  
The established theory of adaptive systems tells us that biological organisms typically (but not 
exclusively) reorganize their components and in doing so remain functional to perturbations 
[Ashby, 1940, 1960]. We extend this observation further in Chapter 3. Kitano also indicates the 
importance of studying the dynamics of agent-internal-systems and properties in order to 
understand biological systems in presence of perturbations: 
“To understand biology at the system level, we must examine the structure and 
dynamics of cellular and organismal function, rather than the characteristics of 
isolated parts of a cell or organism. Properties of systems, such as robustness, 
emerge as central issues, and understanding these properties may have an impact 
on the future of medicine. […]” [Kitano, 2002, p. 1692]. 
Failures of adaptivity can produce inconveniences such as the exhaustion of adaptive resources, 
malfunction of regulation, loss of adaptive buffering provoking the activation of extreme 
regulation, and disharmonious activation of conflicting adaptive mechanisms [Di Paolo, 2005]. 
Failures can result from internal malfunctions or by externally induced perturbations. 
Malfunctions occur, for example, when sensory systems in a biological organism do not work 
properly due to aging, or when an organism is acting in situations that it is not ‘habituated’ to deal 
with. The phenomenon of habituation is regularly discussed in animal behaviour: “if an animal is 
subjected to repeated stimuli, the response evoked tends to diminish. The change has been 
considered by some of the simplest form of learning” [Ashby, 1960, p. 189]. What Ashby’s 
observation suggests is that perturbations are relative to organism knowledge. 
In terms of dynamic systems theory (section 3.2.3), a major factor underlying an intuitive 
notion of robustness is structural stability. “A dynamical system is said to be structurally stable if 
small perturbations to the system result in a new dynamical system with qualitatively the same 
dynamics” [Jen, 2003, p. 2]. Small perturbations can be seen in this context as external parameters 
of the system. Given a system, a variable not included in it is a parameter, where the word 
‘variable’ is reserved for a factor modelled within the system [Ashby, 1960, p. 71]. To give an 
example: assuming that the flow of water in a river only externally depends on a wind speed, the 
flow is structurally stable to wind speed variations if small changes in wind speed do not 
qualitatively modify the dynamics of the flow by producing a new structure such as an eddy [Jen, 
2003][Diacu & Holmes, 1996]. In non-biological adaptive systems like a river, this example 
shows us that there are different responses of a system, which depend on the magnitude of 
changes of external dependencies.  
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Figure 2.3 – Illustration of environmental influences and the effect of perturbations on inner dynamics. In 
[A], two environments are shown (rich and minimal mediums). The agent-internal-system selects cues 
available in the environment (via the body sensing) and responds with actions in the environment. Cues 
are information inputs to inner-control and are deemed essential to accomplish actions. NN represents a 
neural network. Plot adapted and extended from [Freilich et al., 2010]. In [B], this plot represents that a 
current state of an internal control can be modified by small or big perturbations pushing the agent-
internal dynamics within the current boundary of attraction or far from it. Perturbations may produce a 
dynamical return to pre-perturbation state, dynamical changes toward different steady states, or push 
current dynamics toward an unstable region (from which the dynamics will eventually return if possible). 
When an organism with such dynamics remains functional despite perturbations, the changes of regions 
can be part of the robust response needed to reach stability. Plot adapted from [Kitano, 2004a, 2007]. 
In dynamical systems theory, three common outcomes arise from perturbations in structurally 
stable systems [Kitano, 2007, p. 137] (Figure 2.3):  
1. The system cannot tolerate perturbations and it is no longer functional — in the sense 
that it is not able to sustain the ‘same’ defined functionality; 
2. The system compensates for effects of perturbations and maintains a specific steady 
state; 
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3. The system changes (or it is pushed by perturbations) to another stable region in the 
state space (if any exist) that is also functional. This last outcome commonly implies 
multi-stability to radical changes in the face of perturbations [Ashby, 1960, p. 
209][Anderson, 2002].  
These outcomes indicate that robustness, as a capacity of biological organisms, does not 
necessarily only imply maintenance of a dynamical state (toleration) to malfunctions and internal 
or external perturbations. For instance1, imagine two organisms moving from A to B (two distant 
points in the physical space) while a predator is trying to catch them. The first organism, which 
depends extensively on internal state variables, will typically move in a predictable path for which 
will be cached and killed. A second organism dodges from left to right in response to incoming 
signals based on the movements of the predator, and may be is more likely to survive. It is worth 
noting that during environmental coupling not only can an organism rely on internal control for 
robust behaviour, but also on body features2; for instance, insects such as moths and butterflies can 
fly pseudo-randomly, and thus hinder predation due to wing design and the interaction with the 
environment. This simple example suggests that organisms remain functional by producing 
changes at the internal (i.e. based in flexible sensorimotor control) and environmental level (e.g. 
behavioural escaping movements). Tolerance to perturbations is defined by the organism 
organization and environmental current state [Di Paolo, 2005][Ashby, 1960, p. 61]. 
2.2.1 State dependency in robust systems 
As we introduce in the previous section 2.2, internal and external factors as can be seen as part of 
the mechanisms that triggers the exhibition of behaviours. Figure 2.3 indicates that factors like 
these influence state where an inner-control converges during lifetime. In fact, Kitano (2007, p. 1) 
goes further saying that the cooperative work of components in an internal system such as brain 
and nerves is what enables the maintenance of functional requirements during organism 
interaction with the environment. More specifically, he says that:  
“The coordinated physiological processes which maintain most of the steady states 
in the organism […] involving, as they may, the brain and nerves, […], all working 
cooperatively […].” 
Taking an integrative perspective of agent-environment coupling, we hypothesize a corrective 
tendency of agent-internal-control can be induced by dependency on internal and external events 
which are essential to organisms’ functionalities in some environments but not in others (Figure 
2.3-A) (see also [Freilich et al., 2010]). These dependencies can direct inner-agent’s dynamics to 
                                                     
1 Dr. Inman Harvey suggested this example in a private communication. 
2 Dr. Andrew Philippides indicated this observation. 
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functional states, much the way a finite-state machine conditionally transitions based on input. 
However, even if an organism has evolved to accommodate itself to a set of steady states given 
specific environmental conditions, the organism’s internal system can be driven toward a ‘wrong-
state’ by the effects of unexpected perturbations (Figure 2.3-B). One could then ask: what kind of 
features may be found in simple agent-internal-systems exhibiting a tendency toward correct 
states despite perturbations?  
Rigorous answers to this question are rare in current literature of neuroscience and cognitive 
science fields (see [Beer, 2004a] for discussions in a cognitive context). Whereas an organism’s 
internal dynamics may be the prime mechanism for handling certain types of perturbations, in the 
presence of radical environmental changes biological organisms can also use coupled body-
environment dynamics to mitigate the effect of perturbations. For example, most desert animals 
avoid being out in the sun during the hottest part of the day by looking for refuge, and desert 
mammals, reptiles and amphibians live in burrows to escape the intense desert heat. Rodents also 
plug the entrance of their burrows to keep the hot and dry desert winds out. These examples 
suggest adapted actions and for such the named animals exhibit robust behaviours to sun heat.  
Studies in neuroscience and systems biology generally research organism-centred accounts of 
robustness as we previously discussed (Figure 1.1-A). Again, this partition is not always helpful 
for thinking of systems as ‘highly-interdependent’ because it focuses on one-third of the potential 
behavioural interactions. As an example of this last point (the ‘bad’ approach), neural network 
models have been used to explore how modularity can lead to more efficient task management 
[Calabretta et al. 1998]. Despite recognized robust properties of most modular neural networks to 
noisy data [Arbib, 1995], a considerably high amount of noise still drastically reduces their 
filtering capacity. In fact, internal properties like modularity, decoupling, and redundancy are 
conventionally thought to be necessary for (behavioural) robustness as indicated in Chapter 1. 
Properties like these may be required to support functionality to certain perturbations between 
control systems and body, but they do not in themselves ensure robust traits, as reported in the 
literature (see [Kitano, 2004a, 2007][Krakauer, 2005] for complementary discussions).  
2.2.2 Dynamics enhancing robustness against perturbations 
One of the most influential works in theoretical biology was proposed by Kitano in 2004a, and 
extended in [Kitano, 2007]. He emphasizes the necessity for a conceptual framework to 
understand biological robustness at organism level (see [Wagner, 2007] for a complementary 
approach in terms of evolution). Kitano (2004a) has discussed robustness mostly using tools from 
dynamical system theory indicating that: “robustness is a systemic property of some dynamic 
systems with appropriate functional organizations.” Another example is: 
“[…] system controls, modularity, alternative mechanisms and decoupling serve as 
basic mechanisms to provide robustness to the system, but these mechanisms need 
to be organized into coherent architecture to be effective at the level of the 
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organism. Enhancement of robustness against perturbations […] require[s] proper 
dynamics. Therefore, evolution of organisms can be viewed, at least in one aspect, 
as evolution of control systems.” [Kitano, 2007, p. 835] (from a systems biology 
context). 
Kitano’s conception of internal mechanisms sustaining behaviour necessarily requires external 
stimuli that perturb a current organism’s state. Without a dynamical explanation of the emergence 
of agent-internal-mechanisms, however, it is hard to understand how control emerges at inner-
level (e.g. nervous system) and in relation to body, and environment dynamics. We also believe 
that any interpretation of robustness must be defined in terms of structural features and explained 
using dynamic systems theory. This observation is also supported by the following quotation in 
the sense that a dynamical understanding of robust traits is required: 
“We think that the intersection of the mechanisms responsible for persistent activity 
of single neurons with the activity of a network with local or nonlocal recurrence 
provides robustness against noise and perturbations […].” [Rabinovich et al., 2006, 
p. 1237] (from a neurocientific context). 
Despite efforts to understand the dynamics of biological organisms, their evolution, and their 
resistance to certain perturbations, internal dynamics are still considered as essential for robust 
traits. Quoting Kitano (2007, p. 835), “[…] system control is the prime mechanism for coping 
with environmental perturbations that require proper dynamics.” Once more, the notion of 
distributed mechanisms in the brain-body-environment that exhibit robustness to certain 
perturbations, however, has not been seriously investigated in literature despite its recognized 
importance:  
“Distributed robustness, is […] poorly understood. It emerges from the distributed 
nature of many biological systems, where many (and different) parts contribute to 
system functions.” [Wagner, 2005, p. 176] (from a genetic context). 
“[…] as found in biological systems, we can see that the origins of robustness 
against the failure of a given element are largely associated with a distributed 
mechanism of network organization.” [Macía & Solé, 2008] (from a synthetic cell 
context). 
These claims, while interesting, still view robustness as localized and distributed only intra-
organism in the form of a network organization, rather than distributed in the whole agent-
environment system. The following section further discusses the idea of distributed mechanisms 
with some detail. 
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2.3 Functional distribution, redundancy, and cognitive processes 
Previous sections indicate that the nervous system is often considered the sole generator of 
internal activity relevant to behaviour [Farah, 1994][Kien & Altman, 1995], though sometimes the 
rest of the body may also be relevant [Gallagher, 2005][Clark & Chalmers, 1998]. The idea of 
behavioural mechanisms that distribute across brain-body-environment might be thought as an 
additional protection against changes that threaten crucial biological functions, rather than 
exclusively concentrating on internal mechanisms such as redundant back-ups [Wagner, 
2005][Hunter, 2009][Macía & Solé, 2008].  
The concept of ‘distributed robustness’ is gaining awareness in systems biology. In distributed 
robustness, interactions of multiple parts, each with a different role, can compensate for the effects 
of perturbations (Figure 2.4) [Wagner, 2005][Félix & Wagner, 2008]. Important concepts for such 
compensation are ‘degeneracy’ and ‘redundancy’, taken from the neural context. The former is the 
ability of elements that are structurally different to perform the same function [Tononi et al., 
1999][Edelman & Gally, 2001]. The latter generally implies an agent-internal-system with 
redundant parts producing a robust trait at organism level. Félix and Wagner (2008) also have 
proposed redundancy as one way of favouring the robustness of the system [von Neumann, 
1966][Fernandez & Solé, 2004][Wagner, 2005], but the presence of excessive redundancy may 
increase the effort required.  
redundancy distributed  
Figure 2.4 – Illustration of distributed robustness and redundancy. Plots show a hypothetical organization 
in which an upstream signal from upper white circles is processed by a number of intermediate 
components (dark circles) to a downstream effector (lower white circles). If the relation between 
processes shows distributed robustness (right), it is robust because the flow of information is distributed 
among several alternative components and flow paths, with no two parts performing the same function. 
In contrast, if robustness is achieved through redundancy (left), several components perform the same 
function. Adapted from [Félix & Wagner, 2008]. 
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Further philosophical discussions about the structure and the distributive aspects of robustness 
have appeared. Calcott (2010) reviewed the book of the philosopher Wimsatt (2007) indicating the 
importance of the distributed nature of robustness, but with certain concerns: 
“[…] the structure of robustness still requires much clarification. How, for 
example, might the structure of distributed robustness found in biology relate to the 
structure of robustness for theorems or detection? We can also ask what 
interactions there are between the various roles that these different kinds of 
robustness play. For example, what interactions are there between robust 
phenomena and their detection? This question is relevant to Wimsatt’s work on 
levels of organisation, where the question of robust detection and robust 
phenomena are not well separated. More work needs to be done to clarify this 
relationship.” 
The lack of understanding about distributed robustness is partially attributed to the intrinsic 
complexity of analyses of the information flow in most agent-inner-control in biological 
organisms. In other words, the relation between the flow of information that is distributed among 
several alternative components and the effect of perturbation on such flow is not easy to 
comprehend in terms of their contribution to the maintenance of global functionalities. For 
example, the distributed regulation of artificial and natural neural networks illustrates control as 
neither exclusively centred in any component of the network nor in any particular subset (Figure 
2.4-right). Neural networks working as control systems are therefore highly robust to removal of 
synapses or neurons, despite neurons having different roles [Amit, 1989] (see [Beer, 1995a][Clark 
& Chalmers, 1998][Gallagher, 2005]). The distributed processing is an integrated set of 
functionalities that are performed by multiple, semiautonomous units [McClelland, 1989].  
Another example of functional distribution comes from Krakauer (2005, p. 191): “distributed 
processing, or connectionism, might be assumed to be a combination of modularity and spatial 
compartmentalization, but differs in that a single function is emergent from the collective 
activities of units, and correlated activity is thereby a desired outcome.” His observation suggests 
that one of the benefits of having distributed process in connectionist models is the property of 
degrading gracefully upon removal of individual nodes.  
We investigate other concrete examples in our experimental chapters (from Chapter 5 to 
Chapter 8). The type of robustness in our experiments lies in the distributed nature of behavioural 
control mechanisms based on brain-body-environment coupled dynamics rather than functional 
distributions at ‘brain’ level. From a cognitive perspective, our examples indicate that coupled 
internal dynamics with pertinent environmental processes are resources that agents use to reach 
robustness, where from the agent’s perspective the environment acts as an external source of 
knowledge. This idea is also referred in literature as follows: 
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“An agent’s physical body, the structure of its environment, and its social context 
can play as important a role in the generation of its behavior as its brain. Indeed, in 
a very real sense, cognition can no longer be seen as limited to an agent’s head, but 
can be distributed across a group of agents and artifacts.” [Beer, 2003, p. 209] 
(from a cognitive science context). 
“Robustness is observed whenever there exists a sufficient repertoire of actions to 
counter perturbations (requisite variety, [Ashby, 1958b]) […]). In many complex 
adaptive systems (CAS), the actions of agents that make up the system are entirely 
based on interactions with their local environment, making these two requirements 
for robust behavior interrelated. When robustness is observed in such CAS, we 
generally refer to the system as being self-organized, i.e. stable properties 
spontaneously emerge sans centralized routines for matching actions and 
circumstances.” [Whitacre & Bender, 2009, section 2] (from a complex adaptive 
systems perspective). 
Likewise, neuroscience and cognitive science are beginning to show how behaviour and 
cognition arise in coupled dynamics [Beer, 2004a, 2004b]. Once we recognize the crucial role of 
the environment as part of distributed mechanisms in robust systems, we will understand better 
how to identify and achieve robustness in artificial agents. Discussion around the distribution of 
behavioural mechanism (in particular in minimal systems) is one of the goals of this thesis. This 
necessarily involves identifying and characterising the dynamics needed for behaviours that agent-
environment interactions produce. These structures are an essentially biological phenomenon, 
since biological unities can engage only in interactions that affect their structure and maintaining 
their functionality [Beer, 2004a]. A growing body of research in cognitive science reflects this 
view [Beer, 1995a, 1997, 2000][Chiel & Beer, 1997][Di Paolo & Iizuka, 2008]. Because we are 
interested in dynamics associated with the exhibition, persistence, and modification of behaviours 
in agents, we also focus in this thesis on the idea of distributed robustness and its relation to 
dynamical cognitive mechanisms (section 2.4).  
The next section describes the paradigm we use to contextualize robustness in our own study. 
Our approach differs from much of the work above in that we employ a holistic perspective (rather 
than an agent-internal-centred one) rooted on a situated, embodied, and dynamical systems 
understanding (as we further develop in Chapter 3). 
2.4 A distributed account of robustness 
In this section, we provide a brief background into the systemic approach that we want to promote 
in this work. Section 2.4.1 introduces our definition of robustness to use the term consistently and 
clearly. We discuss some characteristics of distributed behavioural mechanisms in terms of 
functional dependencies at agent-environment system level. Sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 represent part 
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of the novel contribution of this thesis to robustness research as a focused discussion on 
distributed behavioural mechanisms. 
2.4.1 The promoted understanding of robustness 
As we have suggested in previous sections, robustness is a property that allows a system to 
maintain functionality against internal and external perturbations [Kitano, 2007]. Another 
definition of robustness from systems biology is “the ability to maintain performance in the face 
of perturbations and uncertainty” [Stelling et al., 2004]. Because it is important to choose an 
appropriate definition for addressing any problem of interest, in this thesis we propose a slightly 
different paraphrasing of previous definitions:  
“Robustness is a capacity that allows an agent (artificial or biological organism) to 
continue functioning via toleration or adaptation to internal and external 
perturbations, where this capacity is partially determined by an agent-environment 
history of interactions.” 
It is informative then (as the experimental models in this thesis will show) to define robustness as 
a property of an organism (agent) coupled to an environment in the presence of perturbations. 
From a biological standpoint, a perturbation is an alteration of a function required by an organism, 
where perturbations can be induced by internal or external factors. For example, an organism can 
be perturbed by environmental stimuli (e.g. temperature changes and pressure), motor movements 
(e.g. a leg stepping into a hole), and small molecules that affect different biological pathways (e.g. 
drugs and toxins). The conceptual difference that we want to highlight with our definition in 
comparison to other definitions appears in the consideration of:  
(i) those situations in which an agent develops endurance resisting perturbations;  
(ii) situations which an agent has not been previously prepared to tolerate situations that 
were not given during organism evolution.  
We propose this definition of robustness because it enables sensible discussion of (a) that to which 
an agent is robust (e.g. specific perturbations that were presented during evolution), and (b) 
functionality that is maintained despite perturbations by toleration or changes in the dynamics of 
the agent-body-environment (i.e. coupled dynamics). Importantly, our definition also suggests a 
differentiation of pre- and post-perturbation state of an agent-internal-system, which can help us to 
categorize dynamical changes due to perturbations. The proposed definition also agree with the 
possibility of perturbing the inner organism (e.g. a part of the nervous system), a trait (e.g. the 
shape of organism’s body through mutilations), or a capability (e.g. the sensory ability).  
Our definition is also compatible with a measurable notion of behavioural robustness, which we 
call fitness or the evaluation function. Fitness is hard to define strictly across agent-environment 
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systems, but we use it as a ‘relative quantitative measure’ in experimental chapters in this thesis. A 
change in fitness can indicate less robustness with respect to some task that an agent should 
accomplish, or robust performance when the fitness remains within certain bounds. Fitness-based 
measures of robustness are detailed for each experimental scenario in this thesis from Chapter 5 to 
Chapter 8. 
Our definition does not deny the relevance of internal mechanisms promoting (instead of 
ensuring) a high degree of robustness in case of unforeseen environmental or internal changes. In 
this respect, agents having specialized internal controls monitoring the environment to perform 
tasks can often have a fundamental advantage in getting information from the state of the 
environment expediently. Internal control systems in fact remain the most active element when 
understanding behaviours under perturbations in experiments in this thesis.  
This thesis promotes the idea, however, that the maintenance of cognitive actions and 
behaviours under perturbations are deeply permeated by the shape and structure of agent-
environment dynamics (Figure 1.1) as opposed to being solely determined by the agent’s internal 
structure. This relation between robustness and coupled dynamics is rarely discussed in literature 
of theoretical systems biology. There is plenty of work however on what kinds of inner structures 
will tend to be robust. Hence, most of the literature tends to show a one-sided view of the 
problem, laden on the side of the agent dynamics and not so much on the dynamics of the 
coupling. For instance, negative feedback is considered in systems biology as the principal mode 
of control that enables robust response (or robust adaptation) to perturbations as extensively 
sustained for bacterial chemotaxis [Kitano, 2004a]. The consideration of an internal control 
system composed of negative and positive feedback is also supposed to be enough to attain a 
robust dynamic response as observed in a wide range of regulatory networks, including the cell 
cycle, the circadian clock and chemotaxis [Alon et al., 1999][Borisuk & Tyson, 1998]. 
Furthermore, integral feedback — a method of feedback control in which control is proportional 
to the integral of the systems’ output [Kitano, 2004a, p. 828] — is thought to be essential to 
maintain robust adaptation in both E. coli and Bacillus subtilis, despite differences in network 
topologies [Rao et al., 2004]. These examples illustrate once more a non-fully appropriated 
approach for understanding how behavioural robustness emerges in biological systems. If we are 
to take the study of such lifetime robustness seriously, we should carefully scrutinize the 
traditional notion that agent-internal mechanisms in the inner-environment and body ‘ensure’ 
robustness. 
A potential criticism of our perspective is that usually behavioural robustness is considered in 
literature as a set of environmental changes (e.g. some living systems are robust to working in the 
air or under-water). One might think that robustness cannot be defined as a property of a system-
in-interaction. This thesis still claims that robustness is a property of an agent in isolation (e.g. a 
robot is made of metal for which is robust to certain environmental conditions that do not affect 
metals). Nevertheless, robustness is also inherently a property of the coupled agent-environment 
when some functionality is being maintained by the full-coupled system. 
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2.4.2 Approximating distribution via functional-dependence 
In Chapter 1 we suggest that distribution of mechanism is not shorthand for brain-body-
environment coupling. If the functionality is distributed (rather than centralized in the brain), the 
flow of information required to accomplish behaviours is possible between several brain-body-
environment processes. Williams and Beer (2009) also noted this issue saying: 
“A common challenge faced by biological organisms and mobile robots alike is the 
need to adjust motor activity in response to unreliable effectors so as to robustly 
achieve some behavioural goal. When motor actions fail to produce their desired 
consequences […] an agent must adaptively reorganize its behavior to meet the 
changing circumstances and accomplish its objective. Can simple model agents be 
evolved to exhibit this kind of behavioral robustness and flexibility? If so, what 
kinds of control strategies will they employ? […]” (from the ER and minimal 
cognitive contexts). 
Most of the experiments reported in this thesis represent examples of this important feature, where 
evolution devises distributed control strategies in the face of dynamical dependencies to body and 
environment. For example as we will see in Chapter 8, the pattern of locomotion of a one-legged 
agent does not always arise from a centralized gait generator (e.g. CPGs in [Beer, 1995a], [Patla, 
1991], and [Calvitti & Beer, 2000]). Rather, behavioural control can also emerge as strongly 
associated to interactions between leg neural patterns mediated by the network of coordination, 
body feedback as the state of the foot and features of the environment (e.g. the presence or 
absence of certain level of sensory noise).  
The question that arises is under what conditions do distributed mechanisms emerge? As 
Ashby (1960, p. 222) indicated: if for certain reason the flow of information from and to the 
environment is not possible or difficult, communication within the brain mediated by the 
environment can be necessary or advantageous. Furthermore, coupled internal control 
mechanisms also allow an organism to respond quickly and efficiently to individual stimuli and to 
detect novel situations if present in the environment. Whether these internal mechanisms promote 
robustness against perturbations, as we will exemplify in Chapter 5, once more, depends on where 
in the brain-body-environment perturbations take place. We hypothesize that internal control 
cannot be easily ensured under the effects of perturbations in agent’s internal state or in agent’s 
sensory dependencies, for which distributed control across a coupled system may be more 
convenient. Chapter 6 and Chapter 8 explore this idea with some detail.  
It is worth noting with this discussion that we cannot always observe the emergence of 
distributed mechanisms. Therefore, why should we pay attention to such distribution in relation to 
behavioural robustness? The set of possibilities to answer this question includes: 
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(a) Robustness always depends on the agent-environment coupling; 
(b) Robustness sometimes depends on the agent-environment coupling; 
(c) Robustness often depends on the agent-environment coupling; 
(d) For certain kinds of systems, robustness strongly depends on the agent-environment 
coupling; 
(e) Robustness is better understood in the context of agent-environment coupling. 
Analysing with some detail the difference between these claims, we can notice that (e) is slightly 
weaker than other claims because it does not require that agent-environment dynamics are the 
determinants of robustness in all cases. To understand robustness we need in fact to take the 
agent-environment perspective. This can be claimed indeed in conjunction with cases (b), (c), or 
(d). In terms of (a), the dependence of robustness to agent-environment coupling is the strongest 
option, but we believe it is false (this is the premise of the question). This thesis defends (e) but we 
also support claim (b).  
Claims (c) and (d) are a bit more interesting: (c) because it proposes that we can expect in 
general some tendency to observe agent-environment dynamics for robust behaviour, and (d) 
because it prompts us to ask the question, which kind of system tends to rely more on agent-
environment dynamics? However, (c) and (d) claims are difficult to defend based on results 
presented here, because one needs to identify how often behavioural robustness depends on agent-
environment dynamical engagements, or classify types of systems where robustness strongly 
depends on coupling.  
Therefore, again, the claim that this thesis want to promote is (b): robustness sometimes 
depends on the agent-environment coupling. Experiments reported in this thesis also emphasize 
that it is not generally appropriate to suppose that the ability to categorize, recognize, and exhibit 
behaviours in normal situations and under perturbations is intrinsically a matter of agent-internal 
neural processes and only extrinsically related to bodily inputs and dynamics. Specific 
environment-engaging loops and patterns of body dynamics make an essential difference in how 
agents perceive the world and sustain robust behaviours.  
Finally, how can one compare of the distribution of a behavioural control system in relation to 
another system? In this thesis, we base such a comparison on perturbation analysis by analysing 
significant variations in fitness after perturbing elements of our simulated models. For example, in 
Chapter 7 we study the effects of reducing incoming signals (sensory feedback) during tests in 
one-legged agents showing walking behaviour. In this scenario, we explore whether further 
dependence on sensory feedback from an agent’s leg is shown in terms of decay in fitness. The 
particular variables to perturb are selected in this thesis using dynamical systems theory to guide 
such identification.  
Our proposal to study the distribution of behavioural mechanisms is common in computational 
neuroscience (see [Keinan, 2005]). To determine the distribution criteria, this thesis employs 
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robust analysis [Wimsatt, 2005][Silverman & Ikegami, 2010][Calcott, 2010]. This is a useful 
method to account for the distribution of cognitive and behavioural mechanisms in agents by 
allowing investigation in what specific ways the system-in-coupling can be behaviourally robust. 
A contribution analysis can be considered a good method to access the distribution for our 
experimental scenarios because we can objectively account for the effects of induced perturbations 
in the performance of agents measurable in terms of fitness. Our approach defines operationally 
the distribution of behavioural mechanisms based on sets of validation tests (i.e. perturbation 
analyses) to determine the presence of internal-control, body and environmental factors required 
for behaviours. In this way, we use a definition of distribution that relies on operations in order to 
avoid trouble associated with attempting to define this concept in terms of some intrinsic essence 
of our models. This approach is in contrast to ‘operationalization’ (a more intuitive approach) that 
uses theoretical definitions (see [Vandervert, 1988]). 
Another possible alternative to compare systems in terms of distribution is by studying causal 
contributions from computational neuroscience is Granger Causality (G-causality) as described in 
[Seth, 2005] and [Seth & Edelman, 2007]. These works discuss the joint product of network 
structure and the dynamical processes operating on that structure, which may be modulated by 
environment and context. Seth and Edelman show how the same network structure can generate 
different causal networks depending on context. G-causality has been applied to simulated neural 
systems to probe the relationship between neuroanatomy, network dynamics, and behaviour. 
Despite its relevance to neuroscience, this thesis does not apply G-Causality as measure of 
distribution of mechanisms because our interest is in a more traditional approach derived from 
perturbation analysis, comparable to current studies in systemic robustness.  
2.5 Remarks 
This section highlights some of the main points given in this chapter in order to help the reader to 
better understand discussion in the following chapters. 
 
• None of reviewed works claims that the environment plays absolutely no role in 
deciding whether a system is robust or not, and while this chapter promotes the 
relevance of interaction, internal dynamics remain essential elements. The real 
contribution of the thesis is investigating coupled dynamics for behavioural robustness in 
simple models from a computational way, which had not previously been reported (see 
[Hubert et al., 2009] and [Silverman & Ikegami, 2010]). 
• The growing consensus about the importance of brain-body-environment couplings is still 
a minority view in several disciplines. These include cognitive psychology, neuroscience, 
a good part of AI and robotics, and indeed several areas of biology. It is to be expected 
that even for those who agree on the view promoted in this thesis (i.e. the distribution of 
mechanisms promoting behavioural robustness), the full implications of it have not fully 
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been drawn, and this thesis attempts to address the proposed issues as indicated in Chapter 
1. This motivates the thesis for the particular topic of behavioural robustness. 
• Robustness studies have not typically been approached from the point of view of coupled 
dynamics. Robustness is usually attributed to a control system in general, but it may well 
turn out to be a property of a particular agent-internal-control in its environmental 
coupling. Hence, the need to untangle the contributions to robustness from different 
factors (e.g. internal, interactive, and environmental) that this thesis promotes. 
Furthermore, it is also the case that the relation between distributed mechanisms and 
behavioural robustness has not been investigated by means of minimal behavioural 
models (i.e. using the ER methodology). 
2.6 Final comments 
In this chapter, we propose that to comprehend robustness in a variety of fields, one must adopt a 
holistic view of system dynamics. Understanding the structure and dynamical properties of 
isolated components in an agent-internal-system is important if we want to know functional 
aspects of specific components (e.g. neural assemblies producing activities ‘inside the brain’). 
However, to recognize properties of a highly coupled system one must view the system as a 
whole.  
As illustrated by Figure 2.5, identifying all structural and dynamical properties of components 
in an inner-system (i.e. internal-agent environment) without seeing the overall picture is like 
describing all the parts of a house without account for the relation between rooms. While such a 
description provides clarity of the individual components, by itself it may not be sufficient to 
encompass the full dynamics of house functionality. We must also analyse the functional relations 
between rooms in a house, and the network of wires that link the rooms (Figure 2.5). Only in this 
way can we fully understand how the organization of components sustains a house as a system. 
This thesis uses a systemic perspective to investigate robust behaviour, looking for answers to 
questions such as: How are the dynamics of a system organized to sustain behaviours despite 
perturbations? How do internal control systems in a particular model face perturbations that 
were presented (or not) during system evolution?  
This concludes our survey in this chapter of holistic robustness research, motivating the brain-
body-environment, and in-silico dynamical systems approach. The next chapter concentrates on 
related work in artificial systems as opposed to biological. The ER research described in Chapter 4 
introduces the ideas behind creating simulated models to explore robustness in embodied, situated, 
and dynamical agents (Chapter 3). 
Chapter 2. Systemic robustness: concepts and insights from systems biology  34 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5 – A metaphor for cell signalling with the milkman as an external factor in the control of 
internal events. The metaphor illustrates the relations between components of the house-environment 
system and the processes that occur inside the house due to external factors (e.g. the presence of the 
milkman triggering the preparation of food in the kitchen). A deeper look into this figure will reveal that 
concentrating on some of the components (e.g. the kitchen) will not reveal what produced the preparation 
of food, and the related processes running simultaneously in other rooms of the house (e.g. the 
preparation of the bathroom). This simple metaphor shows us the relevance of the holistic understanding 
of processes in a system rather than concentrating on properties of isolated components. Figure from 
[Varmus & Weinberg, 1993, Chapter 6]. 
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“All doing is knowing and all knowing is doing.” 
 
Maturana and Varela, 1992 
 
 
 
 
In Chapter 2 we introduced a growing research trend, mainly in the fields of cognitive science, 
neuroscience, and bio-inspired neuro-robotics to refocus on coupled behaviour between brain, 
body, and environment. Current systems biology recognizes the relevance of distribution of 
robustness across systemic components. However, the role of distribution of mechanisms enabling 
behaviours and robustness has rarely been discussed in the literature of these fields, which so far 
has investigated only localized mechanisms. This chapter presents a brief overview of conceptual 
frameworks used in this thesis to study systemic robustness from an agent-environment coupled 
perspective. We introduce initially the main conceptual framework used in this thesis — situated, 
embodied, and dynamical systems. Part of this chapter also provides an illustrative account of 
dynamical systems theory useful for understanding the following experimental chapters. The 
chapter continues with explanations of some computational studies from the cognitive context. 
This chapter concludes with examples from ER on the distribution of behavioural and cognitive 
mechanisms (the full ER methodology is described in Chapter 4). 
3.1 From behaviours to coupled engagements 
A paper by Brooks (1986) started Behaviour-Based Robotics (BBR), which focuses on the 
construction of robots, architectures for controlling mobile robots, and robots that successfully 
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operate in the noisy, complicated physical world [Brooks, 1989, 1990, 1991a, 1991b, 1991c, 
1992] (see also [Brooks & Flynn, 1989]). Over the years, the idea has been the nucleus of several 
controversial discussions within classical AI [Kirsh, 1991][Brooks, 1997]. BBR proposes implicit 
environmentally linked control, rather than representing the world as propositions logically 
manipulated by ‘a solving-task algorithm’.  
In AI research rooted on logic and problem solving, GOFAI (Good Old-Fashioned Artificial 
Intelligence) [Haugeland, 1985] represents the oldest original approach to achieving intelligence 
in artificial systems. The approach assumes that many aspects of intelligence can be achieved by 
the manipulation of symbols. The position of symbolic AI promoters was that 
‘representationalism’ is the way that minds work in nature. One of the main characteristics of 
GOFAI is ‘functional decomposition’ — the process of resolving a functional relationship into its 
constituent parts in such a way that the original function can be reconstructed from those parts. 
Brooks criticised the use of such decomposition to design robotics control systems because it is 
not clear how such division should be made. Instead, Brooks advocated behavioural 
decomposition.  
Behavioural decomposition dictates that desired behaviours be broken into a series of local 
actions or simple behaviours [Brooks, 1991a]. Each module implementing an action requires an 
‘initiator’ to enact, e.g. the presence of a specific situation in the environment to respond [Brooks, 
1989]. The idea behind this decomposition is to create isolated, low-level behaviours that can be 
first tested on a physical robot. That is, the robot is placed in its operating environment to ensure 
that all the actions work before they are coordinated by the high-level, robotic control system. This 
composition of actions or simple behaviours can create more-complex actions when they are 
properly coordinated to accomplish a complex task (see [Fernandez-Leon, 2006] for an example 
with mobile robots). A key feature of behavioural division is that the representation of the 
environment plays little part in the low-level behavioural design process, but an important one in 
the definition of behaviours. Rather than representing the environment as an ‘internal model’ 
through a set of propositions within the robot’s controller (e.g. the positions of objects in the 
environment and paths to follow), the environment can act as its own model [Brooks, 1991a, p. 
15].  
The lesson that arises from Brooks’ work is that robots have the potential to respond directly to 
an event in their environments, rather than reacting to events via an internal environmental model. 
A complex behaviour (i.e. a behaviour composed of different simple, low-level behaviours), may 
consist of the proper coordination of modules contributing to accomplish a high-level task (see 
[Acosta et al., 2010] for an example of behavioural coordination). For instance, the task of safe 
navigation in unknown environments, where a robot should move from one starting position to 
another one (goal), can be obtained by the combination of reactive goal-approaching and object-
avoiding behaviours implemented as separated behavioural modules [Fernandez-Leon et al., 
2004].  
Considering Ashby’s (1960) and Walter’s (1951, 1953) works from the cybernetics field 
[Ashby, 1956], Brooks raised the idea of engagements grounded on ‘situated’ (section 3.2.1) and 
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‘embodied’ (section 3.2.2) properties of robots. Following those ideas, but using the language of 
dynamical systems theory, Beer (1995a) proposes a general conceptual framework for the 
synthesis and analysis of autonomous agents and their environments. The essence of his proposal 
is that coupled dynamics in brain, body, and environment are in general jointly responsible for 
agent behaviour. In this respect, Pfeifer et al. (2005) indicate: 
“Strictly speaking, behavior is always emergent, as it cannot be reduced to internal 
mechanism only; it is always the result of a system-environment interaction. In this 
sense, emergence is not all-or-nothing phenomenon, but a matter of degree: the 
further removed from the actual behavior the designer commitments are made, the 
more we call the resulting behavior emergent. Systems designed for emergence 
tend to be more adaptive and robust.” 
The following sections briefly describe associated concepts, as well as other definitions used in 
this thesis, with special emphasis on their relations with behavioural robustness. 
3.2 A framework for cognitive research 
Beer (1995a) introduces a framework for studying agent cognition through the so-called situated, 
embodied, and dynamical systems approach. He bases most of this framework on the 
understanding of Ashby’s (1960) together with Maturana and Varela’s (1987) works. This 
methodology largely promotes the use of dynamical systems theory [Strogatz, 1994] to explore 
behavioural system dynamics. It focuses on the adaptive fit between an agent and its environment 
as a satisfaction of a given constraint on the dynamical trajectories of the coupled system. In this 
sense, it follows Ashby, who was one of the first researchers to attempt to understand the 
mechanisms underlying adaptive behaviour using a dynamical systems perspective (see [Ashby, 
1960, p. 130-138]). 
Despite the analytical overtones, Beer’s attempt to comprehend adaptive behaviour mainly 
follows a case-study viewpoint, since “there is nothing like studying birds or trying to build an 
airplane to cut to the heart of the debate about what can and cannot fly” [Beer, 1998, p. 630]. By 
using simple studies of precise mathematical simulations, we can therefore ask more about the 
nature of a research problem [Beer, 2003, p. 239]. This work lends back to the concepts of 
situatedness and embodiment discussed in the next sections. 
3.2.1 Situatedness 
In robotics terms, ‘situatedness’ (or being situated in the environment) means that agents (artificial 
organisms or robots) use spatio-temporal situations in their surroundings directly influence the 
future behaviour of agents [Brooks, 1991d, p. 1227]. In the computational paradigm, robots can be 
seen as agents because they have access to the effects of their environmental actions. This implies 
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that agent behaviour while processing environmental signals depends on where the agent is 
placed, when the agent senses the environment, and what state the environment is in during 
sensing.  
One of the requirements of situatedness is that agents themselves must control the whole 
interaction within the agent’s immediate environment (the set of signals in the environment that an 
agent can sense). This control indicates an agent-centred viewpoint, as opposed to an external 
perspective on the exhibition of behaviours. The agent’s experience of interactions with the 
environment forms part of the control that produces the agent’s actions in the environment 
[Pfeifer, 1996, p. 5].  
Agents are autonomous, in that there is no intervention of robot’s designer in the agent’s 
behavioural processes. In the biological realm, the agent’s immediate environment has ‘meaning’ 
from its own perspective, and can be viewed as perceptual cues (see [Beer, 2008, p. 3][von 
Uexküll, 1957][Ziemke & Sharkey, 2001]). Such meaning is an important part of agent’s 
situatedness because environmental cues enable the initiation, modification, or termination of 
behaviours [Macinnes & Di Paolo, 2006][Macinnes, 2007].  
Situatedness implies two main sources of implicit knowledge available for an agent: the agent’s 
internal state and the state of the environment. An example from the biological realm is supported 
by [Bleeker et al., 2006] in that differences in memory dynamics (internal state) between two 
closely related parasitoid wasp species (Cotesia glomerata, and C. rubecula Hymenoptera: 
Braconidae) can produce different reliable behaviours in response to perturbations as sensory 
noise and changing environments (state of the environment). These species, when searching for 
caterpillar hosts, use host plant odours that are released upon feeding by the caterpillars. This 
example shows us that the situatedness of parasitoid wasp species and behavioural robustness (e.g. 
searching for caterpillar hosts in changing environments) relate.  
We can also further study the relation between cognitive capacities of agents as a process of 
interaction with the environment despite perturbations and the presence of certain environmental 
stimulus that agents use to accomplish behaviours. The cognitive paradigm helps us to better 
understand the behavioural competences of agents in our implemented agents (from Chapter 5 to 
Chapter 8). In these experiments, the cognitive mechanisms of agents is associated with their 
activities in the environment mainly though that which agents can sense. Agents are situated, in 
that they depend on environmental cues for behaving, and not only on internal (autonomous) 
components. In our models, situated agents have the capacity of moving in their surroundings, and 
therefore all agents sensing is co-determined by agent-environment activity. In the simplification, 
this idea may teach us some of the core fundamental issues in cognitive science and adaptive 
behaviours research. Beer (2003) develops a series of simple idealized, embodied, and embedded 
model agents, each of which is capable of minimally cognitive behaviours. He argues that by 
proceeding in this abstract way, experiments are not constrained by the biological understanding 
of a research problem.  
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3.2.2 Embodiment 
Embodiment refers to the physical existence of a robot or organism in the environment having a 
co-related, but essentially different, dynamics from the environment (see [Ziemke, 2001, 2003] for 
a classification of embodiment). Brooks (1991d, p. 1227) has argued for the importance of 
embodiment by encouraging robot designers to test and correct robot behaviour in physical 
scenarios rather than in simulations. According to him, this process of correction must take place 
on a physical robot as well as in a simulated one, because the difficulty of transferring behaviours 
from simulation to reality (see [Jakobi et al., 1995] for a partial solution of this inconvenience). 
Brooks also believes that working with physical robots reveals problems that are complicate to 
model in simulated robots. Going further, Pfeifer (1996, p. 5) has suggested that an agent existing 
only in simulation would not be complete.  
From a cognitive perspective, embodiment associates to situatedness in that the body is the way 
that a robot or an organism interacts with the environment [Pfeifer, 1996]. A body with particular 
perceptual and motor capabilities enables certain kinds of experiences that come from having such 
a body. Preliminary work of Macinnes (2001) discusses the concept of ‘embodied cognition’, 
concentrating on hardware aspects of ER from a simulated-physical world approach. Embodied 
cognition proposes that the nature of the human mind is largely determined by the form of the 
human body, which is promoted by some philosophers, cognitive scientists, and artificial 
intelligence researchers [Wilson, 2002]. A similar concept from the theoretical biology research 
field is ‘enactivism’ [Varela et al., 1991][Maturana & Varela, 1992]. 
In terms of behavioural robustness, the actions of an agent can produce damage to the body due 
to environmental perturbation or internal malfunction. Only the bodies of living organisms and 
robots with special control systems can be repaired by specific mechanisms. For example, glia 
cells (non-neuronal cells) provide support and protection for the brain’s neurons [Azevedo et al., 
2009]. Glia cells have a role in the regulation of repair of neurons after injury. Detection and 
action following injury or severance in the human brain, recruits different components in order to 
rebuild the original body and functionality. 
The relation of the body and behaviours in agents mainly obeys to physical considerations such 
as degrees of freedom of actuators, layout, and characteristics of sensors [Beer, 2008, p. 8]. The 
relation between embodiment and robustness as a property of behaviours however is not 
straightforward. The issue is exemplified by the capacity to tolerate or to adapt to perturbations in 
terms of controlling movements. Collette et al. (2007, 2008) have discussed the human capability 
of keeping dynamical balance during complex task movements. They have investigated the 
difficulty to adapt to these capabilities using humanoid robot movements in terms of control 
posture. In presence of external perturbations, object grasping produced by unilateral contacts of 
an artificial hand can be less effective than bilateral grasp with friction. The latter allows for 
arbitrarily pulling, pushing, or twisting on a handhold better than the former method. Body shape 
(in this case, a hand) plays an important role in hand grasping, where some properties of the hand 
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(e.g. bilateral grasp) permit better grasping despite external perturbations (perturbations on 
pulling, pushing, or twisting on a handhold).  
 
 
B
od
y
En
vi
ro
nm
en
t
N
eu
ra
l s
ys
te
m
motor commands
sensory signals
environmental 
control loop
parameter space
neurocontroller’s
autonomous attractors
B
od
y
En
vi
ro
nm
en
t
N
eu
ra
l s
ys
te
m
 
Figure 3.1 – Sensorimotor loop in an embedded neural network context. This is a general representation 
of an embedded neural network in the body of an agent that is also embedded in the environment. Circles 
represent neuron-like units that create network output signals for body actuators. Grey circles stand for 
sensors or input units providing incoming signals to the neural network. Figure adapted from 
[Wischmann, 2007]. 
Fine et al. (2008) discuss the dynamical importance of embodiment. They investigate the 
dynamical processes used by an evolved, embodied, and simulated agent that adapts to large 
disruptive changes in its sensor morphology whilst maintaining goal approaching (phototaxis) 
behaviour. Fine et al. (2008) argue that adaptive processes of the agent are related to its body 
morphology based on the relationship between different timescales within the agent and the 
environment (e.g. neuron and behavioural timescales). Interestingly, the dynamics of the agent 
controller and different behaviours in Fine et al.’s experiments depend on the agent’s current 
sensor layout and the internal-agent-transient dynamics of coupled dynamical states. In other 
words, there is an important relation between embodiment and dynamical relations, and also with 
variables of the agent’s environment and agent’s ‘brain’. 
The models that we present in our experimental chapters simulate only some aspects of 
embodiment, though all models are situated. Our agents produce motion by processing the 
information received from sensors and applying control actions to actuators (Figure 3.1). In 
particular, Chapter 7 researches embodied agents that can change the way that they receive 
sensory information based on environmental experience. This change is made possible through 
self-induced modifications of agent sensors following Macinnes’s and Di Paolo’s (2006) ideas of 
the evolution of ‘sensory offsets’ (further explained in Chapter 7).  
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3.2.3 Dynamical systems 
Beer and other researchers have opened a broader set of possibilities through dynamical systems 
theory to understand how situated and embodied agents show, maintain, and modify their 
behaviours. Beer (1997, p. 260) proposes that:  
“A situated agent receives a continuous stream of sensations from its environment 
and produces a continuous stream of actions which continuously depend both on its 
sensations as well as its own changing internal state. This suggests that the proper 
way to model an agent is as a dynamical system.” 
The dynamical understanding of behaviours is of particular importance in robustness research. 
Dynamical systems theory helps us to comprehend behavioural robustness in the presence of 
perturbations that modify or ‘break’ normal functioning. From a biological systems context, 
Kitano (2004a, p. 835) also suggests the importance of certain dynamics in mechanisms that 
evolved in an agent’s internal environment to deal with certain perturbations:  
“Enhancement of robustness against perturbations can be made through the 
combination of these [system controls, modularity, alternative mechanisms and 
decoupling] mechanisms, but system control is the prime mechanism for coping 
with environmental perturbations that require proper dynamics.”  
Further works from literature discuss the importance of dynamical interpretations in 
neuroscience and coupled non-linear systems. Using the neuroscientific approach, Rabinovich et 
al. (2008) have focused on agent-internal-dynamics working in transients with robust and 
sensitive properties to external and internal factors (see also [Rabinovich et al., 
2006][Afraimovich et al., 2004][Mazor & Laurent, 2005]). From a discrete dynamical systems 
approach, Demongeot et al. (2008) have researched a method for understanding (agent-internal) 
systems by focusing on basins of attraction when structural changes are induced on regulatory 
networks, influencing the properties of these basins of attraction.  
In the next section, we describe some relevant concepts of dynamical system theory useful to 
understand the dynamical discussion on robust and adaptive behaviour given in the rest of this 
thesis. Because we use experimental models working with continuous-time networks (section 
4.3.1), the explanations of the next section refer to concepts from differential equations and non-
linear system descriptions. In other words, we centre on non-linear dynamics to represent the 
dynamical behaviour of neural systems. For a more rigorous description of dynamical systems 
theory refer to [Strogatz, 1994]. 
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3.2.3.1 Basic concepts of non-linear dynamical systems  
Because of the complexity of non-linear systems’ analyses, we mainly follow a similar 
methodology to Beer (in press) in analysing minimal models using dynamical systems tools. 
These analyses are mainly suited for studying embodied, situated, and dynamical agents, and 
chiefly focuses on variables rather than in parameters of the system. That is, the changes of a 
variable overtime will depend on a subset of all state variables in the system given a set of 
parameters (see [Izquierdo, 2008] for dynamical examples with this approach).  
Some of the primary concepts in dynamical systems theory are as follows. A dynamical system 
is represented by a set of state variables and dynamical laws that govern how the values of 
variables change over time. A dynamical system can be linear (i.e. when state variables changes 
linearly) or non-linear (i.e. when state variables have non-linearity). This classification depends on 
how the dynamical laws act on the system’s state variables. State variables represent by their 
values the position over time of a system in a dynamical space. The state space of the system is 
the set of possible values that state variables can reach following the dynamical law or vector field 
in such space.  
A dynamical trajectory of the system is the sequence of states generated by the action of the 
dynamical law starting from some initial state. The dynamical flow is the set of all dynamical 
trajectories through every point in the state space, where a picture showing all of the qualitatively 
different dynamical trajectories of the system is called a phase-portrait [Strogatz, 1994]. A phase 
portrait is a geometric representation of the trajectories of a dynamical system in the phase plane 
for fixed values of parameters. Each set of initial conditions is represented by a different curve or 
point. Attractor states are sets of points that remain invariant under the dynamical law in the state 
space. Stable attractors have the property that all trajectories passing through all nearby states 
converge to it, where the set of initial states that converge to a given attractor is termed its basin of 
attraction.  
A limit set is the state that a dynamical system reaches after an infinite amount of time has 
passed. Limit sets are important because they can be used to understand the long-term behaviour 
of a dynamical system. Examples of limit sets include stable fixed points (or point attractors), limit 
cycles (or stable orbits), saddle points, and unstable fixed point repellors. A saddle point is a point 
in the domain of a function that is a stationary point but not a local extremun. Equivalently, a 
saddle point is a point in state space having stable and unstable manifolds with a dimension that is 
not zero. Limit cycles and similar dynamics present a particularity, among other reasons, because 
they represent dynamical pattern of a system that oscillate even in the absence of external input 
(see Chapter 7 for some related discussions).  
A point in parameter space stands for a specific combination of all parameter values and thus is 
related to a fixed set of basins of attraction and attractors in the corresponding state space of the 
dynamical system or phase portrait. A bifurcation occurs when a small smooth change made to the 
parameter values of a system (the bifurcation parameters) causes a sudden qualitative or 
topological change in system behaviour [Blanchard et al., 2006]. For experimental analyses in this 
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thesis, parameter space is the space where the axes refer to the parameters of an artificial neural 
network. In the case of a continuous-time recurrent neural network (CTRNN) (further explained 
in section 4.3.1), these will be synaptic weights, time-parameters, biases, etc. A search in this 
space is possible for some optimal combination criteria of parameters (e.g. using artificial 
evolution as explained in section 4.2) for points (or regions) in this parameter space that have high 
fitness (see Figure 2.2).  
When we have a specific evolved neural network working as an internal control system 
embedded in an agent body with specific network parameters fixed, we refer to the phase space. 
We then observe the changing values of activations of each neuron, input values, output values, 
possibly position and orientation values of the agent in its environment. In this space, all possible 
states of a system (or allowed combination of values of the system’s variables) are represented 
with each probable state of the system corresponding to one unique point in the phase space. It is 
worth to note that bifurcations then happen in phase space, rather than in parameter space. Phase 
state from mathematics field is a similar concept than phase space in control engineering, where 
axes are the parameters (see [Strogatz, 1994]). 
In terms of small perturbations, the dynamical systems analysed in our experimental chapters 
are structurally stable. This indicates that small variations in the parameter values will produce 
little changes in the dynamical flow, where limit sets and basins of attraction may slightly deform 
and move, but the new flow will be qualitatively similar to the one before the perturbation 
[Demongeot et al., 2008]. This observation suggests that a system can remain relatively unaltered 
despite small variations in its components and relations regardless of the effects of perturbations 
on the structure of a system (section 1.1.1). Consequently, the looseness involved in determining 
the size of a perturbation is because it is a function of maintenance of the systemic structure. 
Section 2.2 extends this observation concentrating on the concept of ‘structural stability’ in that 
small variations of components (and their relations) can produce non-significant changes in the 
dynamics of a system [Jen, 2003]. The next section introduces other basic concepts of dynamical 
systems theory following explanations in [Strogatz, 1994], [Rabinovich et al., 2008], [Izquierdo, 
2008], and [Kitano, 2004a, 2007], among other works.  
3.2.3.2 Emphasis on internal transient dynamics during coupling 
One of the most interesting phenomena in a neural system is the presence of non-stationary 
behaviour. Attractor dynamics usually implies long-time evolution from initial conditions, but the 
important behavioural activities of neuronal systems cannot be understood by analysing attractor 
dynamics alone; rather we need to see these dynamics when coupled with the environment.  
Transients are the parts of the trajectories that do not lie on attractors, moving toward, between, 
or around point or cyclic attractors in the full state space (see [Strogatz, 1994] for more precise 
definitions). This perspective on internally transient dynamics related to agent-environment 
interactions helps us to understand what is going on ‘inside the brain’ rooted on agent’s body and 
its interaction with the environment. Transient dynamics have also been investigated previously in 
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cognitive processes. For example, Rabinovich et al. (2008) have argued from a computational 
viewpoint of how perception and cognition can be modelled as dynamic patterns of transient 
activity within neural networks. 
As we discussed in this chapter and in Chapter 2, the majority of studies in robustness during 
agent lifetime focus on agent-internal properties rather than on dynamical aspects of the whole 
agent-environment system. In fact, internal systemic dynamics that are also robust to perturbations 
are conventionally thought to be both necessary and sufficient to account for behavioural 
robustness (see [Rabinovich et al., 2006][Afraimovich et al., 2004][Kitano, 2007]). Recent 
theoretical and experimental works in neuroscience have attempted to resolve this dissonance by 
suggesting that robust behaviour of key biological and cognitive processes can be grounded on 
(internal) transient dynamics [Rabinovich et al., 2006].  
Understanding how internal dynamics shapes behaviour is a major issue in cognitive and robust 
systems research [Rabinovich et al., 2006, 2008]. This interest rises because it is usually though 
that complex and heterogeneous networks interacting nonlinearly generate the internal transient 
dynamics that operate within living organisms. The activity of agent-internal components in 
Rabinovich et al.’s scenarios changes over time as a function of other components. In an 
environmentally coupled agent context, the dynamics of agents is constantly changing due to 
variations of stimuli that depend on an agent’s situatedness. In this, Rabinovich et al. (2008) 
propose a computational view of how perception and cognition can be modelled as dynamic 
patterns of transient activity within neural networks: 
“Transient dynamics have two main features. First, although they cannot be 
described by classical attractor dynamics, they are resistant to noise, and reliable 
even in the face of small variations in initial conditions; the succession of states 
visited by the system (its trajectory, or transient) is thus stable. Second, the 
transients are input-specific, and thus contain information about what caused them 
in the first place. Notably, systems with few degrees of freedom do not, as a rule, 
express transient dynamics with such properties. Therefore, they are not good 
models for developing the kind of intuition required here. Nevertheless, stable 
transient dynamics can possibly be understood from within the existing framework 
of nonlinear dynamical systems.”  
As we previously described in section 2.2, the state of an agent-internal-system can be shown as 
a point in the state space where perturbations can move such point to a different position in the 
state space. The state of the internal system might return to its original state (or attractor) by 
adapting to perturbations, often using a negative feedback loop [Kitano, 2006] (or by tolerating 
these perturbations [Di Paolo, 2005]) and remaining in a qualitatively different region, i.e. a 
perturbation might ‘push’ the internal transient dynamics of the inner-system far from the basin.  
From a neural context, this explanation suggests that the neural phenomena in biological 
organisms often occur on very short time scales where classical attractor states (e.g. fixed points or 
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limit cycles) cannot be realistically reached and the agent-internal-system mostly works in these 
transient dynamics when viewed at the appropriate perspective. Indeed, behavioural and 
neurophysiological experiments have revealed the existence and functional relevance of dynamics 
that, while deterministic, cannot be described as reaching classical attractor states [Uchida & 
Mainen, 2003][Jones et al., 2007]. Several works in literature support similar observations of 
internal-transient dynamics working in combination with stable space states (e.g. [Fine et al., 
2007][Izquierdo & Bührmann, 2008][Iizuka & Di Paolo, 2007a][Froese & Di Paolo, 
2008][Gigliotta & Nolfi, 2008]). Another alternative less explored is ‘chaotic itinerancy’ [Tsuda, 
2001][Ikegami & Tani, 2001][Hashimoto & Ikegami, 2001]. This thesis is not concerned with this 
last exploratory line of research. 
The agents analysed in Chapter 6 usually exhibit transient dynamics at neurocontroller level 
around one global attractor or between several of them when coupled with the environment. We 
also describe situations where internal transient dynamics emerge due to agent embodiment 
(Chapter 6), intrinsic dynamics (Chapter 7), or the agent-environment system’s history of 
interactions (Chapter 8). The next section describes how the situated, embodied, and dynamical 
framework introduced in this chapter explains cognitive mechanisms that distribute in brain-body-
environment. 
3.3 Distributed cognition approach 
Simon (1981) have shown that “the trajectory of an ant in a beach tells us more about the beach 
than about the ant”, indicating that by observing ants movements we may learn as much about the 
environment for thinking as we learn of the thinking itself. This observation suggests that 
mechanisms exhibiting behaviours can oftentimes usefully be approached from a distributed point 
of view; e.g. by observing how organisms use their environments for particular behaviours. 
Distributed cognition is a hybrid approach to studying most aspects of cognition, from a 
cognitive to social and organisational perspective. It is a psychological theory developed by 
Hutchins (1995). One major thread is the idea of distributed (cognitive) processes among the 
members of a social group, and also of processes which are distributed through time in such a way 
that the products of earlier events can transform the nature of related events. Distributed cognition 
looks for a broader class of cognitive events and does not expect all events to be encompassed by 
the skin or skull of an individual, or inside a smart control system in robots [Gallagher, 2005]. 
This approach pertains to our work, since embodied agents exhibiting behaviours can be 
interpreted as cognitively distributed among internal-control, body, and environmental dynamics. 
Some of the foundations that support distributed cognition are given below. 
3.3.1 The role of the material environment 
Previous sections introduce the idea that cognitive activity can be situated in the physical world in 
such a way that the external environment is part of the cognitive mechanism of agents acting in 
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the environment. Clark and Chalmers (1998) have discussed this issue in relation to the potential 
of the material environment to support memory. However, the environment can be more than a 
memory. According to Norman (1993), ‘cognitive artefacts’ in our close environment (those that 
help the emergence of cognitive actions) are the things that make us smart. The use of artefacts 
amplifies, in some sense, our cognition capabilities. According to Hutchins (2000), cognitive 
artefacts (environmental objects) are involved in a process of organizing functional skills into 
cognitive functional systems. For example, Clark and Chalmers (1998, p. 9) exemplified this 
situation as follows:  
“Now consider Otto. Otto suffers from Alzheimer's disease, and like many 
Alzheimer's patients, he relies on information in the environment to help structure 
his life. Otto carries a notebook around with him everywhere he goes. When he 
learns new information, he writes it down. When he needs some old information, 
he looks it up. For Otto, his notebook plays the role usually played by a biological 
memory. Today, Otto hears about the exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art, and 
decides to go see it. He consults the notebook, which says that the museum is on 
53rd Street, so he walks to 53rd Street and goes into the museum.” 
This example is commonly viewed as Otto’s attempt to extend his memory capabilities despite the 
brain disease. Cole and Griffin (1980) have argued that this is not the case: it is not memory-
amplification, but just an example of the uses of different functional skills to do the memory task. 
Internal and external (material or environmental) structures can initiate, promote, or help to sustain 
cognitive processes. In this respect, the operation of a cognitive system as a whole involves 
coordination between brain, body, and environmental processes as we have previously discussed.  
Processes enabling cognitive behaviour may be distributed through different dynamical systems 
and in time in such a way that the results of earlier events can transform the nature of later events. 
Consider for example the ‘trails on grass’ system [Goldstone & Roberts, 2006][Helbing et al., 
1997]. This system consists of paths made naturally by pedestrians on areas that are covered with 
grass. Trails are made by the action of walking which makes it difficult for grass to grow in zones 
which is frequently trodden upon. The lack of grass makes walking along the trail easier and 
people tend to use the trail rather than cutting across the grass, even if this implies a small 
deviation from the optimal route to their destinations. The process is self-reinforcing and in the 
bigger picture, it is a historical process. As Di Paolo (2001, p. 655) proposes:  
“Once a pattern of trails is formed the history of the process has become partially 
embodied in it and walkers are constrained by its shape to walk along the trails. 
Thus the pattern modulates the dynamics of the process but, at the same time, is 
constantly being constituted by the process as trails can only be maintained if 
enough people use them.” 
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The proposed example, despite being taken from a social interaction context, shows us that the 
distribution of the cognitive mechanism that enables the walking behaviour of agents (humans) to 
destinations, is based on the use of information from the environment (trails on the grass). It is not 
the cognitive performance and expertise of any one single person that is important for the 
maintenance of the trail paths system, rather the distributed cognition over all people using the 
field, including, but not limited, to the grass field as a whole [Di Paolo, 2001]. This sort of 
cognitive distribution is extremely important in coupled systems. 
The trail path situation exemplifies the dynamics of the system (humans and field) in the end 
based on agents with the habit to follow defined paths. Nevertheless, if some new person is 
included, or some perturbation to the grass-field appears, agents will tend to reinforce or create 
new environmental links in his first attempt to go to his destination, for example by choosing one 
milestone in its surroundings to guide its walk. It is clear that the mode of environmental 
influence, whether weak or strong, changes over time and that this is a property of the agent’s own 
internal dynamics and its history of interaction with the environment. In this concern, Di Paolo 
and Iizuka (2008) indicate that during periods of high susceptibility to external variations, an agent 
is highly responsive to environmental changes resulting in less commitment to a particular task 
(e.g. when agents are looking for a given target as a trail on the grass). By contrast, during periods 
of weak susceptibility (e.g. when agents walk following a trail toward a specific target), walking is 
consequence of low responsiveness to environmental changes. What this observation tells us is 
that in all cases walking behaviour in a human-trail path system is the outcome of a tightly 
coupled sensorimotor loop (Figure 3.1). The idea of cognition as distributed in brain, body, and 
environment system is also supported by further examples in [Ziemke et al., 2004][Chiel & Beer, 
1997][Beer, 1995a][Gallagher, 2005], among other works, where the distribution of the cognitive 
mechanism in time also emphasizes the importance of the environment for cognition.  
Our belief is that to contextualize the distribution of organism’s cognition, one must understand 
the dependencies of control (inner) functionality that emerges from agent, body, and 
environmental dynamics. These inter-dependencies are required by particular agent behaviours 
given certain environmental restrictions, and will provide novel opportunities to maintain 
functionality in the presence of perturbations (see [Chiel & Beer 1997][Scheier et al., 1998]). In 
fact, constraints on an agent are generally derived by embedding brain-like systems in a body 
[Scheier et al., 1998]. Ashby (1956, p. 130) has discussed this point saying: “[…] when a 
constraint exists advantage can usually be taken of it.” Advantage, in this context, refers to the 
use of some features of the body and environment in order to exhibit coherent behaviours in 
relation to the environment’s current state. The processes that an agent produces may also 
exploit body and environment to accomplish particular tasks [Ashby, 1960, p. 61].  
Cues from the environment are an integral part of agent behaviours as von Uexküll (1926) 
suggested (cited in [Ashby, 1940]). Macinnes and Di Paolo have investigated this last point using 
ER [Macinnes, 2007][Macinnes & Di Paolo, 2006]. The distribution of behavioural and cognitive 
mechanisms that biological organisms exploit also suggests that the distribution of cognition is a 
biologically plausible basis on which to investigate behaviours. Recent works from computational 
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biology [Freilich et al., 2010] and systems biology [Kitano, 2002, 2007][Wagner, 2005, 2007] 
suggest robustness is affected by the distribution of inner-system functionality among 
components. Calcott (2010), based on the book of Wimsatt (2007), notes this tendency toward 
functional distribution in theoretical biology field. Overall, the understanding of the properties 
underlying robust systems is changing from an agent-centric view to a set of distributed systemic 
properties that depend on conditions in the organism and environment as a whole. Importantly, to 
model relatively complex worlds as in our non-linear experimental models, we use idealized 
representations of the feature of the worlds that we want to study (e.g. different ways to induce the 
emergence of distributed behavioural mechanisms). Given these idealizations, we need to be sure 
that results derived from these models tell us about the world, rather than simply reflecting the 
particular idealizations of the models. The next section continues with explanations of distributed 
cognitive mechanisms from an ER perspective. 
3.3.2 Distributed cognition in Evolutionary Robotics research 
Despite the emphasis on coupled agent-environment interactions in general, ER (see Chapter 4) 
has been paid relatively little attention to work on distributed cognition [Ziemke et al., 2004]. 
Instead, ER has derived much of its inspiration from Brooksian behaviour-based AI as we 
discussed in section 3.1, following principally an anti-representationalism, computational, and 
minimalist bottom-up approach [Beer, 1990, 1995a, 2003].  
Cliff et al., (1993) have suggested that ER follows the behaviour decomposition method of 
behaviour-based robotics. This means that the active adaptation or modification of environments 
has also been studied relatively little in robotic experiments [Chandrasekharan & Stewart, 2004]. 
ER research in behavioural robustness can learn a number of lessons from cognitive distribution in 
embodied, situated, and dynamical agents, because robustness is thought by us an others to be an 
intrinsic property of biological and self-organized distributed systems (see [Camazine et al., 
2001][Wagner, 2005][Wischmann, 2007]).  
Current work on embodied, situated, and distributed cognition has rediscovered some aspects of 
the interaction between agents and their environments as central to the emergence of distributed 
cognitive processes [Ziemke et al., 2004]. From a distributed cognition viewpoint, Ziemke et al. 
(2004) present some simple initial experiments that should be taken as a fruitful starting point to 
discuss the use of the environment to produce cognitive behaviours. Their studies mainly focus on 
the so-called ‘road sign problem’ [Thieme & Ziemke, 2002] illustrating how the evolution of 
environmental adaptation, at evolutionary and individual time-scales, can serve to provide 
cognitive scaffolding that simplifies the tasks for individual agents.  
Thieme and Ziemke (2002) demonstrate that even purely reactive agents can solve the T-maze 
navigation task satisfactorily, where a robot should ‘remember’ to what side it must turn after a 
rightward or leftward beam of light, see Figure 3.2. The robot should move across the first 
corridor and then shift to one side at the junction to reach the goal (final position at right or left 
junction corridor). Interestingly, they observe that reactive agents (without internal states) produce 
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the appropriate behaviour by ‘using’ a wall all the way to the goal in relation to the side that the 
beam of light was initially presented (Figure 3.2). Agents could use their own position with 
respect to the wall as an external memory. Thieme and Ziemke have argued that such use of walls 
as environmental (external) knowledge is an example of distributed cognition sustaining 
behaviours. 
 
 
 
(b)(a)
 
 
Figure 3.2 – Representation of the T-maze for a road sign problem exhibited by a purely reactive agent. 
The agent starts at the foot of the main corridor. The agent encounters a light source on the (a) right- or 
(b) left side, and after a delay period, it has to turn toward the same side at the T-maze conjunction 
toward the large empty circles. Agents solve this behaviour by using the respective wall all the time to 
the goal. Plots taken from [Ziemke et al., 2004].  
 
Ziemke et al.’s lessons are similar to those of [Jakobi, 1998b, Chapter 5] in experiments with a 
Khepera robot in a T-maze (Figure 3.3). In Jakobi’s experiments, the internal controller of the 
robot is a neurocontroller evolved using the ER technique. Jakobi indicates that the observed 
behaviour involves both a behavioural control that avoids touching the sides and control that 
negotiates the junction at the end of the first corridor (simple reactive behaviours both), combined 
with the presence of an internal state for producing the appropriate turning behaviour at the 
junction. Ziemke et al. (2004, p. 340) have called this situation a delayed response task. The 
Jakobi’s experiment is an example of how agents can exploit opportunities from the environment 
in order to solve a particular task under the ER methodology. 
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Figure 3.3 – Example of the paths taken by a Khepera robot in six consecutive trials. The robot should 
perform T-maze navigation considering a right- or leftward source of light. Figures taken from [Jakobi, 
1998b, Chapter 5].  
3.4 Final comments 
A few works in adaptive systems field and ER have studied the modification and the use of the 
environment that agents or species (in an evolutionary sense) produce to accomplish tasks. Fewer 
works discuss how agents make clever use of the environment to make subsequent tasks easier, 
and is ripe for further explanation. This use will be seen as a modification of agent’s behaviour in 
relation to the history of interactions with the environment (see [Nolfi, 1997, 1998] for 
complementary descriptions). Potential benefits include accounting for agents that overcome 
hardwired cognitive limitations, and agents whose cognition is distributed between internal 
mechanisms, external sources and, not least, the interaction between internal and external 
dynamics [Ziemke et al., 2004]. The following chapter describes the main aspects of the ER 
technique that we use in our experimental chapters to evolve fit agents with distributed 
behavioural mechanisms. Chapter 5, Chapter 6, Chapter 7, and Chapter 8 are examples of 
different ways of exploiting such a distribution. 
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CHAPTER 4 EVOLVING MINIMAL MODELS IN EVOLUTIONARY 
ROBOTICS 
 
 
“When the disturbances that threaten the organism have, over many 
generations, had the bi-modal form […], we may expect to find that the 
organism will under selection, have developed a form of fairly close to the 
ultrastable, in that it will have two readily distinguishable feedbacks.” 
 
W. Ross Ashby, 1960 
 
 
 
 
This chapter extends initial descriptions of the methodology that we employ for synthesising 
agents. We introduce and discuss in some detail the ER approach (section 4.1) for evolving agents 
with continuous-time recurrent neural networks (section 4.3) as internal control systems. Based on 
evolutionary processes (section 4.2), agents with these controllers fit the requirement of the tasks 
for which they evolve, and exhibit robust and adaptive behaviour in tests after evolution. This 
chapter finishes in section 4.4 highlighting the main points of our discussions. 
4.1 Evolutionary Robotics 
ER is a research methodology originally attributed to Husbands and Harvey [Harvey et al., 1992]. 
Since its proposal, ER has increased in popularity across the robotics research field, generally in 
the development of controllers for simulated robots [Beer & Gallagher, 1992][Cliff et al., 1993] to 
physical ones [Nolfi et al., 1994][Jakobi et al., 1995][Jakobi 1998a, 1998b], amongst other areas 
of investigation (see [Nolfi & Floreano, 2000]). ER treats agents as dynamic systems being 
continuously perturbed by their environments as opposed to agents that explicitly model the 
world. The focus is on the emergence of adaptive behaviour and cognitive processes as we 
indicated in section 3.3.2 (see also [Clark, 1997][Chiel & Beer, 1997][Pfeifer & Scheier, 2001] for 
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complementary descriptions). The ER methodology demonstrates in a concrete way the 
importance of situatedness and embodiment concepts for understanding cognitive aspects of 
behaviour, and can be seen as giving rise to the situated and embodied dynamical systems 
approach [Beer, 1995a, 1996, 1997, 2003] (section 3.2).  
Works in literature employing ER methodology frequently obtain agents with robust behaviour 
by varying (evolutionarily) the set of attributes that define nervous system (NS), body, and some 
environmental features affecting agent-environment coupled interactions (Figure 1.1-C). To 
explore robustness to certain types and magnitudes of perturbations, however, it is often necessary 
to generate combinational numbers of tests. To compare different systems using these tests is to 
analyse only a few products of many possible features (e.g. the structure of controllers) that have 
emerged to sustain behaviours. Small differences that perturbations produce in agent’s control 
systems, body, or environmental dynamics may generate large differences at coupled level. 
Consequently, to discover the mechanisms exhibiting behaviour under all perturbations is 
probably impossible.  
The problem of comparing behaviour under perturbations can be partly alleviated. Since 
solutions in ER are relatively assumption-free compared to other synthetic approaches [Fine et al., 
2007] (see also [Nolfi & Floreano, 2000] for further arguments), we can use the evolutionary 
approach to obtain behaviourally robust agents and then use both analytical and computational 
methods to compare emerged strategies under different experimental conditions. In simulated ER 
agents, we can usually calculate an accurate estimate of fitness (see section 2.4.1) for behavioural 
robustness, even when the effects of systematic perturbations are quite sensitive and non-intuitive. 
We start next section by introducing one common example in ER, researching on the robustness 
that simulated agents exhibit when transferred to physical robots. 
4.1.1 Minimal models and behavioural robustness 
Cliff et al. (1993) have suggested the importance of modelling the environment as accurately as 
possible to minimize the gap between simulation and reality (see also [Koch & Segev, 
1989][Zagal et al., 2005]). Jakobi (1998b) propose instead the ‘minimal simulations approach’ to 
overcome such a problem using simulation in ER. The main difference between Cliff et al.’s and 
Jakobi’s approaches is that the former requires precise simulations models that are hard to obtain 
in most robotic control situations, since generally more precise simulations require greater 
computational resources. Jakobi’s approach, however, allows the experimenter to choose which 
attributes of the environment should be modelled with relevance to the problem to investigate. 
Minimal simulations are not only useful for crossing the reality gap, but also as a tool for 
investigating simple, but general behavioural properties. Jakobi et al.’s (1995) original minimal 
simulations proposal includes the careful application of environmental noise as part of the 
incoming signals that simulated agents should process to behave. In this respect, Seth (2000) 
indicates that the introduction of noise into artificially evolving systems generate positive effects 
in the emergence of adaptive behaviour, the facilitation of the exploration of genotype space, 
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and the acceleration of evolutionary search. Beer and Gallagher (1992) have used the idea of 
minimal simulations to study different aspects of cognition giving rise to the ‘minimal cognition 
approach’.  
Minimal simulations are simple, but not trivial. The experimenter must first divide the 
experimental model that will influence the exhibition of behaviour of agents into base set aspects 
and implementation aspects [Jakobi, 1998b]. The designer chooses this division. Only a small 
base set of robot-environment interactions are usually sufficient to support the expected actions of 
agents. These features of the simulation have a corresponding basis in reality (the base set 
aspects), while other features derive from the simulation’s implementation (the implementation 
aspects) [Husbands et al., 1998]. The base set aspects ideally provide relations between agent-
environment that are necessary to produce the required behaviour, where evolution selects agents 
that successfully perform the desired behaviour if it depends only upon the base set aspects. For 
instance, the association between sensors and environmental stimulus (sensory inputs) should be 
defined in the base set aspects.  
The features in the environment that affect the sensory inputs (but are ‘not’ required to produce 
a specific behaviour) represent the implementation aspects of the experiment. Implementation set 
aspects (e.g. the amount of sensory noise from the environment) are varied between trials to 
produce truly robust agents in relation to the base set conditions. The essential lesson from 
Jakobi’s works is that an ‘envelope of noise’ [Jakobi, 1998a] should be placed around a 
simulation’s base-set features so that behaviours retain their coherence in the environment. This 
follows from the intuition that simulation models can never be entirely accurate, but that a noise 
envelope compensates in a way that emulates real sensing of physical properties of an 
environment.  
Another characteristic of minimal simulations is that unreliability is necessary to induce the 
emergence of behavioural robustness. In other words, Seth (2000, p. 79) indicates that “[Jakobi’s] 
implementation features should be made ‘extremely’ unreliable through the application of very 
high levels of noise, so that the evolutionary search process cannot come to incorporate them in 
any viable controller” [Seth, 1998b, 2000] (see also [Seth, 1998a]). Some works that support 
Jakobi’s observations are [Miglino et al., 1996][Di Paolo & Harvey, 2004][Harvey et al., 
1996][Seth, 1998b], among others. We extend these discussions through experimental evidence 
including neural noise in Chapter 5. 
Summarising, experiments with minimal simulations require basic features (base set aspects) 
that model and define behaviours. The implementation set aspects must vary allowable real world 
between trials much more than elements in the base set. Nevertheless, only the right amount of 
variation base-set aspects produces robust agents that transfer from simulation to physical 
scenarios. 
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4.1.2 Evolving neurocontrollers with evolutionary algorithms 
One of the most successful methods for training neurocontrollers is artificial evolution using 
genetic algorithms (GA) (section 4.2) [Harvey et al., 1992][Nolfi & Floreano, 2000]. The ER 
technique discussed previously has been largely promoted by faculty and students of the 
University of Sussex. It combines methodologies and techniques inspired by behaviour-based 
robotics as well as artificially evolved agents through genetic algorithms [Cliff et al., 1993]. This 
gave rise to the Sussex approach to ER [Harvey et al., 1996]. One of the main characteristics of 
these studies is research on minimal, embodied, situated, and dynamical agents influenced by 
Beer’s works [Beer & Gallagher, 1992], and finally consolidated as a suitable approach [Beer, 
1997]. For an extensive overview, see [Harvey et al., 2005][Nolfi & Floreano, 2000][Husbands et 
al., 1997]. 
One advantage of the Sussex approach is that an evolutionary algorithm does not necessarily 
require a behavioural or functional division in an agent’s control system. This does not mean that 
the division in behavioural modules is not useful or certainly required in complex tasks [Togelius, 
2004][Fernandez-Leon et al., 2009]. Rather, such a division is not ‘built-in’, but may emerge via 
the evolutionary algorithm (EA). The feature that distinguishes the Sussex approach from other 
approaches is the emphasis on simple and evolutionary open strategies for robotic control. 
Experimenters do not propose control strategies directly because such control is probably not 
similar to those created when systems evolve. Hand-designed robotic control is effective for 
particular tasks in engineering, but builds in assumptions of the designer in how robots should 
solve a task (i.e. human designers after define modular components as part of a nested control 
system to solve a task). ER may creates, in principle, any effective design. 
As it is typical in the ER literature, we evolve the weights, biases, and time constants of a given 
CTRNN (section 4.3.1) using a GA. Once the network parameters are determined, they remain 
fixed for the duration of the task (i.e. no on-line learning or synaptic plasticity takes place). Inputs 
are applied to the network via neuron incoming signals (Ii) to produce change in network activity. 
The following equation shows the integration of each node (i.e. neuron-like units) over time:  
The update equation of each neuron is based on Euler integration [Ascher & Petzold, 1998]. This 
equation integrates an internal variable y (neural activations as explained in section 4.3.1) that 
exponentially decays over time when incoming signals are not given. For experimental purposes, 
the simulation interval is generally 0.1 units of simulation (otherwise specified in each 
experimental chapter). 
yyy tt ∆⋅+=+ 1.01  (4.1)  
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4.2 Evolutionary and genetic algorithms 
A GA is an optimization technique used to find exact or approximate solutions whose defining 
characteristic is that it mimics the heuristic search process of natural evolution [Bäck, 1996]. GAs 
are categorized as global search heuristics, being a particular class of EAs [Mitchell, 1998]. The 
following steps (pseudo-code) describe a ‘canonical’ GA: 
 
 
1. Randomly generate an initial population of solutions 
2. Encode solutions as a population of genotypes 
3. Loop until termination criterion reached: 
(a) For each genotype in population: 
i. Instantiate genotype as phenotype solution  
ii. Test solution on target problem 
iii. Assign genotype fitness based on phenotype performance 
(b) Until a new population has been filled: 
i. Choose two parents biased towards choosing the fitter ones 
ii. Combine parent genotypes to form child genotype 
iii. Mutate child genotype 
iv. Add child to new population 
(c) Replace old population with new population 
4. Final solution is best solution from final population 
 
 
 
Both GAs and EAs find inspiration from biological evolution: reproduction, mutation, 
recombination, and selection (for a detailed description of these concepts see [Bäck, 1996][Bäck 
et al., 1997]). The traditional mutation operator, for example, relies on perturbing all genes in a 
real-valued genotype (Figure 4.1). For binary genotypes, the typical advice is to mutate at a rate 
that leads to an expected one bit being changed. The most common procedure to create mutations 
is the generation of random numbers from a Gaussian distribution; Uniform distributions, among 
others, can also be used [Yao & Liu, 1997].  
EAs loosely mimic the mechanics of genetics and natural selection [Michalewicz & Fogel, 
2004][Holland, 1975]. One of the first promoters of artificial evolution as an optimization 
technique was Rechenberg (1973), but GAs were initially proposed by Holland (1975) to study 
natural adaptation. As an optimization technique, EAs can sometimes quickly converge to optimal 
solutions after examining only a small fraction of the search space. An EA usually selects an 
initial population at random, encoded into a genotypic representation (Figure 4.1). A fitness 
function assigns a value to each member (individuals) of the population after testing it. Next, the 
algorithm may apply the genetic operator of crossover (i.e. controlled swapping of genes between 
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two members for potentially better solutions) and mutation (i.e. changing one gene or a set of 
them to provide diversity) to the population. The algorithm repeats until certain conditions are 
reached (for example, a pre-defined number of generations or a minimal value of fitness). The 
evolved solutions are not always optimal, but often represent useful compromises between 
constraints [Harvey et al., 2005].  
 
 
…..
evaluate the 
population using 
a fitness metrics
random
population
…..
mutate and/or 
recombine individuals 
with high fitness
…..
population ordered 
by fitness
…..
replace individuals with 
low fitness with new 
random individuals mutated 
and/or 
recombined 
individuals
process repeated up to certain 
condition is reached
 
 
Figure 4.1 – A representation of the typical genetic algorithm process. Vertical ovals depict populations 
of individuals (genotypes) indicated as small horizontal ovals. One generation represents a cycle counter-
clockwise. The evaluation process consists on calculating the fitness value for each individual based on 
the performance of phenotypes that they obtain after phenotype-environment interactions. The selection 
process follows a fitter score criteria. Reproduction and mutation create offspring genotypes for the next 
generation using variation of parents; i.e. to select parents with a bias towards higher fitness, but those 
individuals still with low fitness have some small chance to be selected in future generations. The initial 
population is often generated at random, and thereafter each generation increases its tendency to better 
population’s fitness. Figure inspired and adapted from [Harvey et al., 2005].  
Harvey (1994, 1995, 2001) introduced the Microbial Genetic Algorithm as a GA inspired by 
the evolution of microbes (Figure 4.2) (see also [Harvey, 1992]). One of the main features of 
Harvey’s algorithm is that it represents a horizontal transmission of genetic material, rather than a 
vertical process of evolution. Horizontal transmission of genes happens between the winners to the 
losers of a tournament. A generation, in this context, is the time that it takes to evaluate the same 
number of new individuals as would be in a traditional EA. We use a version of this microbial 
genetic algorithm in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 where we further explain the selection of relevant 
parameters.  
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Figure 4.2 – Illustration of the Microbial Genetic Algorithm process. Figure derived from [Harvey, 1995, 
2001] and [Izquierdo, 2008].  
4.3 Artificial Neural Networks 
Artificial neural networks (ANN) are models based on loosely bio-inspired approximations of 
biological networks in brains, where their elemental components are neuron-like processing 
elements [Haykin, 1999]. Artificial neural designers traditionally arrange these neurons in an input 
layer (perception neurons), a hidden layer (associative cortex) and an output layer (motor neurons) 
linked by synapses of varying strength. This configuration is also known as ‘multilayer 
perceptrons’ [Cybenko, 1989]. Typically, multilayer perceptrons denote feed-forward artificial 
networks that map sets of input data onto sets of appropriate output.  
The scientific and technological community has accepted ANN [Haykin, 1999] as useful 
learning control techniques in autonomous mobile robotics. This is mainly because it reduces the 
quantity of prior design assumptions. The GA method has also been widely applied to parameter 
optimisation, because manual tuning of control parameters is notoriously difficult and costly in 
terms of time in physical robots. As an example of its use, Ram et al. (1994) applied GAs to the 
problem of goal seeking and obstacle avoidance in control mobile robots using navigation 
performance as a fitness measure (see also [Fernandez-Leon et al., 2009]).  
Commonly in ER, neural networks acting as agents’ neurocontrollers are represented as a 
vector of numerical parameters. If the topology of the neural network is fixed, then the parameters 
in the genotype map directly onto the phenotypic expression of the neural network. To train 
neurocontrollers, we use in our experimental chapters a GA based on the ER methodology. During 
training, the GA continually adjusts the weights of an ANN until obtaining the desired response 
from the network as measured by the fitness function. This procedure is an instance of 
unsupervised learning; in contrast, supervised training involves supplying a set of correct 
responses for given inputs. 
Several examples from an ER mobile robot context are available in literature using neural 
networks. For example, Floreano & Mondada (1996) have used a recurrent (feedback) neural 
network to develop a set of behaviours for a small mobile robot. They employ such a network in 
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navigation tasks using a corridor with sharp corners and base on a battery charger as a goal for the 
robot. Results show that navigation was more effective than compared to a simple Braitenberg 
Vehicle [Braitemberg, 1986]. Tani and Fukumura (1997) give another example via a hybrid of 
Kohonen and recurrent neural networks with supervised training on a physical robot with a laser 
range sensor and three cameras. The robot’s task is to loop in figures of eight and zero in 
sequence, with no prior information about the environment.  
These examples indicate that the use of neural networks allows flexibility to task and 
configuration changes. Further examples are as follows. Floreano and Urzelai (2000) have argued 
that neural networks only perform well if the algorithm used to fit the networks maintains the 
training conditions. As unpredictable environments are a common problem for physical robot 
navigation, they develop a more robust neural network code testing it in a small mobile robot in 
rectangular environments. Using conventional neural networks, and a robot able to travel to a grey 
area when a light was on, even slight changes in lighting affect the robot’s performance. After 
certain adjustments, they were able to use a larger robot and arena, switching the colours and 
changing from a simulated to a physical one.  
Yamauchi and Beer (1994) have provided another example by using a CTRNN as a control 
system for a robot. The task is to accomplish goal finding with the aid of a light. Sometimes the 
light is placed on the same side as the target and at other times, it is on the opposite side. The robot 
has to decide whether the light relates to the target in order to reach its goal. The control system 
consists of an assessment module, anti-guidance, and pro-guidance mechanisms. Following 
training, the robot learns to ignore the light and use other means to identify the target successfully. 
In the following section, we describe CTRNN as a typical neural implementation of controllers in 
ER. 
4.3.1 Continuous-time recurrent neural networks 
CTRNNs are a class of non-linear neural models that are simple but dynamically universal [Beer, 
1995b][Beer, 2006]. These networks are Hopfield-based additive neural networks [Grossberg, 
1988]. In general, each node in a fully connected CTRNN has n+2 parameters: a decay constant 
τ, a bias term θ, and n afferent connection (synaptic weights) from itself (wjj) and from all other 
nodes (wji) in the network. Thus, a n-node CTRNN has n⋅(n +2) parameters in total. Note that 
the space of all fully connected n-node architectures contains all n-node networks with lower 
connectivity. A connection weight of zero indicates a lack of connection. Since all the 
parameters in a CTRNN are typically real-valued, it is common to use a real-valued encoding 
during the evolutionary process [Nolfi & Floreano, 2000]. This is the method used in this thesis. 
The ranges for connection weights, bias terms, and decays are different for most of experimental 
chapters in this thesis. CTRNNs in our experiments are encoded into a genotype where all values 
are drawn from the range [−1, 1] (otherwise specified for each experiment). 
One of the most important arguments of using CTRNNs is that they are universal 
approximators of smooth dynamics [Funahashi & Nakamura, 1993]. This capacity of CTRNNs 
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ensures they can reach certain dynamical precision to approximate any particular given dynamics. 
Importantly, they are also related to biological processes like non-spiking neurons and more 
general dynamical models used in adaptive behaviour and minimal cognitive research [Beer, 
1997, 2003]. The following equations define the implemented neuron-like units in CTRNN 
networks (Figure 4.3) [Beer, 1995b]: 
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(4.4) 
The variable yi is the activation of the i-th neuron (e.g. the state or ‘membrane potential’); τi is 
its time constant; wji is the strength of the connection from the j-th to the i-th neuron; θi is a bias 
term; gj is a gain; σ(x) is the standard logistic activation function; Ii represents an external input; 
n is the number of neuron-like units in the network. Note that we repeat these equations in each 
experimental chapter for clarity. 
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Figure 4.3 – Schematic representation of the j-th CTRNN single neuron. The neuron receives input from 
other neurons (wji.zi), from itself (wjj.zj), and from an external input (Ij). The incoming signals are 
summed and contribute to neuron activation (yj). Neuron firing rate (zj) is a sigmoid function of 
activation (yj) and bias (θj). See Equations 4.2 and 4.3. 
Beer (1995b) has largely studied the dynamics of CTRNNs, and their parametrical space 
structure in circuits of one, two or three neurons. He has also proposed that in order to produce 
more dynamical sensitivity in neurons, the neuron’s activation function should be centred over the 
full range of input that neurons receive. Beer (1995b) has studied the parameter space of 
CTRNNs, where he defined the following condition for center-crossing: 
∑
=
∗ −=
N
i
jii w
1
2θ  (4.5) 
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where θi stands for the bias of the i-th neuron and wji is the strength of the connection from the j-
th to the i-th neuron. Center-crossing neurons nullcline the curves along which the activation (yi) 
of each neuron is cero and intersects at the exact centre of symmetry [Mathayomchan & Beer, 
2002]. Nullclines, sometimes called zero-growth isoclines, are encountered in two-dimensional 
systems of differential equations (see [Strogatz, 1994] for further details). When this condition is 
satisfied (Eq. 4.5), the null manifolds of each neuron intersect at their centres of symmetry, or, 
equivalently, the steady-state input-output (SSIO) of each neuron is centred over the range of 
synaptic inputs that it receives from other neurons [Beer, 2006]. According to Beer (2006, p. 
3013):  
“Center-crossing circuits are important for a variety of reasons. First, the richest 
possible dynamics can be found in the neighborhood of such circuits. By ‘richest 
possible dynamics,’ I mean dynamics that makes maximal use of the available 
degrees of freedom in the circuit. Second, the bifurcations of the central 
equilibrium point of a center-crossing circuit can often be fully characterized 
analytically. Finally, for any given weight matrix, the corresponding center-
crossing circuit serves as a symmetry point in the net input parameter space for that 
circuit.” 
Mathayomchan and Beer (2002) have found that seeding evolutionary searches with random 
center-crossing networks led to quicker evolution and better solutions. We use center-crossing 
neuron definitions in Chapter 5 where this neural restriction helps to prevent the incidence of 
nearly saturated dynamics that would otherwise nullify the effects of neural noise.  
4.4 Final comments 
The main conceptual frameworks and approaches used in this thesis are presented in this chapter 
and in Chapter 3. Our strategy to understand how embodied, situated, and dynamical agents 
exhibit behavioural robustness is by building minimal models in ER (section 4.1.1). These models 
enable us to test hypothesis and to formalize observations about dynamical properties of 
behaviourally robust agents. Our attempt is not to create realistic simple organisms, but minimal 
agents with robust properties. ER experiments from Chapter 5 to Chapter 8 enable us to test the 
appropriateness of our hypotheses by demonstrating an existence proof for behavioural robustness 
with the proposed experimental conditions. The simulation models also serve as instructive 
examples. Our models are minimal, but sufficiently complex to produce the behaviour of interest. 
This helps us discover features of behavioural robustness during coupling otherwise observed by 
domain-based complexity in the real realm. 
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In literature, biological robustness is generally discussed as a by-product of evolution, where 
robust mechanisms emerge from noisy processes [Félix & Wagner, 2008]. This chapter explores 
the incidence of internally generated noise (neural noise) on agent behaviour and its effects in the 
production of robust traits. We evolve agents for goal seeking (phototaxis) task, testing their 
performance in the presence of sensorimotor and structural perturbations and for different levels of 
neural noise during agent lifetime. Behavioural robustness is shown to arise from coupled 
dynamics that shape agent behavioural mechanisms during evolution combined with dynamical 
features of neurocontrollers that promote robust behaviours. These agents use dynamical coupling 
to achieve robust behaviour. In particular, the implemented evolutionary process implicitly selects 
neural systems that operate in noise-resistant landscapes, which are resistant to bifurcation and/or 
contain bifurcations that retain phototaxis functionality. The concept of bifurcation is introduced 
in section 3.2.3.1, but it is further discussed in section 5.3.3 based on experiments described in this 
chapter. This experimental chapter also serves as a transition into the experiments of the next 
chapters, which continues discussions on the relation between distributed mechanisms and 
behavioural robustness. Here the distribution criterion refers to agent-internal-control in its 
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coupling with the environment. The work reported in this chapter is based on experiments in 
[Fernandez-Leon & Di Paolo, 2007, 2008]. 
5.1 Introduction 
The role of noise in inner-systems with sensorimotor control is of growing interest in bio-inspired 
robotics – in particular, the relation of noise to agent-environment aspects of robust behaviour 
[Hubert et al., 2009]. The understanding of the effects of neural noise on sensorimotor control is 
important to be extended as noise may result in movement inaccuracy (constant errors) and 
imprecision (variable errors and uncertainty) [Bays & Wolpert, 2007][Faisal et al., 2008]. In the 
context of adaptive behaviour during goal-oriented tasks, Bays & Wolpert propose that the 
strategy of the central nervous system for dealing with neural noise, i.e. the spontaneous neural 
background activity present in most brain tissues, is to optimally combine sensorimotor signals. 
Despite this broad hypothesis, we have very little idea about how the algorithms managing of the 
effects of neural noise are realized at the neuronal level. The majority of work in this area neither 
explains how these mechanisms emerge from sensorimotor interactions, nor analyses how such 
strategies may have originated during evolution. In the context of artificial evolution, evidence 
that noise also has some useful properties has been presented several times [Jakobi, 1998a][Di 
Paolo & Harvey, 2004] and this leads us to a second question: whether in natural systems noise 
should always be considered detrimental. Combining these two ideas, the question of what sort of 
control-strategy emerges if neural noise is induced during the evolution of neurocontrollers 
becomes one of conceptual and practical interest not only for evolutionary and autonomous 
robotics, but potentially for neuroscience as well.  
The use of noise is a widespread practice in ER. Applying his minimal simulations paradigm, 
Jakobi (1998b) has investigated the uses of environmental noise and parametrical uncertainty 
(rather than neural noise as in this chapter) in the evolution of neurocontrollers. He found that 
environmental-noise-evolved neurocontrollers have a significant rate of success when transferred 
from simulated agents into physical robots (where direct evolution is impractical or prohibitive). 
Minimal simulations work by avoiding the accurate but computationally costly replication of the 
physical complexities of a real-world robot-environment system. Instead, these simulations 
abstract a base set of factors upon which evolution must rely in order to produce the desired 
behaviour in simulated agents. All other factors in the robot-environment system are crudely 
modelled and subject to large amounts of environmental noise and variability between 
evaluations. The conceptual difference between Jakobi’s work and experiments in this chapter is 
that in the former case the focus is on the efficiency of control between simulated and physical 
agents, while in our case we look to identify properties in agents using dynamical coupling to 
achieve robust behaviour. 
Some of the lessons of the ‘minimal methodology’ may illuminate questions about natural 
robustness. Biological systems exhibit phenomena such as sensorimotor robustness to noise [Bays 
& Wolpert, 2007] or robustness in functional terms [Di Paolo & Harvey, 2004], which may relate 
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to the presence of neural noise and therefore warrant investigation. Studying these mechanisms in 
ER can inform our understanding of what to look for in natural systems and how to build better 
artificial examples. ER provides a useful, relatively assumption-free paradigm in which to study 
agent dynamics that sustain behaviours despite perturbations. 
This chapter is an exploratory piece of work aimed largely at generating hypotheses, and the 
motivations are conceptual as well as practical. We present results from ER simulations exploring 
the effects of neural noise on agent dynamics in order to investigate robustness at the behavioural 
level. In sections 5.2 and 5.3, the methods and experiments are introduced, and in section 5.4, we 
examine the consequences of the results and discuss questions that remain open. 
5.2 Methods 
5.2.1 Agent and structure of the environment 
In order to avoid unnecessary complexity, a minimal approach is deliberately used in experiments 
for this chapter [Jakobi, 1998b][Di Paolo & Harvey, 2004]. The aim is to evaluate the 
consequences of evolving networks with ‘constantly changing values’ of neural noise and to test 
the obtained solutions in terms of behavioural robustness. In this chapter, these constantly 
changing values are represented by a variable y0 (uniformly distributed) where its value is 
randomly selected from the range [-A, A] every time step for every neuron (i.e. different neurons 
have different values of y0 in each time step), where A is a fixed value for each experiment A ∈ 
{0,1,2,3,4}. The range [-A, A] of y0 is a control parameter in our studies. 
A population of simulated agents is evolved to perform light seeking (phototaxis) in normal 
body and environmental conditions while being disrupted by neural noise and externally induced 
perturbations. In each test, one light source is presented every time step for an extended period. 
Limited random noise is applied locally to the dynamics of each neuron.  
5.2.2 Agent’s controller definition 
Agents are modelled as solid circular bodies of radius 5 (arbitrary units) with two diametrically 
opposed motors that differentially steer the agent with their output (in range [0, 1]) and two frontal 
light sensors positioned with a separation between sensors of 47.75°. The agents’ motors can drive 
backwards and forwards in an unlimited 2-D arena. Agents have a very small mass, so motor 
neurons output directly indicate the tangential velocity at the point of the body where the motor is 
located. The sensors respond to the closeness of a point light source by linearly scaling the 
distance from the light to each sensor:  
((clutteredSensorMiss).(1-(distanceToLightSource/ diagonalArena))) 
The model includes sensor shadowing when an agent body occludes light. When not otherwise 
specified, each evaluation consists of a serial presentation of 6 light sources for a relatively long 
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fixed time (Tls=50 time steps) during an agent’s lifetime (T=300 time steps). An agent’s task is to 
approach light sources as they appear. After Tls, the light source is eliminated and another one 
appears at a random distance in [10, 120] and angle in range [0, 2π] degrees. The intensity of each 
source is fixed and equal among them. Sensory inputs are on the range [0, 1]. Distance and time 
units are of an arbitrary scale. 
A CTRNN (section 4.3.1) controls agents. The dynamics of the network are governed by the 
following equations: 
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Using terms derived from an analogy with real neurons, yi represents the cell potential of the ith 
neuron depending on a decaying time constant τi (scaled exponentially in range [1, 2+e2]), θj the 
bias is calculated by center-crossing, zj the firing rate, wji the strength of synaptic connection from 
node j to node i (range [-10, 10]), and Ii is the incoming current, which is zero for non-input nodes. 
CTRNNs are implemented using center-crossing [Mathayomchan & Beer, 2002] (see Eq. 4.5 in 
section 4.3.1). The center-crossing restriction helps to prevent the incidence of nearly saturated 
dynamics that would nullify the effects of neural noise. Time constants τi and synaptic weight wji 
are genetically (real-valued) encoded and optimised using a genetic algorithm.  
The term y0 (uniformly distributed) represents the level of additive neural noise as described in 
section 5.2.1. Even though the addition of the term y0 could be simply considered as a perturbation 
on the current input (Ii), this parameter can be also interpreted as influencing the long-term 
behaviour of each neuron including those that receive no sensory input. The network topology 
consists of 2 motor neurons (#0 & #1), 2 input nodes (#2 & #3), and 2 internal neurons (#4 & #5). 
Full connectivity is used for linking neurons, but only output neurons include self-connections. 
Left/right symmetry in synaptic weights is not enforced.  
5.2.3 Artificial evolution settings 
A population of 60 individuals is evolved using a steady state, rank-based genetic algorithm with 
elitism (50%). Each individual is run for 10 independent evaluations and the performance of each 
phenotype is calculated by averaging the fitness obtained in each evaluation. The mutation 
operator consists of the addition of a small vector displacement selected from a Gaussian 
distributed value in each gene (with mean 0.0 and standard deviation 1.0). When mutated genes 
are below or above their range, a non-reflective criterion is applied, generating a new random 
value for affected genes. Crossover is not used. The network and other simulation variables are 
integrated with an Euler time step of 0.1. Fitness is calculated in the following manner:                     
F = 1-Df / Di, where Df and Di are the final and initial distance to light source for one particular 
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test, respectively. Fitness is determined for each light source (goal) and then averaged for 10 
independent evaluations. F, in the range [0, 1], is taken as 0 if Df > Di. The genetic algorithm is 
run for 1000 generations and for 200 iterations per generation, generally taking a few hundred 
generations to achieve a high level of mean fitness.  
5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Statistical analysis of populations 
We evolve populations with different levels of neural noise (A ∈ {0,1,2,3,4}) using independent 
random seeds, where a constantly changing value of y0 is selected every time step in the range [-A, 
A] per neuron for each test. Most of evolved agents successfully acquired the capacity to perform 
phototaxis despite neural noise (i.e. mean performances are higher than 85% in Figure 5.1-I). 
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Figure 5.1 – Lifetime performance in the presence of constantly changing values of neural noise (y0), 
with 6 randomly positioned lights. [I] Population analyses. Mean fitness obtained after evolution (20 
independent experiments); the x-axis is the value of A for y0 in [-A, A]; y-axis stand for the mean lifetime 
fitness reached by 10 agents per data point. [II] Individual analyses. Comparison between selected agents 
evolved with A=0 or A=4 (x-axis). NC#9 and NC#10 agents were evolved with A=4 and remain with high 
mean fitness even when noise is removed during lifetime tests; NC#7 and NC#3 agents were evolved 
with A=0. For both plots, each data point represents mean fitness over 100 independent experiments per 
agent. Error bars indicate standard deviation. 
The evolutionary process shows relatively good evolutionary fitness for agents using the 
described configuration of y0 during tests. Figure 5.1-I represents mean lifetime fitness (20 
independent experiments per data point) of the best 10 agents evolved for each A value (tested 
with 6 randomly placed light sources). This figure indicates that populations obtained with 
different levels of A show relative good mean fitness. In terms of robustness, agents evolved with 
A=0 exhibit 84.8% robustness in the presence of neural noise during lifetime (A ∈ {0,1,2,3,4}), 
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while agents evolved with A=1, A=2, A=3, and A=4 obtain 86.9%, 96.4%, 98.5%, and 99.7% 
respectively. These percentages specify performance under perturbations in the face of neural 
noise divided by the level of fitness in the control case (A=0). In the presence of sensorimotor 
perturbations (e.g. sensor inversion and sensors removal), mean lifetime performance is generally 
higher for agents evolved with A=4 than for agents evolved with lower values of A [Fernandez-
Leon & Di Paolo, 2007]. 
Figure 5.1-II shows examples of agents obtained with A=4 and A=0 levels of neural noise 
during evolution:  
• NC#9 and NC#10 agents evolved with A=4; 
• NC#7 and NC#3 agents evolved with A=0.  
In Figure 5.1-II, x-axis shows the level of neural noise used during lifetime tests, rather than 
representing the level of noise in evolution, where NC#i represents an agent using the i-th 
neurocontroller forefront. More precisely, the x-axis in Figure 5.1-II identifies the level of neural 
noise (A value) during lifetime and the agent descriptor for each data point (e.g. 0-NC#9 indicates 
that the NC#9 agent is evaluated with A=0 during lifetime tests). It is important to note that, for 
clarity, this chapter only provides some analysis of these four agents rather than descriptions of the 
whole set of agents. This is because the selected agents are representative examples of the whole 
set evolved with A=0 and A=4. In other words, the non-described agents have similar behaviour to 
the ones indicated in this chapter. 
Especially, all of these selected agents demonstrate robustness to noise during lifetime when 
inducing the same level of neural noise than the one during evolution. Except for NC#3, a better 
mean fitness is also observed when inducing A=0 during lifetime for agents evolved with A=4 
(0.89 for NC#9 and 0.87 for NC#10) than with agents evolved with A=0 and tested for A=4 (0.84 
for NC#7 and 0.2 for NC#3). Experiments suggest that neural noise helps evolution find robust 
regions of the parameter space. These results and tests in [Fernandez-Leon & Di Paolo, 2007] 
indicate that agents evolved with A=4 remain robust to sensorimotor and structural perturbations 
even when neural noise is removed during tests. However, while NC#9, NC#10 and NC#7 agents 
maintain high levels of lifetime fitness in spite of the induced y0 noise, NC#3 with A=4 during 
lifetime (Figure 5.1-II) shows low level of fitness during experiments after evolution. 
Understanding why some agents perform differently than others under the influence of neural 
noise can provide clues toward the mechanisms that deal with neural noise at neurocontroller 
level. 
5.3.2 The agent-environment system during phototaxis task 
We analyse here agents from Figure 5.1-II in order to discover the properties which allow robust 
performance in the presence of neural noise. The analysis focuses both on applying neural noise to 
single neurons and on the general effects of neural noise in neurocontrollers. The neurocontrollers 
of NC#9 and NC#3 agents are studied in detail because they are examples of high (NC#9; Figure 
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5.2-left) and low performance (NC#3; Figure 5.2-right) during tests after evolution in Figure 5.1-II 
(see Appendix A.1 for further details of the selected controllers). These agents demonstrate 
robustness or fragility, respectively, when tested with different levels of neural noise. While they 
represent only particular instances, understanding the difference between these neurocontrollers 
sheds some light on how general controllers work differently in the presence or absence of neural 
noise.  
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Figure 5.2 – Schematic representation of the neurocontrollers of NC#9 (left) and NC#3 (right) agents. 
Parameters are neuron time constant (T) for interneurons (neurons 4 and 5) and motor neurons (neurons 0 
and 1), and the strength of the connection (w(j;i)) from the j-th to the i-th neuron (where neurons 2 and 3 
represent sensors). These agents are selected for further analyses because they are representative 
examples of high (NC#9) and low performance (NC#3) during tests after evolution. 
After studying the behaviour of agents under perturbations (see caption of Figure 5.3), we can 
observe that their strategies are based on maintaining light sensory inputs regardless of neural 
noise effects, i.e. agents regulate their movements so as to not lose the signal from light source. An 
intuitive description of the behaviour of agents being affected by perturbations is given as follows. 
When the level of neural noise is the same as the one for which agents evolved, all analysed 
agents (NC#9, NC#10, NC#7 and NC#3) show direct trajectories toward a light in a non-perturbed 
scenario (control cases). The NC#9 and NC#10 agents evolved with A=4 level of noise and tested 
with A=0 show movements similar to the control case or a slight right side tendency of moving 
toward a light, respectively. These behaviours are observed after disabling interneuron #4’s 
activity (Figure 5.3, first row in the [1] group of plots). This simple behavioural analysis indicates 
that NC#9 seems to be more behaviourally robust to that sort of perturbation in comparison to 
NC#10. When including noise in the activity of neuron #5 (Figure 5.3, second row in the [1] 
group of plots), the NC#9 agent seems not to be seriously perturbed showing similar trajectories 
toward the light as in the control case. However, NC#10 displays a combination of slight right side 
moments and loops in its trajectories. We can initially conclude that NC#9 and NC#10 are 
affected differently under these perturbations. 
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Figure 5.3 – Examples of behaviours affected by neural noise and neural disruptions. Columns 
correspond to each neurocontroller indicated at the top of the figure; each row describes the level of 
neural noise (A value) during lifetime tests. Agents start their trajectories to a light source (the small 
circle at the centre of each figure) from positions separated by 45° on each plot. As examples of 
perturbing randomly selected neurons, top rows of each group of plots represent behaviours in normal 
operation but disabling interneuron #4’s activity; for each situation in the top row, bottom rows of each 
group of plots represent agent’s behaviour after including noise in neuron #5 (neural noise y0 in range    
[-4, 4]). 
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Figure 5.3 also shows that agents evolved with A=0 level of noise (NC#7 and NC#3) and tested 
with A=0, present a slight right side tendency of moving toward a light placed in the arena after 
disabling interneuron #4’s activity. This behaviour is also observed when we induce noise in the 
activity of neuron #5 (Figure 5.3, first row in the [2] group of plots). Interestingly, these agents 
show a combination of slight right side moments and loops toward the light when the level of 
neural noise is A=4 during tests (Figure 5.3, second row in the [2] group of plots). Consequently, 
we can conclude from our preliminary behavioural analysis that NC#7 and NC#3 show a 
qualitatively different behaviour under these perturbations in comparison to the control case where 
perturbations are not present. 
A more detailed description of how the behaviour of agents is produced and how it leads to 
robustness is given along the following lines. Agents in Figure 5.3 exemplify the tendency to 
receive sensory stimulation mainly from one side, which is evident from agent trajectories. The 
effects of perturbing differently two randomly selected neurons by inducing constantly changing 
y0 values in range [-4, 4] in intern neuron #5 and deactivating intern neuron #4, indicate that 
agents can approach to light or lose the contact after turning in the ‘wrong direction’ (i.e. avoiding 
light contact); and thus producing movements to sense it again (Figure 5.3). These types of 
perturbations are commonly employed in perturbation analysis in neural-like system (see [Keinan, 
2005]). This observation suggests two different modes of maintaining light contact: from right or 
left side. Analysing the lasting response of neurocontrollers when sensory inputs are forced to be 
constantly activated or deactivated can show in more detail how different behavioural responses 
are generated in the presence of neural noise. Because the noise term y0 in Eq. 5.1 is additive, 
nullclines in phase space will tend to be relatively displaced to each other for different values of 
y0, but not warped or changed (as would be expected if noise were added to a weight term) [Beer, 
1995b]. It is worth noting that nullclines are the geometric shape for which a differential equation 
is equal to 0, and that the fixed points of the system are located where all the nullclines intersect 
[Strogatz, 1994]. 
Table 5.1 shows the long-term responses of NC#9 and NC#3 as the difference between left and 
right motor neuron activities (i.e. neuron #0’s and neuron #1’s output activations). This difference 
produces leftward and rightward movements for phototaxis behaviour. To achieve these results, 
we force incomings to be constantly activated (sensor inputs=1) or deactivated (sensor inputs=0) 
given fixed values of y0 ∈ {-4, 0, 4} in neurons #4 and #5, with y0=0 for the remaining neurons. A 
positive difference means that an agent turns left, while a negative difference implies an agent or 
eventually turns right. The lasting response of neurocontrollers for each sensor and fixed y0 
configuration helps to differentiate the neurocontrollers’ strategies for approaching a light source 
as noted in Figure 5.3. We explain as follows the approaching strategy of NC#9, but a similar 
analysis holds for NC#3 based on Table 5.1.  
Our categorization of all behavioural space divides into rightward and leftward movements of 
agents without taking into account the magnitude motor output responses in Table 5.1. This two-
valued categorization is because, by definition, a qualitative change in behaviour usually implies a 
change in associated dynamics. In our experiments, the strategies for right or left side approaching 
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are exhibited during negative or positive motor responses, respectively. In this case, we are 
interested in identifying these changes in direction, because a change of magnitude in motor 
output do not necessarily entail a qualitative change in right or left approaching behaviour. 
 
input 
neurons 
neural noise 
interneurons 
motor response  
input 
neurons 
neural noise 
interneurons 
motor response 
#2 #3 y0 #4 y0 #5 NC#9 NC#3  #2 #3 y0 #4 y0 #5 NC#9 NC#3 
0 0 -4 -4 0.103 (Å) 0.200 (Å) 
 
0 1 -4 -4 0.172 (Å) 0.249 (Å) 
0 0 -4 0 0.170 (Å) 0.102 (Å) 0 1 -4 0 0.202 (Å) 0.171 (Å) 
0 0 -4 4 0.211 (Å) -0.019 (Æ) 0 1 -4 4 0.226 (Å) 0.064 (Å) 
0 0 0 -4 -0.114 (Æ) 0.205 (Å) 0 1 0 -4 0.160 (Å) 0.253 (Å) 
0 0 0 0 -0.094 (Æ) 0.108 (Å) 0 1 0 0 0.199 (Å) 0.176 (Å) 
0 0 0 4 -0.041 (Æ) -0.012 (Æ) 0 1 0 4 0.225 (Å) 0.070 (Å) 
0 0 4 -4 -0.116 (Æ) 0.210 (Å) 0 1 4 -4 -0.099 (Æ) 0.258 (Å) 
0 0 4 0 -0.100 (Æ) 0.114 (Å) 0 1 4 0 -0.043 (Æ) 0.182 (Å) 
0 0 4 4 -0.075 (Æ) -0.005 (Æ) 0 1 4 4 0.128 (Å) 0.076 (Å) 
1 1 -4 -4 0.214 (Å) 0.065 (Å) 1 0 -4 -4 0.200 (Å) -0.018 (Æ) 
1 1 -4 0 0.233 (Å) -0.060 (Æ) 1 0 -4 0 0.225 (Å) -0.139 (Æ) 
1 1 -4 4 0.242 (Å) -0.175 (Æ) 1 0 -4 4 0.238 (Å) -0.236 (Æ) 
1 1 0 -4 0.214 (Å) 0.071 (Å) 1 0 0 -4 0.200 (Å) -0.011 (Æ) 
1 1 0 0 0.233 (Å) -0.053 (Æ) 1 0 0 0 0.225 (Å) -0.133 (Æ) 
1 1 0 4 0.242 (Å) -0.168 (Æ) 1 0 0 4 0.238 (Å) -0.230 (Æ) 
1 1 4 -4 0.214 (Å) 0.077 (Å) 1 0 4 -4 0.192 (Å) -0.004 (Æ) 
1 1 4 0 0.233 (Å) -0.046 (Æ) 1 0 4 0 0.223 (Å) -0.126 (Æ) 
1 1 4 4 0.242 (Å) -0.162 (Æ) 1 0 4 4 0.237 (Å) -0.225 (Æ) 
Table 5.1. Long-term responses of NC#9’s and NC#3’s turning behaviours. Table shows the difference 
between left and right motor activities (motor response), when sensory input nodes #2 and #3 are forced 
to be constantly activated (sensor input=1) or deactivated (sensor input=0) (indicated for each response 
data); y0 #4 and y0 #5 represent fixed levels of neural perturbation (y0 ∈ {-4, 0, 4}) in interneurons #4 and 
#5, respectively. Arrows indicate rightward (Æ) or leftward movements (Å). Highlighted (bold-italic) 
rows are referred to in the main text. 
We start our analysis of NC#9 with no lights (sensor inputs=0) and without noise in any neuron. 
In this situation, the agent moves slightly turning right due to motor response -0.094 (indicated as 
(0;0;0;0) for (#2; #3; y0#4; y0#5) in Table 5.1). This motion will cause that right sensor to 
encounter the light. Then, the right sensor will start to receive more input, causing the agent to 
turn left slightly when approaching the light due to motor response 0.199 (indicated for (0;1;0;0) 
values of (#2; #3; y0#4; y0#5) in Table 5.1). This produces a decrease of the right sensing input up 
to the non-sensing situation as in the starting case, because the sensor loses contact with the light. 
After approaching the light blindly, the agent will generate a new movement to right (similar to 
that described before), generating again an increase of the right input sensing. 
From a long-term perspective, this right strategy will cause the right sensor activity to be 
increased or decreased depending on robot’s approach to light. However, in normal phototaxis, 
values of y0 change, which can produce a change in the approaching strategy of NC#9 toward a 
left sensor configuration (see for example (4;0) or (4;4) values of (y0#4; y0#5) in Table 5.1). In this 
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case, starting from the situation sensing no light, eventually the right sensor will perceive first 
more light than the left sensor, producing agent motion to the right (motor response -0.043); or 
slight moves left (motor response 0.128) for (4;0) and (4;4) values of (y0#4; y0#5), respectively 
(Table 5.1). When the levels of y0 are (4;0) for neurons (y0#4; y0#5), the agent will move to 
produce a decrease in right sensor input due to the approaching angle to the light. The left sensor 
input will increase generating a left movement (motor response 0.223) instead of a right 
movement, as explained before for the right sensor configuration. A similar strategy using the left 
sensor is observed with (4;4) levels of (y0#4; y0#5), but control takes longer, i.e. the robot turns left 
more slightly when the right sensor input increases during the approaching behaviour. We 
conclude that the strategy of NC#9 for maintaining phototaxis behaviour with left or right sensors 
is based on the combination of internally generated motor responses and agent’s situatedness, 
which creates the approaching behaviour that eventually activates right or left sensors as described 
previously.  
5.3.3 The effect of perturbations in a dynamically engaged system 
The phototactic behaviour is not demonstrated in other configuration of noise during a normal 
sensing approach. For example, adding y0=-4 to neuron #4, regardless of the level of noise in 
neuron #5, results in the agent not performing phototaxis because to agent loses the capacity to 
turn right and also the ability to maintain right or left sensory inputs (see Table 5.1). Similarly, 
setting y0=-4 in neuron #5 and y0=4 in neuron #4 also produces non-phototactic behaviour, 
because left movements are not reached correctly during normal sensing approach. This 
observation is important because we realize that the NC#9 agent falls into a left or right sensor 
configuration depending on the value of y0 in the interneurons and current sensing.  
Let us now look at NC#3 with no input sensing (agent sees no lights) and without neural noise. 
This agent turns left (motor response 0.108 indicated for (0;0) values of (y0#4; y0#5) in Table 5.1). 
Eventually, the left sensor will activate abruptly, producing a rightward movement (motor 
response -0.133) that will generate a decrease in left sensor input when the agent approaches light. 
This use of the left sensor is also observed during normal sensing situations when the level of 
noise in internal neurons is (-4;0) and (4;0) values of (y0#4; y0#5). Phototaxis is performed only in 
non-noisy configurations, because the agent loses its capacity for turning left using its left sensor. 
For example, in (0;-4) of (y0#4; y0#5) configuration, the NC#3 agent turns left (motor response 
0.205) when it senses no lights, which eventually will produce an increase of left sensing and a 
slight right movement (motor response -0.011). However, this right movement is not enough to 
maintain left sensory input while the agent approaches a light. This means that eventually the right 
sensor becomes activated, producing a left movement (motor response 0.253), which results in a 
new non-sensing situation with both sensors. According to the lasting response of NC#3 in Table 
5.1, the agent sometimes turns in diverse directions with different levels of noise mainly when 
both sensors are activated or when no sensing is produced. The agent will receive overall inputs 
from ‘the wrong side’, causing movements that do not approach a light. This long-term analysis 
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however only provides an indication of how the attractor landscape is affected for different 
configurations of sensory input and y0 values of neural noise. 
Based on Table 5.1, our observations of the actual phototaxis indicate that NC#9 performs well 
in 5 out of 9 cases ((0;0), (0;-4), (0;4), (4;0), and (4;4) values of y0 in neurons #4 and #5). NC#3 
however produces 3 out of 9 ((0;0), (-4;0), and (4;0) values of (y0#4; y0#5)). Moreover, NC#9 is 
able to deploy at least two different behavioural strategies (section 5.3.2) while only one has been 
observed for NC#3. By taking the values of y0 investigated as rough representatives of the whole 
space of variation for y0, we can conclude that for most levels of noise (but not all) NC#9 will 
perform phototaxis using a combination of two strategies, though that this is not the case for 
NC#3. NC#9 is therefore sometimes undergoing bifurcations at phase space level (section 
3.2.3.1), but they are most of the time functional allowing it still to perform phototaxis (roughly 
around two-thirds of the time). Nevertheless, about one third of the time these bifurcations are 
non-functional, as described before. For example, NC#9 is not significantly affected by noise 
when sensors are simultaneously activated, but it generates wrong long-term responses (turning 
left instead of turning right, for example) more frequently than in NC#3 where input sensors are 
deactivated simultaneously depending on the levels of noise. However, noise produces 
dysfunctional bifurcations in NC#3’s neurocontroller dynamics more frequently than in NC#9. 
Again, as specified in section 3.2.3.1, a bifurcation occurs when a small smooth change made to 
the parameter values of a system (the bifurcation parameters) causes a sudden qualitative or 
topological change in system behaviour [Blanchard et al., 2006]. 
The proposed general hypothesis is that those controllers evolved with enough noise undergo 
fewer long-term dysfunctional bifurcations because of noise. Evolution finds networks that operate 
in regions of phase space for which moderate displacement of the nullclines does not significantly 
affect the functionality of the inner-system. NC#9 has two different strategies for approaching 
light in the presence of noise, this implies that noise can generate bifurcations at phase space but 
they happen to be also functional. For perturbations in the noise range, perturbations do not 
usually cause qualitative changes to inner-system functionality. Evolution is therefore not only 
searching for regions of parameter space where bifurcations in phase space induced by noise are 
unlikely to happen, but also for regions in phase space where ‘neighbouring’ bifurcations are also 
functional during agents’ lifetime.  
Analysis in this section suggests that NC#9 produces sharp changes in its behaviour. However, 
there are still three possibilities to explain how fitness is maintained high despite neural noise:  
(I) those particular bifurcations do not largely affect the transient dynamics of the network;  
(II) all (or most) bifurcations produce different forms of instantaneous phototaxis (they are 
mostly functional in themselves);  
(III) no bifurcations are produced.  
The last possibility (III) is not considered for further discussion in this chapter because it refers to 
the absence of bifurcations at neurocontroller level, and we have given evidence of the existence 
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of long-term bifurcations during agents’ coupling (section 5.3.2). The two first possibilities also 
imply two explanations:  
(1) negative (non-functional) bifurcation may indeed happen in the range of the noise 
parameter, but these bifurcations may be short lived while the agent performs 
phototaxis;  
(2) negative (non-functional) bifurcation may occur for significant amounts of time, creating 
bifurcations that lead asymptotically to non-phototaxis.  
In the first case (1), bifurcation during an internal transient seems to be related with NC#9 because 
robustness against noise is functionally maintained despite increasing neural noise in most 
situations. The agent still performs phototaxis because it is held in a transient between attractors 
that are functional (see [Iizuka & Di Paolo, 2007a] and experiments in Chapter 8). By contrast, 
NC#3 probably corresponds to case (2) with noise leading to the loss of performance when it is 
increased. We have not ruled out internal transient effects for the situation described for NC#9, 
however.  
5.4 Discussion: the relation between situatedness and internal dynamics 
for robust behaviour 
Experiments with neural noise have been presented in this chapter from an evolutionary and 
sensorimotor perspective. The simulation model in itself is minimal but results suggest that, at 
least experimentally, evolution relies on behavioural mechanisms that maintain functional 
(coupled) dynamics in inner-transients, as shown for the NC#9 agent. Results also indicate that 
neurocontrollers lose sensitivity to detrimental effects of noise when internal-systems 
(neurocontrollers) are evolved with high levels of neural noise (i.e. y0 ∈ [-4, 4]).  
From an evolutionary perspective, the interesting lesson is that neural noise in evolution seems 
to put pressure for selecting neural systems that are resistant to non-functional bifurcation in 
phase space, and so robustness lies in having a dynamic landscape that remains, in the overall 
balance, functionally the same during behaviour. This is evidenced by the noise robustness of 
NC#9 and the noise sensitivity of NC#3. The relationship between behavioural mechanisms 
emerging from evolution with neural noise has been minimally investigated in the simulation 
studies so far. In fact, mechanisms where noise is irrelevant could vary from the simple attractors’ 
view where noise utility is removed because of convergence to stable system dynamics.  
Our results suggest that the evolutionary process in the presence of neural noise – following the 
logic of Jakobi’s minimal simulations – is finding robust neural dynamics that, when coupled with 
the environment, produce phototaxis. However, this robustness has a structure. It is a combination 
of locating the evolved neurocontrollers in regions of parameter space that maximize evolutionary 
fitness which bases on lifetime fitness of agents and, if and when bifurcations occur in phase space 
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(or are unlikely to occur), agents remain in balance functional showing phototaxis. This finding 
suggests that robustness to other sensorimotor perturbations may be a by-product of locating such 
regions of parameter space, which refers to the evolutionary history of how an evolved population 
goes through successive generations. If this is so, a prediction from this result is that a similar 
evolutionary process under parametrical variability (e.g. neural noise), but applied to non-additive 
parameters (such as weight synaptic values) may result in even higher levels of robustness to 
sensorimotor perturbations. 
In our results, and in accordance to the above explanation, good performance was also observed 
when noise was removed, indicating that noise is not actively maintaining functionality in the 
analysed neurocontrollers. Nevertheless, we do not discard the idea that evolution may find 
neurocontrollers for which noise is advantageous, in which case our explanation will need to be 
appropriately modified. Such last idea is further investigated in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8, including 
comparisons using embodied agents to perform qualitatively different tasks.  
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 “… when a constraint exists advantage can usually be taken of it.” 
 
W. Ross Ashby, 1956, p. 130. 
 
 
 
 
In Chapter 5 we have discussed how agents develop coupled engagements and use 
neurocontroller properties to sustain behaviours in the presence of internally induced 
perturbations (i.e. neural noise). This chapter continues investigating the emergence of 
behavioural mechanisms but evolves agents with dynamically limited controllers (monostable 
agents) and compares them to less limited ones (bistable agents). ‘Dynamically limited’ here 
relates to a reduced quantity of steady states that an agent controller exhibits when it does not 
receive stimulus from the environment. As indicated in section 1.3, again, neurocontrollers 
showing long-term global stability around one fixed-point are named as monostable controllers in 
this chapter; while those controllers exhibiting two fixed-point attractors within the intrinsic 
dynamics of analysed successful agents are referred to as bistable (see further descriptions in 
section 6.4.2). Agents are evolved for categorical perception, a minimal cognitive task [Beer, 
2003], and must correlate approaching or avoiding movements to different types of objects in the 
environment. The model has been designed so that the final input state of agents is qualitatively 
the same for both approaching and avoiding behaviours, i.e. without sensory stimuli from the 
environment. In this way, we challenge evolution to exploit opportunities in brain-body-
environment coupled dynamics, given a restricted amount of internal dynamical resources. 
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Results suggest a small but significant tendency of better performance by monostable in contrast 
to bistable agents in the presence of sensorimotor, structural, and mutational perturbations. We 
argue that the difference is based on greater environmental dependence of neurocontrollers to 
coupled dynamics. We also extensively analyse the behaviour and engaged dynamics of best-fit 
agents. However, as mentioned before, results are partial but not definitive because of such slight 
tendency. This chapter lays the foundation for further experimental work inducing coupled 
(environmental or body-based) dependencies of behavioural mechanisms in next chapters. Here 
the distribution criterion refers to the use of external factors for behaviours, where environmental 
dependence is induced via limited neurocontroller dynamics. This chapter is derived from work 
submitted for journal publication (see [Fernandez-Leon, sub. 2010a]). 
6.1 Introduction 
Studies in systems biology show that bacteria reach extreme robustness under harsh stress 
conditions [Balaban et al., 2004][Alon, 2006][Alon et al., 1999]. It is assumed that bacteria can 
reach robustness by creating internal switches from one steady state to another to keep themselves 
functional, rather than trying to sustain a given state [Kitano, 2004a]. In such a dynamical 
interpretation, however, the roles of body (embodiment) [Ziemke, 2003] and spatio-temporal 
factors (situatedness) [Brooks, 1991d] are not considered despite the fact that bacteria are free 
moving organisms.  
Work here reinforces the idea given in previous chapters that behavioural robustness may well 
turn out to be a property of a particular organism-internal-control in its coupling with the 
environment, rather than a systemic property that is ‘ensured from inside’ (a common 
interpretation in current systems biology [Kitano, 2004a]). This research aims to understand both 
(i) whether feedback from the actions that an agent produces in the environment is a decisive 
factor underlying behavioural robustness, and (ii) whether further dynamical complexity at 
neurocontroller level helps the emergence of robust behaviour. Without this feedback, it can be 
hypothesized that an agent will more easily be driven by perturbations to internal states that do not 
correlate with current environmental situations, and as such, it will produce non-appropriated 
categorical perception.  
For (ii), research in adaptive systems raises the question whether agents with further dynamical 
complexity at internal control can better cope with perturbations than dynamically simpler agents. 
In the former agents, internal dynamics could ideally transit between dynamical states, enabling 
agents to cope with the effects of perturbations [Kitano, 2007]. In the latter agents, for instance, 
internal control could be rooted in transient dynamics around one attractor (internal state) 
[Buckley et al., 2008][Fine et al., 2007]. Answers to question (ii) have a conceptual and practical 
interest for ethology and theoretical biology [Cliff, 1991], because they will provide a broad 
account of the simple dynamics and mechanisms underlying robustness (see [Hobbs et al., 
1996][Teo, 2004]). In fact, as we indicated in Chapter 3, robustness studies have not typically 
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been addressed from the point of view of coupled dynamics [Silverman & Ikegami, 2010]. 
Towards this aim, this part of the thesis describes statistical, behavioural and dynamical analyses 
to answer questions (i) and (ii). 
Work here contributes to this approach (coupled dynamics for robust behaviour) with 
experimental proofs and discussions from a computational perspective. The ER technique 
(Chapter 4) is used to give the right conditions during evolution for the emergence of dynamically 
limited control systems performing categorical perception [Slocum et al., 2000][Williams et al., 
2008]. Experiments in this chapter induce the emergence of agents that cannot exclusively rely on 
internal control for robust and adaptive behaviour, but they can exploit agent-environment 
coupling for the categorization task.  
The next section introduces related works. The methods and experimental configurations are 
given in section 6.3. Section 6.4 and section 6.5 examine the results obtained and provide 
discussions to validate the hypothesis described. 
6.2 Related works 
The use that agents show of environmental dynamics can be investigated via small bio-inspired 
models. For example, Thieme and Ziemke (2002) describe agents showing T-maze navigation by 
using walls all the way toward a goal (section 3.3.2). The decision for turning to one side rather 
than another depends on a beam of light initially given by the experimenter. They argue that such 
use of walls is an example of distributed cognition to perform T-maze goal approaching; that is, 
the dependence on external conditions can be seen as part of a control strategy which is distributed 
among internal-control, body, and environment [Thieme & Ziemke, 2002]. Thieme and Ziemke 
indicate that an agent’s own position regarding a wall represents a simplified external memory that 
overcomes the absence of internal memory states. Hutchins (1995) gives similar arguments about 
the use of the external world, suggesting that the role of material environment is part of an agent’s 
cognitive strategy to produce behaviours.  
Discussions in this chapter exemplify the use of coupled dynamics for robust and adaptive 
behaviours in a task that raises issues of genuine cognitive interest (i.e. categorical perception in 
minimal agents) [Beer, 1996]. After making a preliminary investigation of the difference between 
agents with one or two internal (dynamical) states, this work goes on to consider the engagements 
of internal-control, body and environment that agents exploit to produce approaching and avoiding 
behaviours. The following section describes the methods used for this research. 
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6.3 Methods 
6.3.1 Agent and structure of the environment 
The categorical perception task presented here is defined mostly following descriptions given in 
[Slocum et al., 2000] and [Williams et al., 2008]. However, the task is implemented by evolving 
agents with binary (rather than continuous) sensors. This is made to simplify the analysis of non-
linear dynamics during behaviours. Such a simplification creates a reduction of the number of 
sensory states (7-sensor signals) in every time step. Note that it is not required for evolving a 
categorical perception task to have agents with continuous sensors. This work also defines 
variations on the internal agent architecture and object configuration, which differ from the 
settings given in [Williams et al., 2008]. Here 5 rather than 3 interneurons are used (further 
discussed in section 6.4). 
Following the same line of investigation in minimal cognition as in [Beer, 1996], the 
implemented task requires the capacity of agents to differentiate between ‘objects to approach’ 
and ‘objects to avoid’. Categorization here depends, however, on sensing two diamonds that are 
(i) separated enough (d≠0, with d > agent’s body diameter) to enable the agent body to pass 
through the diamonds, or (ii) close enough (d=1) where there are no chances for the agent to 
accommodate its body between the diamonds (Figure 6.1). An object of each type is dropped from 
21 different starting positions, and this is repeated 3 times for each object. This gives a number of 
63 trials per type of object to profile the ability of an agent for categorical perception. Trials 
represent the number of times the simulation drops an object.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 - Experimental setup for the categorical perception task. The agent (circle) can move 
horizontally while objects composed by two diamonds with an adjustable aperture d fall from above. 
d 
approaching 
object 
avoiding 
object 
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An agent is placed at the centre, in the bottom part of the arena (horizontal axis), and objects are 
initially located at the top part in the range [-100, 100] (arbitrary units), relative to the agent’s 
initial position (Figure 6.1). In each trial, the state of every unit in the agent’s internal control 
(neurons) is initialized to zero. Objects fall down from above to lower positions where the agent 
moves horizontally (the bottom part in Figure 6.1). The final agent-object horizontal distance 
describes approaching or avoiding behaviours.  
In a more ‘traditional implementation’ of categorical perception [Beer, 2003] (i.e. with squares 
[Slocum et al., 2000] and circles [Williams et al., 2008] to categorize), the final state of the 
agent’s sensors is all activated for approaching, while sensing nothing for avoiding behaviour. The 
layout of objects used in this chapter (two falling diamonds), challenges the evolutionary process 
in that the final state of the agent is the same for approaching and avoiding tasks (i.e., without 
external sensory stimulus). In this way, we induce that agent’s neurocontrollers do not develop 
different dynamical states for approaching and avoiding tasks because of these final sensory states. 
This last point is further discussed in section 6.3.4 in relation to the emergence of monostable 
controllers.  
6.3.2 Agent’s controller definition 
The following experimental settings are chiefly based on descriptions given in [Beer, 2003]. The 
agent model has a circular body with a diameter of 30 (arbitrary units) receiving stimulus from an 
array of seven sensor rays (maximum length 325 arbitrary units) that are equally placed from the 
centre of the agent over an angle of π/4 on the agent’s top side (Figure 6.1). Sensors take binary 
values representing the intersection (incoming signal 1) and no-intersection (incoming signal 0) 
between a ray and an object. A continuous-time recurrent neural network (CTRNN) [Beer, 1995b] 
controls the behaviour of an agent. The intersection between object and ray causes a binary signal 
that is processed by the corresponding sensory node and transmitted to 5 interneurons. 
Interneurons connect to 2 motor neurons that control the horizontal displacement of an agent (i.e. 
difference in neurons zj values according to Eq. 6.2). The following equations define the 
implemented neuron-like units: 
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where yi is the activation (the state) of the i-th neuron, τi is its time constant in range [1, 2], and wji 
is the strength of the connection from the j-th to the i-th neuron in range [-5, 5]; θj is a bias term in 
range [-10, 0] for input nodes and [-5, 5] for interneurons; gj is a gain in range [0, 10] for input 
nodes and [-5, 5] for interneurons; σ(x) is the standard logistic activation function; Ii represents an 
external input (from a sensor), and n is the number of neurons in the network. Neuron activations 
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are calculated forward through time by straightforward time-slicing using Euler integration with a 
time-step of 0.1. The neuron’s activations are re-initialized between different trials to zero yi 
activation. 
The network architecture is defined as bilaterally symmetric in the connection weights, biases, 
and time constants. While imposing such symmetry often made trials involving nearly centred 
objects difficult, it reflects the symmetry of the agent and the task, and halves the number of 
parameters to evolve. All the sensory nodes share the same time-constant with value 1, while bias 
and gain parameters for sensors, bias, gain, and time-constant for internal and motor neurons, and 
synaptic connections are genetically determined.  
6.3.3 Artificial evolution settings 
A real-valued genetic algorithm [Mitchell, 1998] is implemented to evolve the CTRNN 
parameters. The 51 parameters are encoded on a vector of real numbers in the range [-5, 5]. The 
evolutionary process works using a population size of 300 neurocontrollers. Initially, a population 
of genotypes (neurocontrollers) is established assigning random values for each evolving 
parameter. The genetic algorithm selects a specified elitist fraction of 100 top individuals in every 
generation using a rank proportionate criterion, which are copied to a new population in the next 
evolutionary generation (1000 generations in total). The remaining 200 individuals are determined 
using both mutation and crossover over the elitism fraction.  
The evolutionary crossover method creates an offspring from two genotypes derived from 
recombination with probability of 0.2 (single point crossover). Following descriptions in [Beer, 
1996], vector mutation is applied by adding to the genotype a random displacement vector whose 
direction is uniformly distributed on the M-dimensional hypersphere. The magnitude of this vector 
is a Gaussian random variable with 0 mean and variance 0.05. This variance has reported a good 
evolutionary convergence of fitness in our preliminary tests (experiments non-reported here). 
Finally, muted genes are linearly mapped to every evolutionary parameter in their phenotypic 
scales.  
The performance of each agent is maximized by averaging the fitness obtained in the whole set 
of trials for avoiding and approaching objects simultaneously. Eq. 6.4 describes the proposed 
fitness measure that discriminates between an aperture wide enough for the agent to pass through 
(approaching objects) and a zero aperture (avoiding objects). The final horizontal separation si 
between the centre of the agent and the object is obtained at the end of the i-th trial. This fitness 
measure assigns near-zero value to incorrect actions and linearly penalizes by misses. Since 
making the correct decision without hitting the diamonds results in a significantly higher score, 
this measure also rewards accuracy in agent’s movements in a similar way than developed in 
[Slocum et al., 2000].  
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 ( )ii sap ⋅= ,100min  if avoiding (6.5) 
 ( )ii sbp ⋅−= 100,0max  if approaching (6.6) 
The implemented algorithm determines the fitness for a trial (n trials in total) considering the 
absolute horizontal distance (|si|) between the centre of an agent and the falling object. Fitness is 
measured when the object is at a random distance in range [0, 10] (arbitrary units) from the 
agent’s final (vertical) position. In this way, it is prevented that evolution comes up with agents 
that approach or avoid objects predominantly at the end of a trial. The si distance is multiplied by 
an adjustment constant a or b, for avoiding or approaching objects, respectively (further explained 
below). The algorithm clips the obtained fitness measure to a maximum value of 100 units (see 
Eq. 6.5 and Eq. 6.6) and then normalized in range [0, 1]. A final separation between the agent and 
object of zero corresponds to a perfect approach, and a maximum separation (defined by 100 units 
in Eq. 6.5 and Eq. 6.6) represents a perfect avoidance. More evaluations (20) in the last generation 
are used to better profiling the performance of agents. That is, 20 times a particular object is 
leaved to fall down from a different position in the arena (section 6.3.1), and for each time fitness 
is independently measured and finally averaged. 
6.3.4 Inducing monostable and bistable network dynamics 
This section describes the developed process to induce mono- and bi-stability via evolution. 
Initially, the reader should be aware that at least two different strategies can be used for this 
purpose: strategy 1 to impose explicit dynamical constraints at neural dynamics level, or strategy 
2 to define experimental conditions that require different modes of behaviour. The following 
descriptions clarify these strategies to support methodological aspects for this chapter. 
Buckley et al. (2008) give an example of strategy 1 for inducing monostability in the 
autonomous dynamics of neurocontrollers (i.e. in the absence of incoming signals). They discuss 
how to obtain monostable controllers based on explicit restrictions in the dynamics of agents 
evolving for a goal-approaching (phototaxis) task. Firstly, they require center-crossing in the 
network configuration. The effect of defining center-crossing neurons is that it nullclines the curve 
along which yi=0 (see Eq. 6.1) intersects the exact centres of symmetry of each neuron 
[Mathayomchan & Beer, 2002]. Buckley et al. obtain local stability in CTRNNs as a necessary, 
but not sufficient precondition for global stability of the full, nonlinear center-crossing system 
[Buckley et al., 2008, p. 106]. Secondly, they impose the condition that all the system’s biases are 
settled to zero ensuring that there is equilibrium at the zero state in the neurons’ dynamics. In 
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other words, Buckley et al. require y*=0 (zero vector), where y* is a vector describing the position 
of an equilibrium point in the neuron’s state. Consequently they construct a criterion for local 
stability by linearising the system around y* looking for the equilibrium point through a Jacobian 
matrix examination. In brief, their neurocontrollers are locally stable around the zero state if all 
real parts of the eigenvalues of the Jacobian are negative; otherwise, it is unstable (see also 
[Strogatz, 1994] for further descriptions of the dynamical systems theory).  
In order to obtain bistable neurocontrollers, however, Buckley et al. (2008) use strategy 2 by 
following experimental descriptions given in [Fine et al., 2007]. The task is phototaxis towards a 
sequence of lights with a single light sensor. The sensor alternates its position intermittently 
between the front and back of the agent’s body. Since the agent cannot reverse, the nature of the 
task is fundamentally altered by this unsignalled change to the agent’s sensor [Buckley et al., 
2008, p. 107]. Therefore, the demand for bistability is methodologically different to the one for 
monostability. Buckley et al. construct a goal-approaching task requiring state and encouraged 
two modes of behaviour, rather than imposing explicit requirements for bistability at 
neurocontroller dynamics.  
In this chapter, only the strategy 2 is used to induce mono- and bistability, because it better fits 
a more traditional ER methodology (see [Buckley et al., 2008, p. 112]). The criterion is to select 
the conditions that favour the emergence of both types of dynamics rather than imposing 
dynamical restrictions at neural level. To attain bistability, this work proposes to set differently a 
and b parameters in Eq. 6.5 and Eq. 6.6: a=1/3 and b=10 for bistability, while a=2 and b=4 for 
monostability. These values are obtained after a trial-and-error process. The question that arises is: 
why should changing the a and b parameters in Eq. 6.4 lead to mono or bistability in the resulting 
networks?  
By replacing a=1/3 in Eq. 6.5, we find that a bistable agent obtains maximum avoiding fitness 
(i.e. value 100) after moving far away from an avoiding object (i.e. more than 300 arbitrary units). 
However, in the case of monostable agents (replacing a=2 in Eq. 6.5), the maximum fitness for 
avoiding is reached by moving at least 50 arbitrary units. These values of ‘a’ parameter implicitly 
impose that bistable agents must move farthest (6 times more) than monostable agents for 
maximum fitness. When replacing b=10 in Eq. 6.6, the requirement of approaching in bistable 
agents is that, in the end, maximum fitness can be reached with distances lower than 10 arbitrary 
units. For monostable agents, and if we replace b=4 in Eq. 6.6, such distance can be lower than 25 
arbitrary units. These values of ‘b’ parameter therefore implicitly impose that bistable agents 
move in the long run closer (0.4 times more) to objects than monostable agents for the 
approaching task.  
The difference between these critical distances for maximum fitness in the bistable case (i.e. 
approaching: <10 arbitrary units; avoiding: >300 arbitrary units) is considerably greater than in the 
monostable situation (i.e. avoiding: <25 arbitrary units; approaching: >50 arbitrary units). Note 
then that the evolutionary requirement of a higher difference in critical distances is what induces 
the emergence of two dynamical states in the autonomous dynamics (bistable neurocontrollers). 
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Furthermore, the reduced difference in critical distances induces no further states in the 
autonomous dynamics of the monostable agent. Proceeding in this way, we obtained 87% bistable 
and 99% monostable controllers with (a=1/3; b=10) and (a=2; b=4) of 20 independent 
evolutionary experiments for each type of controller. Appendix A.3 demonstrates that by using the 
described values of (a; b) parameters for mono- and bistability, the comparison of lifetime-fitness 
between sets of agents is possible. 
It is worth noting that when a network is embedded in an agent body, and despite both kinds of 
neurocontrollers being driven with time-varying inputs from the sensors, the mono- and bistable 
distinction has to be made in order to determine the number of basins of attraction used during 
agents’ coupling with the environment. Following the statistical analysis given in [Buckley et al., 
2008], work in this chapter tests for mono- and bistability by allowing each network to settle down 
(10000 time steps) from 1000 different uniformly-distributed random neural activations (yi ∈ 
[−10, 10]). This analysis shows that the outputs of networks are globally stable for monostability, 
or reveals the presence of two fixed-point attractors for bistability. It should be noted that other 
ways of analysing the emergence of mono- and bistability are also possible using the dynamical 
systems theory [Strogatz, 1994].  
6.3.5 Experimental procedure 
The implemented algorithm evolves agents that can accurately distinguish between ‘passageways’ 
(approaching objects) and ‘obstacles’ (avoiding objects). To perceive whether an aperture between 
objects is ‘passable’, an agent must discriminate the aperture’s width relative to its own body. An 
agent is placed along the bottom part of a two dimensional environment with no limits. The agent 
is able to move horizontally with velocity in range [-10, 10] (arbitrary units per time step) to the 
rightward or leftward direction. The horizontal velocity is proportional to the sum of the opposing 
output signals produced by two CTRNN motor neurons. Based on Eq. 6.2, the motor output 
equation controlling the movements of an agent is: motorLeftOutput – motorRightOutput.  
The agent moves according to first-order dynamics, with motor neurons directly specifying the 
velocity of movement with a constant of proportionality. This constant is an evolved output-
scaling factor for each neurocontroller in range [0, 10]. Objects fall from above with a constant 
vertical velocity of -3 units per time step (otherwise specified during tests with perturbations). 
During evolution, objects have a fixed vertical initial distance to the agent’s position of 270 units 
(at zero agent-object distance) with a fixed horizontal offset in range [-100, 100].  
Two diamonds each 30 units wide compose both the approaching and avoiding objects. The 
distance between the centre of these objects represents the objects’ horizontal aperture forefront, 
where for approaching the aperture is 90 units (namely, d=3.0, three times the diameter of the 
agent). For avoiding, the separation is 30 units between the centre of diamonds (d=1.0, once the 
diameter of the agent), which means no separation between the edges (Figure 6.1).  
Chapter 6. Evolving cognitive-behavioural dependencies in situated agents 84 
 
 
6.4 Results 
Some preliminary settings were tested to evolve a categorical perception task as specified in 
section 6.3.1. In these experiments, a lower number of sensors were available (2, 4, or 6 sensors), 
and/or the number of interneurons was reduced from 5 to 4, 3, or 2 neurons. After five 
independent evolutionary runs for each parameter configuration, the evolution of agents with these 
numbers of interneurons and sensors did not produce better categorical perception than 
experiments with 5 interneurons and 7 sensors. For the experimental conditions given in section 
6.3, preliminary tests (non-reported experiments) showed that this last combination of neurons and 
sensors may be the necessary minimum for high performance on simultaneous approaching and 
avoiding tasks. The sections that follow consequently report results only with mono- and bistable 
controllers using 7 sensors, 5 fully connected interneurons, and 2 motor neurons. 
6.4.1 Statistical analyses of sets of agents 
6.4.1.1 Lifetime categorical perception performance 
This section contrasts the median lifetime fitness of two different sets of agents: one with 20 
monostable agents, and another one having 20 bistable agents. Each agent of both types was 
obtained as the best-fit individual in the last generation of one independent evolutionary run 
(section 6.3.3). These two sets are referred to as ‘sets of agents to compare’ forefront.  
Figure 6.2 shows the results obtained on the median lifetime fitness for both sets. Each agent of 
each type achieves a mean lifetime greater than 90% in tests after evolution. The best agent of 
each set has a mean fitness (1000 independent experiments) of 91.51% and 97.21% for the mono- 
and bistable case, respectively. The better median performance of bistable agents (Figure 6.2) is 
confirmed using a significant t-test that supports such positive difference, which is based on a 
normal distribution assumption, but comparisons of medians are reasonably robust for other 
distributions.  
As we can observe from Figure 6.2, both sets of agents produce proper categorical perception, 
but the bistable set reaches better median fitness. Box-plots and whisker plots in Figure 6.2 (as 
well as in all box-plots reported here) have lines at the lower quartile, median, and upper quartile 
values. Whiskers extend from each end of the box to the adjacent values in the data. These values 
also include the extreme ones within 1.5 times the interquartile range from the ends of the box. 
Outliers are data with values beyond the ends of the whiskers displayed with a ‘+’ sign. Notches 
show the variability of the median between samples.  
Chapter 6. Evolving cognitive-behavioural dependencies in situated agents 85 
 
 
 
 
bistable monostable
0.8
0.9
1
Li
fe
tim
e 
fit
ne
ss
 (m
ed
ia
n)
Performance in tests after evolution
 
Figure 6.2 – Lifetime fitness (median) for mono- and bistable agents compared in a box plot representation. Fitness is 
clipped in range [0, 1]. 1000 independent experiments for each agent (20 in total for each type). Networks are 
composed by 7 sensors, 5 fully-connected interneurons, and 2 motor neurons. The task relates to catching (d=3.0) and 
avoiding (d=1.0) behaviours where object are dropped from 41 different starting positions in range [-100, 100] 
(horizontal agent-object relative distance). Results indicate a significant better lifetime fitness by bistable than 
monostable agents for categorical perception. 
The following experiments investigate the capacity of both sets of agents to generalize the 
perception of objects for approaching and avoiding behaviour. These experiments define 
separations between diamonds that are not the same as the ones presented during evolution (i.e. 
d=1.0 and d=3.0 as explained in section 6.3.5). Figure 6.3 shows the median performance (y-axis) 
of both sets of agents relative to different ‘d’ apertures between diamonds (x-axis). The obtained 
median performances for d=1.0 in avoiding (Figure 6.3-B) and d=3.0 in approaching behaviours 
(Figure 6.3-A) are near the optimum (median) fitness for both types of agents.  
For approaching behaviour, a t-test of significance reveals that we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that mono- and bistable median fitness are equal for d=1.0, d=1.5 and d=3.0 
separations (Figure 6.3-A). However, we can reject the null hypothesis for d=2.0 and d=2.5. This 
means that the monostable set obtains a good lifetime median fitness when the separation between 
diamonds enables approaching behaviour (i.e. d=2.0 and d=2.5). For other apertures between 
diamonds (i.e. d=1.0, d=1.5, and d=3.0), both strategies obtained quantitatively similar 
performances with a 95% confidence level (5% of significance level) for the true similarity in 
medians. For avoiding fitness (Figure 6.3-B), we cannot reject the null hypothesis when d=1.0, 
d=1.5, d=2.5, and d=3.0; however, we can reject it when d=2.0. What these last results indicate is 
that for d=1.0, d=1.5, d=2.5, and d=3.0, the difference in mono- and bistable performance is not 
considerably high, which suggests a similar overall performance for both sets of agents in 
approaching and avoiding tasks. 
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Figure 6.3 – Lifetime fitness (median) of (M) mono- and (B) bistable agents (20 for each type) with a box plot 
representation for various object apertures (d=1.0, d=1.5, d=2.0, d=2.5, and d=3.0). Fitness is clipped in range [0, 1]. 
Fitness measures are divided into [A] approaching and [B] avoiding measures. Objects are dropped from agent-object 
distances in range [-100, 100]. Plots indicate that monostable controllers obtained better lifetime median fitness than 
bistable agents when the separation between diamonds are d=2.0 and d=2.5, and these separations were not the same 
than the ones presented during evolution, namely d=1.0 and d=3.0. 
Summarizing, both mono- and bistable agents perform a sharply approaching behaviour when 
d=3.0, and avoiding behaviour when d=1.0. For intermediate separations between diamonds like 
d=2.0 and d=2.5, monostable agents show better approaching than bistable ones (higher median 
fitness in Figure 6.3-A); while bistable agents perform better than monostable agents for avoiding 
(Figure 6.3-B). It is worth noting here that bistable agents generally received less score in 
comparison to monostable ones not because they equivocated between approaching and avoiding 
movements, but because they ended up colliding with the middle of one of the diamonds. 
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6.4.1.2 Performance with mutational perturbations 
Results here and in sections 6.4.1.3 and 6.4.1.4 give evidence whether mono- and bistable sets 
share similar capacities to sustain behaviours in the presence of ‘extreme perturbations’. The 
concept of extreme perturbations refers to mean situations that negatively affect the production of 
behaviours, where these situations were not given during the evolution of agents.  
Figure 6.4 shows the normalized lifetime (mean) fitness of the set of mono- and bistable agents 
discriminated by different levels of mutational perturbations and avoiding/approaching fitness. 
Perturbations are applied to agent genotypes as mutations to each gene and, after translating them 
to their phenotypic expressions, the algorithm measures agent fitness. The algorithm repeats this 
process 1000 times for each agent taking the mean fitness, and averages the performance (y-axis) 
of the whole set of agents for each level of perturbation (Figure 6.4). Random mutations to genes 
(in range [0.0, 1.0]) are normally distributed with zero mean and controlled deviation (x-axes in 
plots of Figure 6.4). Values lower than 0.6 of mean (normalized) fitness in Figure 6.4 indicate that 
agents cannot produce approaching or avoiding behaviours.  
Both types of agents usually produce proper avoiding behaviour despite perturbations, because 
the mean fitness in Figure 6.4-A is higher than 0.7 (y-axis). Results indicate a small but significant 
higher mean fitness by the monostable set across levels of mutational perturbations in sustaining 
approaching behaviour (Figure 6.4-B). For avoiding behaviour (Figure 6.4-A), the mean fitness 
indicate a better performance for the bistable set of agents at most levels of mutational 
perturbation. The Mann-Whitney U-test [Mann & Whitney, 1947] for each plot supports the 
validity of these differences with 5% of significance. Plots in Figure 6.4 include metrics of 
significance based on the Spearman’s rank (s) coefficient, the associated t-test (t) and p-values (p) 
showing the correlation between the mutation deviation rate (x-axis) and the normalized mean 
fitness value (y-axis). These tests of significance indicate that such a correlation is slightly higher 
for the mono- than for the bistable set in avoiding behaviour (Figure 6.4-A), but lower for 
approaching behaviour (Figure 6.4-B). In other words, the higher the induced mutation deviation 
is, the lower mean avoiding fitness the monostable set reaches, where such decay of the mean 
fitness is less evident for the bistable case (Figure 6.4-A). Finally, for bistable agents, the higher 
the mutation rate is, the lower mean approaching fitness they reach, where this decay is more 
evident than in the monostable set (Figure 6.4-B).  
Summarizing, results indicate that there is a slight but significant tendency toward more a 
robust approaching performance by monostable agents than bistable ones based on analysis with 
mutational perturbations (Figure 6.4-B). This tendency appears mainly because bistable agents 
move farther than monostable agents in the presence of these perturbations in the approaching task 
(Figure 6.5-B), where the former agents are rewarded with lower approaching fitness. Monostable 
agents however cannot obtain higher mean fitness in avoiding than bistable agents under 
mutational perturbations (Figure 6.4-A). This is also because bistable agents can move farther than 
monostable agents in the presence of these perturbations, and consequently the former agents 
obtain better avoiding fitness (see explanations on the fitness function given in section 6.3.3).  
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Figure 6.4 – Normalized lifetime (mean) fitness based on mono- and bistable sets of agents in the presence of 
mutational perturbations. Twenty (20) agents compose each set. Each data point represents the mean fitness of 1000 
independent experiments. Perturbations are applied to agent’s genotypes and after translating them to their 
phenotypic expressions, we take agent’s normalized performances (y-axis). Mutations to genes are normally 
distributed with zero mean and controlled deviation in range [0, 1] (x-axis). Error bars represent standard deviation. 
Plots stand for mono- and bistable agent’s performances based on [A] avoiding and [B] approaching fitness. Results 
indicate a small, but significant difference in favour of the monostable set in sustaining approaching behaviour ([B]) 
despite induced mutations. For avoiding behaviour ([A]), the mean fitness trajectories indicate an overall better 
performance for the bistable set. Differences in mean fitness are supported by a Mann-Whitney U-test of significance 
(see imprints in each plot). 
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Figure 6.5 – Normalized (mean) agent-object distance for tests after evolution (lifetime experiments) based on mono- 
and bistable sets composed by 20 agents each. Each data point represents mean distance over 1000 independent 
experiments. Results are shown for mono- and bistable agents at different induced mutational deviations (x-axis) in 
agent’s genotypes. After mutations, we translate the resulted genotype to their phenotypic expression, evaluating the 
agent’s performance in order to obtain the final relative agent-object mean distance (y-axis). Mutations are normally 
distributed with zero mean and controlled deviation in range [0, 1] (x-axis). Error bars represent standard deviation. 
Plots correspond to mono- and bistable agent’s performances based on agent-object distances after [A] avoiding and 
[B] approaching behaviours. Results on [B] plot indicate that monostable agents remain closer to approaching objects 
in comparison to bistable ones in the presence of mutational perturbations. The [A] plot indicates that bistable agents 
move farthest than monostable agents in avoiding behaviour in the presence of mutational perturbations. 
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6.4.1.3 Performance with changing-object perturbation 
Continuing the discussions of the statistical tendency of both sets under perturbations, this section 
shows analyses of the capacity of both sets of agents to recognize changes in aperture between 
dynamics while objects fall.  
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Figure 6.6 – Performance (avg. of mean fitness) of mono- and bistable set of agents after changing from 
avoiding/approaching to approaching/avoiding falling objects at different vertical positions (x-axis). Objects fell 
down from 41 different horizontal agent-object positions in range [-60, 60]. The object’s switching position over time 
is plotted for an aperture relative to agent body’s size for [A & D] approaching (d=3.0) and [B & E] avoiding 
behaviour (d=1.0). [C & F] show an overlapped representation of first and second columns for each row. Error bars 
indicate standard deviation. Plots show similarity in mono- and bistable agent’s capacity to produce behavioural 
changes according to the falling object. 
Figure 6.6 shows the performance obtained (avg. of mean fitness) in approaching (d=3.0) and 
avoiding (d=1.0) tasks when the type of falling object is changed at different vertical positions 
(e.g. from avoiding/approaching to approaching/avoiding). Note first that the dissimilarity 
between curves in Figure 6.6-C & F is not statistically significant, but indicative of the sort of 
categorical behaviour employed by both sets of agents. For certain changing positions, the fitness 
of the monostable set does show less variability from their means (standard deviation) in 
comparison to the one for bistable agents. This lower variability mainly appears from 275 to 230 
units switching positions (x-axis) for approaching-to-avoiding objects (Figure 6.6-B & E). 
Bistable and monostable agents obtain a nearly constant low performance at the latter switching 
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positions for avoiding-to-approaching tasks. This is shown in Figure 6.6-A & D from 170 to 36 
switching positions. One explanation for this low performance is that mono- and bistable sets did 
not react as fast as required after the change of object, losing contact as the object fell, due to 
initial avoiding movements.  
Figure 6.6-A & D also suggest that the reaction of mono- and bistable agents to changes in 
object does not show a considerably high mean fitness in avoiding to approaching, mainly 
between 270 to 250 switching points. Finally, it should be noted that in approaching-to-avoiding 
tests, bistable agents (Figure 6.6-B) show less variability (standard deviation from the mean 
performance) than the monostable set agents (Figure 6.6-E) from 240 to 180 switching steps. This 
is because agents in the former set go farther more frequently from the new avoiding object in 
comparison to agents in the latter set after sensing an avoiding object. 
According to Figure 6.6, the overall observation is that for both types of agents the capacity 
to discriminate objects shows dependence on the agent position, the horizontal object starting 
position, and the vertical relative-distance between the agent and the object (approaching or 
avoiding ones). This suggests that some aspects of the agents’ situated state corresponds with the 
layout of both diamonds at the early trial midpoint when the object begins its fall. 
6.4.1.4 Performance with environmental and neurocontroller perturbations 
The motivation behind the following analysis is to understand the effects of environmental and 
neurocontroller perturbations on lifetime (mean) fitness during categorical perception. Here the 
algorithm induces different levels of additive and multiplicative noise in incoming or internal 
signals, as opposed to the mutational change indicated in section 6.4.1.2.  
Figure 6.7 shows results from experiments testing the performance of the mono- and bistable 
sets of agents discriminated by degrees of perturbation, i.e. 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, 100%, and 
120% at x-axes. Percentages apply to perturbations affecting sensory, neural or motor signals that 
agents should process. For each signal, the algorithm adds a uniformly distributed, randomly 
selected value that is multiplied by these percentages. Plots in Figure 6.7 are also divided into:  
 
(a) environmental perturbations at object level: (a.1) noise in the velocity of falling objects, 
and (a.2) noise in the separation between diamonds;  
(b) additive perturbations at signal level: (b.1) noise in sensory incoming signals, and (b.2) 
noise in the activity of neurons;  
(c) multiplicative perturbations at neurocontroller level: (c.1) noise in synaptic connections, 
and (c.2) noise in neuron gains.  
Perturbations a.1, a.2 and b.1 have some relation between them because they refer to 
‘environmental perturbations’ as well, while b.2, c.1, and c.2 relates to ‘perturbations affecting the 
neurocontroller’. For all of these perturbations, the algorithm implements a pseudorandom 
(uniformly distributed) additive noise to signals in a range [0.0, 1.0] proportionate to the degree of 
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perturbation. The following results are reported for 200 independent experiments per agent in each 
set discriminated by the level of perturbation (Figure 6.7).  
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Figure 6.7 – Lifetime fitness (median) obtained for mono (M)- and bistable (B) sets at different degrees of 
perturbations (y-axis). Each data point represents 200 different experiments for each agent (20 agents per set). 
Perturbations are divided as: (a) environmental perturbations at perceived object level: (a.1) noise in the velocity of 
falling objects, and (a.2) noise in the separation between diamonds; (b) additive perturbations at signal level: (b.1) 
noise in incoming sensory signals, and (b.2) noise in the activity of neurons; (c) multiplicative perturbations at 
neurocontroller level: (c.1) noise in synaptic connections, and (c.2) noise in neuron gains. Plots indicate a slight, but 
significant overall tendency to better performance by monostable agents in most of perturbation tests (see the main 
text for further descriptions). Results also indicate similar median performances in a.1, b.2, and c.1 experiments. 
Figure 6.7 shows that mono- and bistable sets obtain a similar median fitness for most degrees 
of perturbation in tests with noise in the velocity of falling objects (a.1), noise in the activity of 
neurons (b.2), and noise in synaptic connections (c.1). A significant difference in median 
performances in favour of monostable agents is observed when we induce noise in incoming 
signals (b.1), and noise in the separation between diamonds (a.2). For a.2 and b.1, there is a lower 
decay of the median performance for the monostable set in comparison to the bistable case. The 
lower decay is evidenced after inducing noise in incoming signals (b.1), noise in the activity of 
neurons (b.2), and noise in synaptic connections (c.1) for certain levels of perturbations (see 
Figure 6.7). In these observations, we account for fitness differences with 95% confidence (5% of 
significance level); i.e. median fitness for mono- and bistable set of agents differ when the notches 
do not overlap for each pair of test (e.g. B20% and M20% in x-axis of Figure 6.7-b.2).  
Results in this section indicate a higher median fitness tendency by the monostable set of agents 
than the bistable ones after inducing some levels of sensory perturbations (e.g. results with noise 
in incoming signals, and noise in the separation between diamonds in Figure 6.7). We cannot 
observe, however, an overall significant difference in fitness from the rest of the perturbations. 
The next section provides behavioural analyses with the two randomly selected agents, one of 
each type. This is done in order to exemplify what produces such a positive tendency to better 
median fitness in monostable agents.  
6.4.2 Behavioural analyses of selected agents 
Before describing the indicated behavioural analyses, this section briefly exemplifies the output 
responses of a mono- and bistable controller after allowing each network to settle down (10000 
time steps) from 1000 different random neural activations (yi ∈ [−10, 10]) (Figure 6.9). These two 
agents are representative examples of the mono- and bistable sets of agents. The remaining 
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sections of this chapter also report results for these two (randomly selected) agents. Appendix A.2 
describes the structure of the agents’ neurocontrollers in detail.  
Figure 6.8 shows the number of activated sensors for both behaviours when objects are placed 
at different agent-object separations in the arena. Regions in which the agent is fully sensing the 
object (e.g. the central region in the avoiding case, Figure 6.8-B) are bright meaning that all 
sensors are activated, whereas those with fewer activations are darker. Plots in Figure 6.8 show the 
full range of sensory activations that agents encounter. 
 
 
[A]  [B]  
Approaching case Avoiding case 
Figure 6.8 – Sensor activation for approaching [A] and avoiding [B] behaviours. Dropped objects have two diamonds 
of diameter 30 placed at different starting horizontal (range [-100, 100]) and vertical (range [35, 265]) positions. The 
object’s aperture is d=1.0 and d=3.0 for avoiding and approaching objects, respectively. Plots represent the number of 
activated sensors that an agent would eventually process if an object were fixed at that location in its field of view at 
each point as a function of x-axis and y-axis. The intensity of the grey shade regions represents the number of 
activated sensor ranging from bright (all sensors activated) to dark (no sensors activated).  
Our tests show that monostable controllers were globally stable in their autonomous dynamics 
based on one steady state in output responses (see Figure 6.9-B caption). Again, we distinguish 
mono- and bistable controllers based on the number of steady states exhibited by the autonomous 
responses of mono- and bistable controllers (i.e. when inputs are 0000000). Bistable controllers, 
however, presented globally stable network output derived two fixed-points within the intrinsic 
dynamics of controllers. Only to check that mono- and bistable agents show one or two stable 
points, respectively, for any combination of incoming signals, we fixed the incoming signal of 
their 7 sensors to a specific sensory pattern (each binary representation in y-axis in Figure 6.9). 
The number of points differentiates derived from the given sensory pattern. For example, the 
bistable controller showed two stable point near ±0.5 and 0 but it is so only for some sensory 
patterns (e.g. 0000000); while for other patterns it presented only one point overtime (e.g. 0-output 
value for 1111111 in Figure 6.9-A). Note that the number of steady states (two or one) in the 
bistable case cannot be deduced for each sensory pattern before testing the output response of 
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controllers. An explanation of this difficulty rises in that both approaching and avoiding 
behaviours are simultaneously ‘coded’ in neurocontrollers by the evolutionary process. This also 
holds for the monostable agent.  
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Figure 6.9 – Example of output responses (difference between motor neuron outputs) for a bistable 
(circles) and monostable (squares) neurocontrollers. Output responses differentiate according to a given 
sensory incoming after the network settle down (10000 time steps) from a random set of neural 
activations. The sensory incoming is represented as a binary array of 7 binary values in y-axis. For each 
label in y-axes, 1/0 represents the on/off state of sensors. Graphics show that [A] the bistable controller 
produce outputs around ±0.5 and/or 0 values in x-axis depending on the given sensory pattern (y-axis). 
Because the imposed model symmetry, this represents two stable states of the long-term dynamics of 
agents (e.g. 0000000 representing the absence of sensory stimuli). In the monostable case, [B] the 
network shows only one response for each sensory incoming at y-axis over the range [-0.7, 0.7].  
As an example of such difficulty, note that a small change in sensory incomings, e.g. 0000001 
and 0000010, differently generate slight leftward movements (x-axis negative differences) for the 
monostable agent in Figure 6.9-B. The 0000011 sensory pattern however generates a rightward 
movement (x-axis positive differences) at long run (Figure 6.9-B). Some sensory patterns like 
1111111 produces a slight movement to the leftward side, but the deactivation of sensor 7 
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(1111110 pattern) generates a change of direction to the rightward side; while the non-evident 
effect of deactivation/activation of sensors, e.g. 1111101 and 1111100, generates a movement to 
leftward and rightward sides for the monostable agent, respectively. These examples show that the 
correspondence of a sensory pattern and the dynamics of the agent over the long term can be quite 
complex to generalize and nonlinear. 
6.4.2.1 Approaching and avoiding behaviours for discrimination task 
This section investigates how a randomly selected agent from each set produces behaviours when 
the aperture between diamonds are the same as the ones for which agents evolved (i.e. d=1.0 for 
avoiding and d=3.0 for approaching). Analyses here look for behavioural explanations as to when 
approaching and avoiding behaviours initiate, based on object aperture detection. 
Plots in Figure 6.10 in E & G show the trajectories in the arena that one randomly selected 
monostable agent produces during categorical perception with d=1.0 (avoiding) and d=3.0 
(approaching), the separation of the diamonds. Similarly, plots in Figure 6.10-A & C show the 
corresponding trajectories but for a randomly selected bistable agent. The differently shaded 
regions of plots in Figure 6.10-right represent the long-term horizontal velocity that these agents 
would finally take if an object were fixed at every location in their vision field. Axes in Figure 
6.10-right indicate the relative horizontal (x-axis) and vertical (y-axis) agent-object separations. 
The symmetry of velocities is evidenced by the intensities of the shaded regions, ranging from 
dark (no velocity) to light grey (high velocity). For instance, the long-term approaching velocity in 
the bistable case (Figure 6.10-B) shows dark regions representing no movements of the agent 
mainly when the agent centres the object. Light grey regions stand for fast rightward or leftward 
movements for approaching behaviour. 
An interpretation of the long-term velocities related to sensory activation is difficult to examine 
without the appropriate agent-object horizontal position. However, Figure 6.10 suggests that part 
of the monostable agent’s strategy in approaching and avoiding tasks grounds on tracking the 
object during its fall. Figure 6.10-E & G shows that the monostable agent produces nearly straight 
trajectories in the boundary of the arena from 40 to 80 elapsed times, mainly in the avoiding 
situation. This behavioural strategy is not observed in the analysed bistable agent (A & C plots), 
where this agent can move rightward or leftward without maintaining contact with a falling object.  
By further analysing the behaviour of both selected agents, and plotting the evolution of the 
horizontal separation between each of them and the centre of the object’s aperture (Figure 6.10-A, 
C, E & G), we can see that both agents make a clear categorical distinction between approaching 
and avoiding objects. This difference mainly appears when the horizontal separation between the 
agent and the object is in the range [-60, 60]. Consequently, the rest of this work focuses on 
behavioural descriptions in such horizontal range.  
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Figure 6.10 – Example of the trajectories in the arena (left column) and the steady-state horizontal-velocity field 
(right column). Plots are divided into behaviours for mono- and bistable agents in approaching and avoiding tasks 
(see labels in each plot). The right column shows different shaded regions for the long-term horizontal velocity that 
the agent would eventually adopt if an object were fixed at that location in its field of view. Trajectories suggest that 
part of the monostable agent’s strategy for solving the approaching and avoiding behaviours is based on ‘tracking the 
object’ during its fall, which is evidenced as a relatively constant horizontal separation throughout most of elapsed 
time (y-axis in [E] and [G] plots). This continuous tracking is not mostly observed for the bistable agent in [A] and 
[C] plots. Right column plots are obtained by scaling velocities in [0, 255] range of colour (the relative maximum and 
minimum velocity representations in each plot). 
Chapter 6. Evolving cognitive-behavioural dependencies in situated agents 98 
 
 
 
Agent trajectories in catching & avoiding behaviours - Bistable case 
[A]
-100 0 100
50
100
150
200
250
d=1.0
horizontal dist.
ve
rti
ca
l d
is
t.
-100 0 100
50
100
150
200
250
d=3.0
horizontal dist.
ve
rti
ca
l d
is
t.
-100 0 100
50
100
150
200
250
d=2.0
horizontal dist.
ve
rti
ca
l d
is
t.
-100 0 100
50
100
150
200
250
d=1.5
horizontal dist.
ve
rti
ca
l d
is
t.
-100 0 100
50
100
150
200
250
d=2.5
horizontal dist.
ve
rti
ca
l d
is
t.
 
Agent trajectories in catching & avoiding behaviours - Monostable case 
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Figure 6.11 – Example of the behaviour of a [A] bistable and [B] monostable agent in approaching and avoiding 
tasks. Objects are dropped from different agent and object horizontal distance in range [-60, 60] (x-axis). The object 
horizontal and vertical positions are plotted over time for d=1.0, d=1.5, d=2.0, d=2.5, and d=3.0 apertures (relative to 
agent body’s size). Trials begin at top and time increases from top to bottom in each plot. Plots indicate clear 
strategies for categorical perception in relation to apertures between diamonds given during evolution (d=1.0, d=3.0). 
See main text for further descriptions. 
Depending on the initial horizontal offset of the object, the trajectories of both selected agents 
(Figure 6.10) can be grouped into two distinct bundles, namely fast approaching/avoiding or 
scanning movements. Figure 6.11 gives examples of this distinction with d=1.0 and d=3.0 
apertures (see caption). Mostly when the object intersects one of the farthest sensory rays shortly 
after a trial begins, it defines avoiding movements for the analysed monostable and bistable agents 
(e.g. 265 to 250 units of vertical separation in Figure 6.11). Trials that are more central result 
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predominantly in scanning movements, generating series of actions crossing the midline in each 
plot. Trials that are more peripheral with approaching objects result in slower centring movements 
that cross the plot midline fewer times. This scanning behaviour is more frequent for the 
monostable case than for the bistable agent, increasing when d=3.0 (approaching object) (Figure 
6.11). However, scanning is not observed with d=1.0 for both agents. The next section continues 
investigating what produces switching behaviour in both agents, focussing further on apertures 
between diamonds different than d=1.0 and d=3.0. 
6.4.2.2 Environmentally modulated behavioural switches 
After the behavioural analyses given in the previous section, two features of agents’ dynamics are 
assumed to be necessary for the implemented categorical perception task: (a) the initiation of 
catching and avoiding behaviours, and (b) the capacity of agents to recognize objects based on the 
aperture between diamonds. With the purpose of understanding when avoiding and approaching 
are initiated in both randomly selected agents, we must examine when behavioural switches 
appear after changes in perception. This section gives explanations on this point rooted in 
behavioural analyses of the selected two agents (section 6.4.2.1), and with apertures between 
diamonds not given during the evolution of agents. 
Figure 6.12 shows the behavioural trajectory depicted in the arena by the two previously 
described agents when the separation between diamonds is d=1.65. Plots B & E in Figure 6.12 
(based on Figure 6.12-A & D plots, in that order) clearly show the mono- and bistable agents’ 
attempt to switch behaviours at the trial midpoint (around 150 vertical distance). These switches 
are the result of the ‘uncertainty’ of both agents about performing approaching or avoiding 
behaviours because d=1.65 is a non-evolutionarily presented aperture between diamonds. 
Furthermore, for d=1.5, d=2.0, and d=2.5 apertures in Figure 6.11, we can also have a bigger 
picture of when these behavioural switches appear in both agents. 
We can hypothesize then that certain state variables (e.g. the agent’s place in the arena and its 
current dynamical state) enable both agents to switch behaviours, rather than being the 
consequence of an ‘internal process’ for producing behaviours. In other words, where certain 
sensory patterns appear, these patterns initiate the approaching or avoiding movements in the 
analysed mono- and bistable agents. This section further researches on B & E plots in Figure 6.12 
to develop a global description of neural activities and their relation to the depicted behavioural 
strategies.  
At the neural level of the bistable agent, the output of the right motor neuron (mr) generating 
the trajectory shown in Figure 6.12-B (B1), starts to decrease after sensor 3 activates (before time 
step t=35). The agent-object’s relative distance produces the sensory pattern 0111000 (the state of 
each binary sensor) that stimulates the left sensory side of the bistable agent, which creates a 
leftward movement (negative velocity). This type of sensory pattern mainly affects the activity of 
an interneuron (neuron 8 forefront), causing a change from maximum (around 1) to minimum 
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(near to 0) activation. This produces an alteration of the motor neuron mr evidenced in the agent’s 
behaviour as shown in Figure 6.12-B (B1) for a vertical separation of 125 units.  
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Figure 6.12 – Example of mono- and bistable agent behaviours when objects are dropped from different horizontal 
positions in range [-60, 60] (x-axis). The agent-object horizontal and vertical positions are plotted over time for an 
aperture of d=1.65 relative to agent body’s size. Trials begin at the top part of plots and time increases from top to 
bottom in each plot. From left to right columns, graphics show the trajectory of agents, the selected trajectories for 
comparing behavioural switches, and the steady-state horizontal-velocity field, respectively. Bi and Mi labels indicate 
different trajectories for mono (M) and bistable (B) agents. Behavioural analyses indicate the ‘uncertainty’ of agents 
for performing approaching or avoiding behaviours around 150 vertical distance (y-axis). 
Interestingly, only the activation of sensor 5 produces an abrupt increase of neuron 8’s activity 
with a direct effect on motor neuron right (mr) where the activity of this motor neuron increases 
over the activity of motor neuron left (ml). This effect produces a rightward movement of the 
agent as shown in Figure 6.12-B (B2). Furthermore, the stimuli represented by the 0111000 
sensory pattern, followed by the deactivation of sensor 5, produces a decay and thereafter a 
maintained low activity of neuron 8 in the B3 agent’s trajectory (Figure 6.12-B (B3)). The 
persistence of this sensory pattern (0111000) creates a constant rightward movement of the agent 
mainly because of the relative low activity of motor neuron mr in comparison to motor neuron ml. 
That is, when the incoming sensory pattern changes from 0111000 to 0111100, the bistable agent 
avoids the object. The bistable agent then remains moving rightward sustaining the avoiding 
behaviour. This rightward movement persists after the agent loses contact with the object in the 
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presence of the 0000000 sensory pattern. Comparing the trajectories in Figure 6.12-B to the ones 
in Figure 6.12-E, we note that a right- or leftward avoiding movement of the monostable agent 
cannot persists after the agent loses contact with the object, i.e. approximately 150 units of vertical 
distance for objects placed around 60 units of horizontal distance (see trajectory M3 in Figure 
6.12-E). This observation suggests that the analysed bistable agent can ‘remember’ a previous 
movement for avoiding behaviour to one side independently of current perception, which does not 
hold for the analysed monostable agent. This last point is the focus of discussion in the next 
section. 
6.4.3 Dynamical analyses of selected agents 
6.4.3.1 State-dependent dynamics during coupling 
This section continues with analyses of the same two randomly selected agents, but concentrating 
on agent-environment coupled dynamics underlying approaching or avoiding movements after 
sensing objects. 
Plots in Figure 6.13 and Figure 6.14 illustrate the changes in motor dynamics (first columns) for 
the bistable and monostable agents as a function of the type of object and the agent-object distance 
(second columns). More specifically, Figure 6.13-A & C and Figure 6.14-A & C show for the bi- 
and monostable agents the dynamical relation between the left (ml) and right (mr) motor neuron 
states (yi) during approaching and avoiding behaviours (see captions). Figure 6.13-B & D and 
Figure 6.14-B & D represent the dynamical relation between agent’s motor response at y-axis (i.e. 
the difference between motor neurons outputs) and the agent-object relative distance (x-axis) for 
each agent.  
Plots in Figure 6.13-B and Figure 6.14-B indicate that these agents finish at distance zero to the 
object after approaching behaviour (x-axis). In the presence of an avoiding object, the bistable 
agent moves with leftward or rightward direction (x=±400 in Figure 6.13-D), while the 
monostable agent finishes at around 70 units of distance and stops when the object is not sensed 
(approximate at x=±70 in Figure 6.14-D). Plots in Figure 6.14 show that the behavioural strategy 
in approaching (Figure 6.14-A & B) and avoiding (Figure 6.14-C & D) tasks employed by the 
analysed monostable agent is rooted in returning to its dynamical state, namely a unique fixed-
point attractor. At state space level, this return occurs when the difference in motor neuron activity 
is zero (dotted straight line in plots of Figure 6.13 and Figure 6.14). Interestingly in Figure 6.13-B, 
we can see that the presence of an approaching object creates a unique attractor (fixed-point) in 
the bistable-agent internal dynamics. In this situation, the bistable agent uses a similar strategy to 
the monostable one to move toward the centre of the diamonds, showing internal transient 
dynamics around such a state (Figure 6.13-A & B). The presence of an avoiding object, in 
contrast, does not induce monostability; in fact, it promotes bistability in the agent’s 
neurocontroller (see ±2.66 and 0 points in y-axis of Figure 6.13-D). The bistable agent moves in 
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the long run to different horizontal directions after sensing a leftward (-20 and -40 object 
positions) or rightward (20 and 40 object positions) placed avoiding object. Note that the 
oscillatory behaviour of the bistable agent shown in Figure 6.13-B is not because dynamics 
actually get to a periodic attractor, but because the system is going through a dynamical 
bifurcation depending on sensory input (see also Figure 6.9). 
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Figure 6.13 - Example of dynamical trajectories when a bistable agent is placed in the environment. Dynamical 
trajectories [A & C] are plotted for the motor neuron states (yj) of a bistable agent; [B & D] indicate the dynamical 
relation between the difference of left (ml) and right (mr) motor neuron states (yi) during approaching and avoiding 
behaviours, and agent-object distance (x-axis). Each plot represents dynamics considering only ±20 and ±40 agent-
object relative positions (horizontal separations). For left side plots, ‘sp’ and ‘ep’ labels indicate where the dynamics 
starts and ends for each starting position, respectively. Black dots in right-side plots (y-axis) point out the long-term 
autonomous attractors for the mono- and bistable agents. Plots indicate that the bistable agent moves with different 
direction after sensing a leftward (-20 and -40 object positions) or rightward (20 and 40 object positions) placed 
avoiding object by using different dynamical states. 
Chapter 6. Evolving cognitive-behavioural dependencies in situated agents 103 
 
 
 
M
on
os
ta
bl
e–
ap
pr
oa
ch
in
g 
[A] 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1
-3.5
-3
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
Motor neuron left (ml)
M
ot
or
 n
eu
ro
n 
rig
ht
 (m
r)
Lifetime tests (monostable) - Motor neuron activities - Approaching
pos. -40
pos. 40
pos. -20
pos. 20
rightward
movements
leftward
movements
no
movements
ep. +/- 40
sp. +/- 40
sp. +/- 20
ep. +/- 20
[B] 
-50 0 50
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
Distance agent/object
Le
ft 
- r
ig
ht
 m
ot
or
 a
ct
iv
iti
es
Lifetime tests (monostable agent) - Motor neuron activities - Approaching
pos. 40
pos. -40
pos. 20
pos. -20 leftward movements
rightward movements
no
movements
M
on
os
ta
bl
e–
av
oi
di
ng
 
[C]  
-6 -4 -2 0 2
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
Motor neuron left (ml)
M
ot
or
 n
eu
ro
n 
rig
ht
 (m
r)
Lifetime tests (monostable) - Motor neuron activities - Avoiding
pos. -40
pos. 40
pos. -20
pos. 20
rightward
movements
leftward
movements
no
movements
ep. +/- 40
sp. +/- 40
sp. +/- 20
ep. +/- 20
 
 
[D] 
-80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
Distance agent/object
Le
ft 
- r
ig
ht
 m
ot
or
 a
ct
iv
iti
es
Lifetime tests (monostable agent) - Motor neuron activities - Avoiding
pos. 40
pos. -40
pos. 20
pos. -20leftward movements
rightward movements
no
movements
 
 
Figure 6.14 - Example of dynamical trajectories when a monostable agent is placed in the environment. Plots [A & C] 
represent the dynamics of motor neuron states (yj) for a mono- and bistable agent; [B & D] indicate the dynamical 
relation between the difference of left (ml) and right (mr) motor neuron states (yi) during approaching and avoiding 
behaviours, and agent-object distance (x-axis). See Figure 6.13 caption for further descriptions. Dynamics suggest 
that part of the monostable agent’s strategy in solving approaching and avoiding behaviours is based on returning to 
its autonomous dynamical state when the difference in motor neuron activities is zero (dotted line). The black dot 
(autonomous attractor) indicated in y-axes of B & D plots represents no movements of the monostable agent. 
We can now put together all the information from behavioural and dynamical analyses in order 
to explain the mono- and bistable strategy for categorical perception in normal situations (i.e. 
without perturbations). During the first half of a trial, some sensory patterns come to correlate with 
clear approaching or avoiding behaviours in both analysed agents, while other patterns cannot 
produce a qualitative change in behaviour. All through the trial midpoint, if the agent cannot 
match its current sensory stimuli with one that it recognizes, both agents start scanning actions in 
the presence of approaching objects. The dynamics of the bistable agent can end up in one of two 
internal states after sensing an avoiding object (moving to one direction or not moving). In 
contrast, the analysed monostable agent remains dynamically near its autonomous attractor all the 
time, requiring the presence of an object in its environment to create transient dynamics for 
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approaching or avoiding movements. The monostable agent shows similar behaviour-switch 
features to that of the analysed bistable agent, but the former returns to a single attractor in the 
absence of stimuli. The bistable agent can switch its dynamical state after sensing an avoiding 
object, but this capacity does not seem to be an advantage for producing behaviours in comparison 
to the monostable agent’s dynamics.  
A more intuitive explanation of the type of transients that both agents show is: the monostable 
agent bases its behaviours on chasing a unique attractor that moves in state space due to changes 
in sensory inputs, in contrast to more structured (ordered), long-term multiple attractor states for 
the bistable agent (cf. right and left plots in Figure 6.9). The monostable agent dynamics is at, or 
moving toward, a unique fixed-point attractor (neurocontroller level) during environmental 
coupling. The behaviour of the monostable agent is therefore possible by changes of 
neurocontroller dynamics due to fixed-point shifts toward its unique (but mobile) attractor as the 
sensory input changes (cf. Figure 6.9-right and Figure 6.14-C&D for avoiding behaviour). 
Therefore, we can say that the monostable agent shows ‘dynamical determinacy’, i.e. the 
continuous presence of a unique attractor that must be chased during behaviour. In contrast, 
movement toward one of its fixed points chiefly determine the long-term avoiding behaviour of 
the bistable agent, when the agent does not engage with a falling object. This happens when it 
loses contact with the object after avoiding movements (cf. Figure 6.9-left and Figure 6.13-C&D 
also for avoiding behaviour). The behaviour of the bistable agent is therefore possible by changes 
of neurocontroller dynamics due to fixed-points shift as the sensory inputs change. In this case, the 
bistable dynamics presents ‘dynamical indeterminacy’ during avoiding behaviour, i.e. the 
presence of two simultaneous attractors for some sensory patterns (see Figure 6.9-left). We can 
hypothesize then that the effects of some perturbations on the bistable agent’s current state 
produces bad performance due to incorrect dynamical switches between attractors at internal 
control level. To explore this last point, the next section describes experiments with sensory 
perturbations affecting the internal state of both mono- and bistable agents. 
6.4.3.2 Coupled dynamics under sensory perturbations 
This section show results using the same experimental scenario as that described for Figure 6.13, 
but after inducing 5%, 25%, and 45% of sensory noise (Figure 6.15). These percentages represent 
probabilities of perturbation in our tests. The algorithm induces at each time step that the current 
state of each binary sensor is flipped into its opposite state. For clarity, this section only reports 
dynamics when the agent-object relative distance is 40. 
Figure 6.15 shows that the induced sensory noise differently affects mono- and bistable agents 
depending on the level (percentage) of perturbation. Despite the fact that the agent-environment 
coupled dynamics can forcefully move the inner-agent’s state to different places in the state space, 
the dynamics of the analysed monostable agent returns to or remains near its autonomous attractor 
in the long run (horizontal dotted line in Figure 6.15-C & D). The monostable agent produces the 
Chapter 6. Evolving cognitive-behavioural dependencies in situated agents 105 
 
 
right approaching and avoiding behaviours indicated by a decrease or an increase in the agent-
object relative distance (x-axis) in Figure 6.15-C and Figure 6.15-D, respectively. Plots of Figure 
6.15 mark with light-grey arrows the dynamical trajectory that an agent’s dynamics will follow in 
the absence of perturbations. Interestingly the monostable agent remains mostly in the same state 
when perturbations are relatively high (25% and 45%), showing no movements of the agent in the 
environment. We can observe this in the trajectories near the agent-object relative distance x=40 
and around the horizontal dotted line of Figure 6.15-C & D.  
The bistable agent shows internal-transient dynamics between or toward their autonomous 
attractors when coupled remaining dynamically in one of the two possible attractors most of the 
time after perturbations. These attractors are marked as black dots representing fixed-points in y-
axes of Figure 6.15-A & B. For example, inducing 45% of perturbation (probability of noise), we 
can observe in Figure 6.15-B that the dynamics of the bistable agent moves to y=-2.66 when x=40, 
it remains near y=-2.66 up to x=170, and then it moves to y=0. However, in the end, the dynamics 
reaches the autonomous attractor at y=2.66. Furthermore, after inducing sensory noise with a 
small probability 5% of switching sensors, the dynamics moves from x=40 (y=0) to x=200 and it 
maintains its position mostly near the y=-2.66 (Figure 6.15-B).  
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Figure 6.15 – Example of dynamical trajectories when a mono- and a bistable agent are placed in the environment 
after inducing sensory noise (sensor switches) with different probabilities (5%, 25%, and 45%). Plots represent 
dynamical trajectories of the difference between motor neuron activities (left (ml) and right (mr) motor neuron states 
yj) for a mono- and a bistable agent during approaching ([A & C]) and avoiding behaviours ([B & D]) in relation to 
agent-object distance (x-axis). Each plot represents dynamics considering an agent-object relative position of 40 units 
(horizontal separation). Black dots in y-axes point out the long-term autonomous attractors for the mono- and bistable 
agents. Arrows represent the direction that the dynamic trajectories will follows in the absence of perturbation. Plots 
indicate the effect of stochastic processes as sensory noise affecting the transition between attractors. See main text 
for further descriptions. 
Experimental evidence in this section indicates that perturbations that are big enough (e.g. 25% 
and 45%) can push the dynamics of the bistable agent to the ‘wrong’ dynamical state in relation to 
the non-perturbed scenario. In fact, in Figure 6.15-A we can observe that the effects of inducing 
45% of noise produce two different dynamical trajectories for the bistable agent (i.e. toward ±2.66 
or remaining around 0 attractor). In terms of behaviour, these trajectories generate approaching 
movements (minimizing the agent-object distance toward x=0), or leaving the agent at 
approximately x=97 units of distance to the approaching object’s position (see labels in Figure 
6.15-A). For the monostable agent, the presence of minor (5%) or major (25% and 45%) 
perturbations have a lower negative effect on behaviours in comparison to the bistable agent 
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because inner-transients in the end approach (or remain) around the agent’s only attractor. The 
monostable agent’s dynamics becomes close enough to the attractor most of the time, even when 
the neurocontroller presents internal transient dynamics (Figure 6.15-C & D). It is worth to note 
that such a ‘wrong’ tendency is also observed for all agents in the bistable set in similar dynamical 
experiments (no-reported in this chapter). 
Summarizing, dynamical analyses in Figure 6.15 point towards the effect of sensorimotor 
perturbations as stochastic processes that negatively affect the production of approaching and 
avoiding behaviours mainly for the bistable agent. Such a stochasticity induces dynamical 
switches within the bistable agent’s state space, generating for instance avoiding movements when 
approaching is expected at behavioural level (Figure 6.15-A). We can conclude then that the 
capacity of the analysed bistable agent to maintain the appropriate dynamics for categorical 
perception is only robust to minor sensory perturbations. 
6.5 Discussion: the effect of agent’s perturbed dynamics in performance 
This work has reported so far statistical, behavioural and dynamical analyses of the categorical 
perception task described in section 6.3. The focus of discussions has mainly concentrated on the 
type of dynamical engagements that two randomly selected agents (a mono- and a bistable agent) 
produce to accomplish approaching and avoiding behaviours. Studies in absence/presence of 
diverse types of internal and external perturbations (e.g. mutational, sensorimotor, and 
neurocontroller perturbations) also complete these analyses. 
Results suggest that the studied monostable agent uses the presence of objects more than the 
bistable agent for categorical perception, which by definition is a more distributed (behavioural) 
control strategy. Once more, the distribution criterion in this chapter refers to the use of coupled 
dynamics that emerge from the evolutionary process spanning of internal control, body and 
environment. This use creates control dependences at neurocontroller level for behaviours. In fact, 
by actively using environmental dynamics, we saw that the monostable agent exhibits approaching 
or avoiding behaviour via a continuous sensing of falling objects. 
Explanations for the less observed behavioural robustness of the analysed bistable agent 
(compared to the monostable one), are rooted in the effects of perturbations on the agent’s internal 
state, pushing its internal dynamics to the ‘wrong’ basin of attraction (section 6.4.3.2). This result 
is interesting in that it opposes the intuitive thought that an agent with more internal states (i.e. 
fixed-point attractors) would be more sophisticated and robust for categorical perception under 
certain perturbations than more dynamically simple agents. More sophisticated here means that 
the bistable agent could ‘switch’ between different dynamical modes to deal with the effects of 
induced sensory perturbations for appropriate categorical perception. A statistical tendency to 
lower robustness is also reported in this part of the thesis with a set of bistable agents in section 
6.4.1. This work reports dynamical analyses for the two randomly selected agents (the same 
agents for the whole chapter) to exemplify how perturbations can switch the internal dynamics of 
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a bistable agent. It is worth to note also that some agents in the bistable set are more easily to be 
pushed to the wrong basing of attraction than other bistable agents in the same set. The discussion 
of why some bistable agents are more easily pushed to the wrong basing of attraction is not 
introduced in this chapter, but this comparison is planned as future work. 
The lesson that this work promotes is therefore that robustness is better understood in the 
context of agent-environment dynamical coupling rather than being ensured internally. Results 
here suggest that the combination of agent-environment coupling, and the single-state 
characteristic of the analysed monostable agent enable it to cope better with the effects of most of 
the perturbations reported here. Such a behavioural robustness, however, is present, but less 
observed, in analysis with the bistable agent. The proposed lesson reinforces the idea that 
behavioural robustness cannot be deduced directly from internal mechanisms by themselves, a 
common belief in systems biology literature; rather it can be associated with the dynamics arising 
from the coupled internal control, body and environment.  
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Evolving experience-dependent robust behaviour in 
embodied agents: a one-legged walking task under 
sensorimotor perturbations 
 
CHAPTER 7 EVOLVING EXPERIENCE-DEPENDENT ROBUST 
BEHAVIOUR IN EMBODIED AGENTS 
 
 
 “Can a system be self-organising? No system can permanently have the 
property that it changes properties.” 
 
W. Ross Ashby, 1981 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 deal with analyses of evolved behavioural mechanisms that are shaped 
by coupled interactions. Discussions in these chapters are mainly rooted in situatedness (section 
3.2.1). We study in this portion of the thesis agents with the capacity to change feedback from 
their bodies to accomplish a one-legged walking task by implementing the evolution of ‘sensory 
offsets’ [Macinnes & Di Paolo, 2006] (i.e. evolutionary-defined biases that modify incoming body 
signals). Discussions in this chapter remark the role of embodiment (section 3.2.2) in the 
production of behaviours. In particular, we examine whether these agents show further 
dependence to their coupled dynamics than others with less feedback control. The ability to 
sustain behaviours is tested during lifetime experiments with mutational and sensory perturbations 
after evolution. Using dynamical systems analysis, we identify conditions for the emergence of 
dynamical mechanisms that remain functional despite sensory perturbations. Results indicate that 
evolved agents with an evolvable sensory offsets (or in absence of them) does not necessarily 
offer an advantage in resilience to sensory perturbations. However, agents using multiple sensory 
offsets are less affected by mutational perturbations than other sets of agents. Results in addition 
show that agents sensing the environment directly in a noiseless environment evolve controllers 
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that are highly independent to sensory stimuli, while those agents using multiple sensory offsets 
develop further dependence to sensory signals.  
Finally, experimental evidence here leads us to suggest a dynamical systems perspective on 
behavioural robustness that goes beyond attractors in phase space. The behaviour of agents that 
are evolved with sensory offsets depends not only on where in neural space the state of the neural 
system operates, but also on the transients to which the internal-system was being driven by 
sensory signals from its interactions with the environment, nervous system, and agent body. Here 
the distribution criterion refers to feedback from agents’ body that is processed at neurocontroller 
level, where such a distribution is induced via sensory offsets and sensorimotor noise. This chapter 
is derived from work submitted for publication (see [Fernandez-Leon, 2011]). 
7.1 Introduction 
Recently, Macinnes and Di Paolo (2006) have discussed the role that ‘the indirect experience’ of 
sensing the environment has to the production of agent’s behaviours. They analyse the process of 
stimuli recognition in simulated agents and the ‘meaning’ that agents impose to achieve dynamical 
engagement. By meaning, they denote the selections that agents make from their own stimuli and 
therefore find their own ‘reference’ in how to process external information. Despite the 
importance of such research, we have very little idea about how an agent’s own experience shapes 
sensory signals at the neuronal level and the effect of this shaping on robust behaviour. The 
majority of work in this area neither explains how these mechanisms emerge from sensorimotor 
interactions, nor analyses whether it promotes behaviour production and robust traits in different 
environmental conditions.  
In von Uexküll (1957)’s terms, the selection of sensory stimuli can be seen as a process which 
can ‘bring forth their own Umwelt’, or relevance in the surrounding world of agents. This suggests 
that agent behavioural mechanisms can be thought as cognitively distributed between internal 
control, body, and environment. As stressed by Macinnes and Di Paolo, it is not necessary 
however to concentrate on how an implemented agent model acquires genuine sensory cues from 
the environment. The description of ‘functional circles’ proposed by von Uexküll (1957) suggests 
that a ‘cue’ (or functional trigger) is distributed along the entire functional circle of which the 
organism is a part. Functional circles are “abstract structures that tie together a subjective 
experience or perception (termed a perceptual cue) and the effect that the perceptual cue has on 
the behaviour of the organism (called an effector cue)” (ibid. from [Macinnes & Di Paolo, 
2006]). It is meaningless therefore to claim that a perceptual cue resides in a particular location in 
the agent’s milieu. The ability to walk and the feedback that the nervous system receives during 
walking, for example, is not localized at neural level but is fully distributed throughout the agent 
and its dynamics, where part of the control task is ‘outsourced’ to the physical dynamics of the 
agent [Pfeifer et al., 2007].  
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The question that arises is what sort of control-strategy emerges if an agent’s own interactions 
with the environment shape its sensory capacity and its dynamics under sensorimotor 
perturbations. An answer to this question has conceptual and practical interest for understanding 
robustness in neuroscience and body control, e.g. in the consideration of controlled walking 
behaviour in humans in different terrain conditions. Once more, we regard an agent here for 
clarity as a dynamic system perturbed by, and hence responding to, a number of environmental 
cues and externally induced perturbations.  
In this chapter, the described ER minimal model methodology may illuminate how to answer 
the above question due to its relatively assumption-free paradigm [Fine et al., 2007]. Studying the 
mechanisms that emerge can inform our understanding of what to look for in natural systems and 
how to build better artificial ones that regulate the conditions of their exchange with the 
environment [Di Paolo & Iizuka, 2008]. In sections 7.2 and 7.3, the methods and experiments are 
introduced. In section 7.4, we examine the consequences of results and discuss ideas that remain 
open. 
7.2 Methods 
The experimental part of this chapter first investigates how a one-legged agent model in ER can 
produce robust walking behaviour, controlled by a single neural network. We also examine if the 
tuning of sensory offsets improves the agent’s behavioural robustness in the presence of 
sensorimotor perturbations. We use artificial evolution to synthesize an embedded recurrent neural 
network enabling active regulation of agent-environment dynamical exchange. Experiments then 
inspect whether different sets of evolved agents with and without sensory offsets can exhibit a 
higher (or lower) qualitative dependence to environmental dynamics, but maintaining in all cases a 
quantitative high performance (lifetime fitness). We have based our implementation on Beer’s 
model software and use Mathematica’s tools for our dynamical analyses. 
7.2.1 Agent and structure of the environment 
The one-legged insect-like agent (Figure 7.1) is used as experimental model in this chapter, which 
is a simplified model of the simulated hexapod agent described in [Gallagher et al., 1996]. This 
agent model is inspired on Beer and Gallagher’s (1992) (see also Beer et al.’s (1999), Izquierdo 
and Bührmann’s (2008), and Beer’s (in press) works). In particular, Beer (1995a) has studied three 
variants of his legged-agent model, differing in whether sensory feedback is continuously 
available, only sporadically or completely absent for the agent.  
Beer (1995a) reports three different types of controllers that produce the expected walking 
behaviour: the reflexive pattern generators (RPGs), central pattern generators (CPGs), and mixed 
pattern generators (MPGs). RPGs are reminiscent of Sherrington’s proposed ‘chained reflex’ 
locomotion circuits that depend on the presence of external periodic timing signals [Sherrington, 
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1898] (ibid. from [Gallagher, 2001]). CPGs are defined as neural networks that can endogenously 
(i.e. without rhythmic sensory or central input) produce rhythmic patterned outputs [Marder & 
Calabrese, 1996]. Finally, MPGs represent a combination of previous generators – i.e. like RPGs, 
MPGs can use sensory feedback when it is available to improve their operation, but like CPGs 
they can function in its absence if necessary [Beer, 2009]. In this chapter, we focus on RPGs 
requiring continuous sensory feedback from the leg’s joint angle (Figure 7.1). However, we 
qualitatively compare the trajectory of agent leg movements to the idealized trajectory obtained 
from a perfect CPG without sensory input.  
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Figure 7.1 – (top) Schematic representation of the agent’s leg configuration for one-leg walking 
behaviour. Neurons are fully connected including self-connections. Three effectors controls the forward 
and backward force applied to the leg and the foot for walking. Effectors receive sensory stimuli of the 
leg angle during the ongoing task. (bottom) The leg model of a simulated insect where the leg can swing 
about their single join with the body (figure based on [Beer, 1995a]). 
Experiments here are based on the leg model in Figure 7.1, which has two degrees of freedom, 
one for rotation and another for extension. The leg can swing through 45 degrees from vertical 
forward (fwd) or backward (bwd). The leg passively stretches between the joint and the foot as the 
body translates. The agent’s leg has a foot that can be either up or down. The agent’s body is 
considered stable as long as its foot is not too far back to enable the ongoing forward motion. In 
order to compute the force applied to the body, the model allows a supporting leg that has passed 
outside of the mechanical limits to apply force in a direction that moves it back toward that 
mechanical limit. This is not possible in a direction that would move it further away where these 
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mechanical limits become one-way constraints for a supporting leg. When the leg’s stability is 
lost, the agent falls and its forward velocity is immediately set to zero.  
The leg’s set-up is as follows: the leg’s length is 15 units long; the maximum leg force, 
velocity, maximum torque and angular velocity are 0.05, 6.0, 0.5 and 1.0, in that order; forward 
and backward angle limits are θmin=-π/6 (or -θ=-0.5236 radians) and θmax=π/6 (or θ=0.5236 
radians), respectively. The leg is only able to generate force over a limited angular range of 
motion of [-θ, θ] (see Figure 7.1). In other words, when a stretched stancing leg lifts its foot, the 
leg immediately snaps back to the swing angular limits of [-θ, θ]. When a stancing leg reaches 
these limits, forward motion comes to an abrupt stop, which according to Beer’s descriptions it 
produces a loss of postural stability. During the stance phase, the leg stretches between the body 
joint and the stationary foot as the body moves with a horizontal distance between the joint and 
the foot. A stancing leg exceeding the angular range of motion can still provide support, but only 
within vertical limits of [xmin, xmax]. Torque is controlled by two motor neurons (forward or 
backward neuron effectors onwards). When the foot is up (swing phase), torque produced by 
effectors serves to swing the leg along an arc relative to the body [Beer, in press]. For this 
movement applies a limit constraint with a maximum angular acceleration of αmax=1/40. The 
binary state of the foot (FT) is up when the difference between effectors is lower or equal than 0.5, 
and down when such a difference is higher than 0.5. 
The agent is given 220 units of time to walk and after this period, we measure the total walked 
distance during the trial (fitness measure). An agent performing a perfect walking behaviour will 
walk 305.7101 units of distance over these units of time, which represents more than 12 full 
walking steps. A successful agent must maximize the final walked distance. The overall 
performance of agents is averaged over all trials producing a value in range [0, 306].  
7.2.2 The implemented network topologies 
The agent’s leg is controlled by a fully connected five-neuron controller, where three of these 
neurons are effectors creating the force applied to the agent’s body that generates translational 
motion. One effector (n1) governs the state of the foot, and the other two generate (n2) clockwise 
and (n3) counter clockwise torques to the leg’s single joint producing forward and leftward 
movements. The remaining two units are interneurons with no-specified role in the agent’s leg 
behaviour. Only effector neurons receive a weighted sensory input from the leg’s angle sensor that 
measures the leg’s angular position in radians. The angle sensor is proportional to the angular 
deviation of the leg from the perpendicular axis to the long one of the body. The neurocontroller 
supplies signals specifying what torques should be applied at each joint. These signals are 
summed, and depending on the state of the leg’s foot will either move the body (foot down) or 
rotate the leg about its joint (foot up). The motor output equation to compute the force (f) applied 
to the body for walking movements is: 
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 Leg.ForwardForce    = NervousSystem.MotorNeuronOutput(2) * MaxLegForce 
 Leg.BackwardForce = NervousSystem.MotorNeuronOutput(3) * MaxLegForce 
 f = Leg.ForwardForce - Leg.BackwardForce 
 
The embedded controller defines one or three mutable sensory attributes (or offsets) to the 
agent’s genotype (further explained in the next section). These offsets are either all the same or 
different for every sensor-interneuron connection (Figure 7.2), and are added to every sensory 
signal. Sensory offsets consequently act as ‘biases of sensory signals’ that controllers must process 
for motor actions after receiving sensory stimuli of the leg angle during the ongoing task. The 
agent is able to co-evolve to some extent the capacity to sense the environment alongside the rest 
of its internal dynamics in order to remain functional. By ‘functional’ in this context, we mean the 
capacity of agents to produce rhythmic stepping for the expected walking behaviour. As 
introduced in section 7.1, the presence of sensory offsets adds to the model the capacity that an 
agent can bias its sensory input based on its own interactions with the environment. The use of 
offsets means that we can no longer observe a signal of zero to neurons if we disrupt the angle 
sensor of the controller (i.e. setting the sensor to non-sensing value).  
 
 
fwd effectorbwd effector
foot effector
n1
n5
n3 n2
n4
+ SO3
+ SO2
+ SO1
+ SO1
+ SO1
+ SO1
multiple 
sensory offsets 
single 
sensory offsets 
sensor (only one per experimental scenario)
[1] [2] 
[0] 
 
Figure 7.2 –Schematic representation of the implemented controller topology. Only one sensor is used in 
each experimental scenario. The signal provided by the leg’s angle sensor is fed [0] directly into the 
controller; [1] one sensory offset (SO1) is added to every synaptic connection from sensors to connected 
neurons; or [2] it is added multiple sensory offsets to each sensory connection (SOi). Offsets are positive 
and genetically determined.  
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7.2.3 Agent’s controller definition 
A CTRNN (section 4.3.1) controls the behaviour of the leg and finally the movement of the agent. 
The following equations define the implemented neuron-like units: 
ij
n
j jii
i
i Izwydt
dy ++−= ∑τ  (7.1) 
))(( jjjj ygz θσ +=  (7.2) 
)1(1)( xex −+=σ
 
(7.3) 
where yi is the activation of the i-th neuron (e.g. the state or ‘membrane potential’); τi is its time 
constant in range [1, 10]; wji is the strength of the connection from the j-th to the i-th neuron in 
range [-20, 20]; θj is a bias term in range [-15, 15]; gj is a gain with value 1 for all neurons; σ(x) is 
the standard logistic activation function; Ii represents an external input (i.e. a signal from the 
sensor to which an offset will be added); n is the number of neurons in the network. Sensory 
offsets between the sensor and connected neurons are defined in range [-π/6, π/6] (or                     
[-0.5236, 0.5236] radians). Incoming signals are computed as the current leg angle times a 
constant value of 5.0/(π/6). The controller receives then an input signal S = SW.φ from the angle 
sensor (φ value), where SW=30/π (see [Beer, in press]). To such sensor and interneuron 
connection, a sensory offset (or multiple of them per sensory connection) is added when indicated 
in experiments in this chapter (see Figure 7.2).  
7.2.4 Artificial evolution settings 
Biases, time-constants, synaptic connections and sensory offsets are evolved using a version of the 
microbial genetic algorithm proposed by Harvey (2001) (section 4.2), coding real valued 
genotypes over the range [0, 1]. Genes are linearly mapped to network parameters in their 
respective phenotypic ranges. The offspring of microbial tournaments replaces the loser. Offspring 
are generated from microbial tournaments by mutating the winner genotype and recombining with 
a probability of 0.6 at each locus. Gene mutation is implemented as a random displacement on 
every gene drawn from a Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and variance 0.2. The algorithm 
forces each gene to be in range [0, 1] during evolution (using reflection) and specifies a 
probability of 0.05 for mutating each locus. 
We define a population of 40 genotypes during evolution. The number of trials, run duration 
and number of generations are defined as 100, 500 and 1000, respectively. A generation, in this 
context, is the time it takes to generate the same number of new individuals (or a new population). 
The algorithm calculates the neuron activations forward through time by straightforward time-
slicing using Euler integration with a time-step of 0.1. The neuron’s activations are uniformly 
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randomized in range [-0.1, 0.1] between different runs. The leg’s angle with respect to the body 
(state of the leg) was initialised between runs at uniformly random values in range [-π/6, π/6]. 
7.2.5 Selection of task parameters 
Before rigorously comparing the behaviour of legged agents using and not using sensory offsets, 
this section describes some observations during our preliminary tests in a different experimental 
scenario. This was made in order to understand the effect of sensory offsets on evolved agents. 
First, we ran an exploratory investigation with reactive and non-reactive agents performing 
categorical perception task [Beer, 1996, 2003]. We carried out it using zero, one, or multiple 
sensory offsets per sensor-neuron connection, analysing the effect on agent performance 
with/without self-connections at neural level, a lower number of sensors (2, 4 or 6 sensors), and/or 
reducing the number of interneurons from 5 to 4, 3, and 2 neurons. We proposed further 
experimental set-ups changing properties of falling objects (e.g. their size and shape), 
experimenting also with sensors that measured the horizontal distance between a falling object and 
agent’s current position. Several attempts to evolve models with these numbers of interneurons, 
object properties and sensor features were unsuccessful in demonstrating advantages of sensory 
offsets. We did not obtain a significant difference in fitness when evolving offsets with categorical 
perception task. However, we obtained high performance in these tasks without sensory offsets 
(see Chapter 6).  
These preliminary results suggested that the effects of sensory offsets cancelled each other, 
possibly due to the high number of synaptic connections (35 in total) in our model agent for 
categorical perception task. We did not continue testing whether a lower number of sensors or 
synaptic connections produced better performance. This was mainly because the implemented 
controller topology seems to be the minimum necessary for obtaining good categorical perception 
(see for example [Slocum et al., 2000]). Our preliminary results raise the following question: how 
can we identify a task that produces better-adapted agents using sensory offsets? Macinnes’ 
(2007) experiments, suggest continuous feedback seems a necessary factor when evolving 
successful agents with sensory offsets. Accordingly, we have proposed the analysis of walking 
behaviour requiring not only the production of motion, but also a continuous feedback from 
agent’s leg position to produce the right switching movement. The following sections describe 
experiments with legged agents in detail. 
7.3 Results 
7.3.1 Statistical and sensory perturbation analyses 
Figure 7.3 shows the lifetime (median) fitness performance of different sets of agents evolved 
with and without sensory offsets, where 10 walking agents compose each set. We have obtained 
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each of them from an independent evolutionary run selecting only the best-fit agent after 
evolution. Data points in Figure 7.3 refer to: 
• (CUE0) agents evolved without sensory offsets; 
• (CUE1) agents evolved with one sensory offset for all sensor-neuron connections; 
• (CUE3) agents evolved using three sensory offsets, one for each sensor-neuron 
connection. 
Each study case is differentiated into: 
• (N) experiments with none sensory noise;  
• (H) experiments with a half level of noise, inducing Gaussian sensory noise with mean 
signal 0 and variance π/12;  
• (D) experiments with a double level of noise, inducing Gaussian sensory noise with mean 
signal 0 and variance π/6.  
We compare these nine independent sets of agents in how they produce the expected walking 
behaviour. The performance of sets evolved without sensory offsets (CUE0) achieved 96.43%, 
94.98% and 95% of lifetime fitness for N, H and D levels of noise, respectively. These 
percentages indicate efficacy compared to a perfect movement. The percentages for other sets are 
CUE1 (N) 96.89%, (H) 96.75%, (D) 68.97%; and CUE3 (N) 99.22%, (H) 93.67%, (D) 68.59%, 
respectively, showing that all studied cases obtain good performance in motion movements mostly 
in the absence of sensory noise, and also with H level of noise. When noise is relatively high 
(level D), only the CUE0(D) set obtain a high performance in comparison to CUE1(D) and 
CUE3(D) (Figure 7.3). This indicates that the presence of D level of noise represents a challenge 
for evolution in come up with agents that produce perfect motion (mainly for CUE1 and CUE3 
sets with sensory offsets). 
Results in this section indicate that the presence of evolvable sensory offsets does not offer an 
advantage in resilience to noise, as we can see in Figure 7.3. For example, CUE1(D) and 
CUE3(D) sets evolved with sensory offsets have worse fitness than CUE0(D), a set evolved 
without offsets. Sensory noise mostly has a negative effect on the mean performance of most sets 
of agents. Note however that CUE3(N) set obtain the highest mean performance (303.3230) 
evolving sensory offsets without environmental noise (Figure 7.3-C). We continue investigating 
some of the characteristics of these sets of agents in next sections. 
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     [A]                                         [B]                                            [C] 
Figure 7.3 – Lifetime performance (median) obtained in tests after evolution. Box plots (25% to 75% 
quartiles and outliers as point) compare the fitness achieved by [A] CUE0 the control case without 
sensory offsets, [B] CUE1 set using one sensory offset, and [C] CUE3 set implementing multiple sensory 
offsets (3 in total). Each set is also divided into (N) experiments without sensory Gaussian noise, (H) 
experiments using Gaussian noise with mean 0 and variance π/12, and (D) Gaussian noise with mean 0 
and variance π/6. Each data point (obtained afters 100 independent experiments) represents the median 
performance over 10 neurocontrollers. Plots show that all studied cases obtain good performance in 
walking behaviour; mostly in the absence of sensory noise (N) or when the level of noise is H. When 
noise is relatively high (level D), only the CUE0(D) set remains high performance in comparison to 
CUE1(D) and CUE3(D) sets of agents. 
7.3.2 Behavioural robustness analyses through mutational perturbations 
We focus in this section and in section 7.3.3 on studying the dependency of agents to sensory 
signals and the persistence of walking behaviour under sensorimotor and mutational perturbations. 
These perturbations are selected because agents were never exposed to failures on their sensory 
incomings and neurocontroller structure during evolution, and so there is not a priory reason to 
assume that agents will successfully cope with perturbations such as these.  
Figure 7.4 represents the effects of inducing mutational perturbations on the normalised mean 
fitness of agent sets. Each data point represents 1000 independent experiments per agent (10 
agents for each set). To every gene in an agent’s genotype expression, the algorithm adds a 
randomly generated Gaussian value with mean zero and controlled mutational deviation in range 
[0, 1], and then we measure the agent’s performance. Due to the low variability of every data point 
(<0.03), curves in Figure 7.4 present significant differences among mean performances when 
curves do not overlap. We can observe that the increase of mutation rate (mainly from >0.3 to 1.0 
in x-axes in Figure 7.4), creates a degradation of the walking behaviour in all sets. CUE0 sets 
(namely, CUE0(N), CUE0(H) and CUE0(D)) are not seriously affected when increasing the 
mutational deviation rate in range [0.0, 0.3]. Sets evolved with H and D levels of noise in Figure 
7.4-A show a decay in performance that seems not considerably high for mutational rates lower 
than 0.3. The effect of increasing such rate in sets CUE1 and CUE3 (Figure 7.4-B & C) show a 
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decay in performance, but this decay notoriously increases for CUE1(D) and CUE3(N) sets in 
Figure 7.4-B and Figure 7.4-C, respectively.  
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Figure 7.4 – The effects of mutational perturbations on the normalized mean performance of set of agents 
in tests after evolution (10 agents per set) in [A, B & C] plots. Plots [D, E & F] are re-plots of the same 
data for comparative purposes. Mutational perturbations add a randomly distributed Gaussian value 
relative to each gene with mean zero and controlled deviation in range [0, 1] (x-axes). Each data point 
represents the mean fitness obtained in 1000 independent experiments for every agent. Legends indicate 
sets (CUE0) without sensory offsets, sets using (CUE1) one sensory offset for all sensor-neuron 
connections and (CUE3) multiple sensory offsets. N indicates tests without sensory Gaussian noise, H 
tests using Gaussian noise with mean 0 and variance π/12, and D tests inducing Gaussian noise with 
mean 0 and variance π/6. Grey arrows stand for the tendency to better performance when increasing 
noise from N, H to D levels (plots in [A, B & C]) or increasing the number of sensory offsets (plots in 
[D, E & F]). Results show in [A] that CUE0 sets (i.e. CUE0(N), CUE0(H) and CUE0(D)) are not 
seriously affected when increasing the mutational deviation rate in comparison to other sets. Agents in 
sets [B] CUE1 and [C] CUE3 also shown a non-considerable high decay in performance, but this decay 
is noticeably and moderate high for CUE1(D) and CUE3(N) sets, respectively. 
Observations agree with our preliminary supposition that one-legged agents evolved with high 
levels of sensory noise benefit from using differentiated (multiple) sensory offsets for walking 
behaviour in the presence of mutational perturbations (see Figure 7.4-D, E & F plots). Although 
most of CUE0, CUE1 and CUE3 sets have similar overall mean fitness, results show that 
randomly perturbing properties of agents through mutational perturbations has some negative 
effect on the overall performance of CUE0 and CUE1 sets. Agents often become slower than in 
the control case (without mutational perturbations) - i.e. after every step, the leg is stepping slower 
or the controller’s ability to provide rhythmic dynamics is partially destroyed by perturbations.  
Results in Figure 7.4-F also indicate that agents with multiple perceptual cues (CUE3) in the 
presence of D level of noise are not considerably affected by mutational perturbations lower than 
0.3, in comparison to CUE0(D) and CUE1(D) sets. When we contrast the performance of 
CUE3(D) to CUE3(N) under perturbations, a substantial high decay of performance appears in 
Figure 7.4-C after disturbing the latter set of agents. This indicates that agents in CUE3(D) 
perturbed with D level of noise have a tendency to be more robust to mutations than other CUE3 
sets. One hypothesis is that individual neurons may effectively act like filters on the sensory input, 
averaging over spurious sensory noise (e.g. H or D levels). As we will see in section 7.3.4 
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(explanations around Figure 7.6 and Figure 7.7) it seems that robustness in our model with 
sensory offsets comes about because offsets mean non-sensorimotor neurons are saturated, and 
hence less affected by noise. The next section continues with analysis of sets of agents but 
inducing sensory perturbations. 
7.3.3 Environmental perturbations through sensory degradation 
This section analyses the relation between sensory dependence and mean fitness for all sets of 
agents in previous sections. Figure 7.5 shows the effects of altering the amount of incoming 
stimuli on the overall mean performance of agent sets. The algorithm scales incoming signals 
using a gain in range [0, 1], where 0 represents sensor off and 1 normal sensing (x-axes in Figure 
7.5). Each data point in Figure 7.5 indicates the mean fitness obtained in 1000 independent 
experiments per each agent (10 agents in every set). Again, when curves do not superimpose, the 
results present significant differences among mean fitness due to the low variability of most data 
points.  
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Figure 7.5 – The effects of reducing the incoming signals (sensory feedback) during tests after evolution 
in [A, B & C] plots. Plots [D, E & F] are re-plots of the same data for comparative purposes. Each point 
represents the normalized mean distance walked in a set period for decreasing the sensory incoming. 
Almost no difference in the agent’s behaviour is observed among agent sets until the signal decreases up 
to 80% the current sensory range. Grey arrows represent the tendency of sensory dependence when 
increasing noise from N, H to D levels (plots in [A, B & C]) or the number of sensory offsets (plots in 
[D, E & F]). Plots in [A] indicate that CUE0(N) set presentes the highest independence to sensory signals 
in comparison to other sets. Contrarily, [B] CUE1(N) and CUE1(H) sets shown a high dependency to 
sensory incomings because their mean fitness suddenly decay for values higher than 0.7 in the controlled 
parameter (see main text for further details). Plots in [D, E & F] confirm that the presence sensory offsets 
create further dependency to sensory signals independently of the level of sensory noise as depicted by 
grey arrows. 
Figure 7.5-A specifies that CUE0(N) set shows the highest independence to sensory signals in 
comparison to CUE0(H) and CUE0(D) sets. Such independence is observed as an overall better 
mean performance when decreasing the level of sensory signal (from 1 to 0 in x-axis). This result 
suggests that agents of such type work based on a CPG-like control strategy, because they can 
produce rhythmic patterned outputs with low rhythmic sensory or central input as we indicated in 
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section 7.2.1. However, we cannot fully associate it with CPGs due to the decay in performance in 
Figure 7.5-A when we perturb sensory inputs. In contrast, CUE1(N) and CUE1(H) agents in 
Figure 7.5-B show high dependency to sensory input because their mean performance suddenly 
decays for values lower than 0.8 (x-axis). These results indicate that CUE0(N) and CUE1(N) sets 
present examples of two different strategies for motion movements. 
Adding higher levels of sensory noise during evolution differently affects CUE0, CUE1 and 
CUE3 sets (Figure 7.5). For CUE0 agents, increasing such level of noise (i.e. from N, H to D) 
produces more dependency on incoming signals in comparison to the control case, i.e. noiseless 
situation (Figure 7.5-A). For CUE1, the increase of noise augments the independence to sensory 
signals (Figure 7.5-B). In CUE3, changing the level of sensory noise during evolution does not 
produce a slight increase in the mean fitness when decreasing the degree of sensory sensitivity 
during lifetime (Figure 7.5-C). In other words, in the case of CUE3 sets, the increase of Gaussian 
noise in sensor readings (from N, H to D) produces almost no difference in the agent’s overall 
mean fitness until the level of induced sensory degradation decays up to 60% (Figure 7.5-C). Our 
observation confirms that the presence of sensory offsets creates dependency on sensory signals 
independent of the level of sensory noise (as depicted by grey arrows in Figure 7.5-D, E & F). This 
observation also agrees with our preliminary hypothesis in that agents evolved with multiple 
perceptual cues sustain better performance when reducing the sensory capacity under N, H and D 
levels of noise. An overall observation is that the presence of further sensory noise (from N, H to 
D levels) produces in CUE0 and CUE1 sets a tendency toward further dependency (Figure 7.5-A) 
or independency (Figure 7.5-B), respectively, to sensory signals while for CUE3 it remains mostly 
unchanged (Figure 7.5-C). 
7.3.4 Emerged neural strategies for one-leg walking behaviour 
We hypothesize in sections 7.3.2 and 7.3.3 that CUE0(N), CUE1(N) and CUE3(N) agents present 
different dynamical strategies for motion movements. This section consequently analyses whether 
agents with or without sensory offsets exhibit dynamical differences at neural level based on 
relative high or low dependence to incoming signals. Studies here concentrate on a selected agent 
from each of these sets.  
Figure 7.6 gives an example trial of a randomly selected agent in CUE0(N) set showing its 
dynamical pattern for the walking task. All neurons produce a changing output during the ongoing 
task in Figure 7.6-A. Figure 7.6-B indicates ‘foot up’ for a positive, and ‘foot down’ for a negative 
angular velocity value (states of the foot). Note that for such plot, a limited angular range of 
motion at leg angle φmin=-π/6 and φmax=π/6 is observed due to mechanical changes with limb 
geometry; a leg angle vertical minimum φxmin=-1 also appears due to modelling skeletal 
constraints.  
As can be seen from Figure 7.6-B, the agent geometrically almost aligns its leg trajectory (dark 
trajectory) with an idealized optimal pattern (bright trajectory). This optimal route agrees with 
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results in [Beer et al., 1999]. The different sections of produced dynamical pattern correspond to 
particular stages of the walking cycle:  
(1) foot up and swing, corresponding to negative valued x-axis and positive valued y-axis;  
(2) foot down, analogous to positive valued x- and y-axes;  
(3) stance power, corresponding to positive valued x-axis and negative valued y-axis (where 
movements start from this stage of the walking cycle in reported experiments); 
(4) stance coast, where both axes are negatively valued.  
 
Figure 7.7 represents the dynamics of a randomly selected CUE3(N) legged agent. Despite the 
similarity of dynamics shown by agents in Figure 7.6 and Figure 7.7, we realize that the former 
agent shows a small lower performance (98.35%) in comparison to the latter one (99.22%). These 
percentages are taken in relation to the optimal trajectory that a walking agent can achieve (see 
Figure 7.3). The overall difference in the performance of these agents is in the timing of the 
generated leg movements; i.e. the CUE0(N) agent produces 11 rather than 12 full walk steps in 
comparison to the optimal case. In other words, the analysed CUE0(N) agent presents a non-
optimal leg trajectory between the moment that sets its foot down in phase 2 and the instant that it 
starts to move the leg backwards in phase 3, where the leg is on the ground and propelling the 
agent forwards. 
After comparing the neural dynamics controlling two randomly selected agents from CUE3(N) 
and CUE3(D) sets, evidence indicate that the output activity of the non-effector neurons o4 and o5 
are constantly saturated in 0 or 1 levels. Figure 7.7-A shows an example with a CUE3(N) agent 
exhibiting saturation of o4 and o5 interneurons in 0 level of output activity. An analysis of the 
distribution of evolved sensory offsets for the CUE3(N) agent indicates effectively that offsets are 
being used, because all are positive and higher than 0.63% of the maximum offset value, i.e. 
θ=0.5236 radians, indicated in section 7.2.1 (see also the values of CUE3(N) sensory offset in 
Appendix A.4). This saturation holds also for the dynamics of a CUE1(N) agent (study not shown 
here). A more intuitive explanation of this saturation of non-effector neurons in our model 
suggests a tendency of controller dynamics to eliminate those neurons that do not intervene 
directly in walking behaviour. For example, the analysed CUE3(D) agent shows a non-perfectly 
fit foot trajectory in relation to optimal. In this case, its performance is only 69.15% of the optimal 
trajectory. This low performance is mainly because the CUE3(D) agent shows a non-stable 
walking pattern in its foot trajectory, generating around 8 instead of 12 full walking steps. In fact, 
its susceptibility to environmental variability (D level of noise) causes the degradation in fitness in 
the analysed CUE3(D) controller. 
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Figure 7.6 – Example trial for a randomly selected agent in CUE0(N) set. Sensory and neural activities 
[A] during the walking behaviour, and [B] walking dynamics in dark colour compared to the optimal 
walking trajectory in bright colour (circle-marked trajectory). The trajectory of the leg is represented by 
the leg’s angle against the angular velocity related to neural activities. Plots in [B] show that the agent 
geometrically almost aligns its leg trajectory (dark trajectory) with an idealized optimal pattern (bright 
trajectory). 
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Figure 7.7 – Example trial for a randomly selected agent in CUE3(N) set. Sensory and neural activities 
[A] during the walking behaviour, and [B] walking dynamics in dark colour compared to the optimal 
walking trajectory in bright colour (circle-marked trajectory). The trajectory of the leg is represented by 
the leg’s angle against the angular velocity related to neural activities. The saturation of non-effector 
neurons o4 and o5 in [A], suggests a dynamical tendency of these neurons to remain constant in 
CUE3(N) controller; i.e. they do not intervene actively in the control of the walking behaviour. 
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7.3.5 Transient dynamics and non-functional bifurcations 
In previous sections, we have considered the dynamics of agents when coupled with the 
environment. These experiments are our first step towards (a) understanding the overall evolved 
control for walking behaviour, (b) studying the effects of evolving sensory offsets on agent 
dynamics, and (c) analysing the behavioural robustness of agents to mutational and sensory 
perturbations. We examine in this section the asymptotic behaviour of a randomly selected agent 
in CUE0(N), CUE1(N) and CUE3(N) sets (Appendix A.4 describes the structure of agents with 
some detail). Analyses here continue similarly as described in [Izquierdo & Bührmann, 2008] by 
replacing the time varying sensory input with a fixed (control) parameter that reduces our study to 
an autonomous dynamical system. By doing so, we can compare the coupled agent dynamics to 
the autonomous dynamics of controllers.  
Figure 7.8 shows the long-term values, equilibria, fixed points, and periodic orbits produced by 
the randomly selected CUE0(N) agent as a function of the leg angle (bifurcation parameter). 
Where both are stable branches, we represent trajectories toward a stable point (sp) with a dark 
solid line and bright lines representing saddle point branches toward a saddle node (sn). Plots 
denote bifurcations as black dots labelled by their type. Labels stand for a fold or saddle-node 
bifurcation (F) and a local bifurcation in which a fixed point of the dynamical system loses 
stability (H or Hopf bifurcation [Strogartz, 1994]). Under reasonably generic assumptions about 
the dynamical system, we consider these H bifurcations as orbitally stable, if a certain quantity 
called the first Lyapunov coefficient is negative, and the bifurcation is supercritical. Otherwise, it 
is unstable and the bifurcation is subcritical [Strogartz, 1994]. 
The identification of these bifurcations is important in order to discover the probability that 
sensory perturbations produce non-functional bifurcations for walking behaviour in studied 
agents. In Figure 7.8-C & D, we can observe five bifurcations as black points at -0.598, -0.486, -
0.025, 0.047 and -0.013 angle values. The black dot labelled H at angle -0.013 indicates a stable 
spiral point for sensor values in (-0.598; -0.013]. Other points represent saddle-node bifurcations 
(folds) from which a fixed point (dark lines) and a saddle node trajectory (bright lines) arise. The 
spiral point is a stable limit cycle (weakened) that emerges near the origin H. The size of the cycle 
first changes along the named sensor range crashing to a stable fold until it reverts to a stable 
spiral point for close values outside such range (e.g. sensor values higher than -0.013 but lower 
than 0.047). The generated cycle is created and destroyed in saddle-node bifurcations on a loop 
(Figure 7.9). In other words, the Hopf bifurcation gives rise to a branch of stable limit cycles that 
quickly terminates when the limit cycle touches the dark trajectory of stable point branch, and 
another stable limit cycle branch exists between fold bifurcations. Interestingly, we do not observe 
Hopf bifurcations (as evidenced by the CUE0(N) case) for the analysed CUE1(N) and CUE3(N).  
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     [C]                                                                     [D] 
Figure 7.8 – Bifurcation diagram for the analysed CUE0(N) controller in [C & D] and agent coupled 
dynamics in [A & B]. Note that mostly the coupled cycle in [A & B] remains outside the dashed lines. 
Bifurcation diagrams represent only two-dimensional slices of the six-dimensional bifurcation space (five 
neurons and the sensor). The agent-environment coupled trajectories stand for two slices of the non-
autonomous controller dynamics. Axes stand for the activities of effector neurons y2 (fwd), y3 (bwd) at 
y-axis and the leg angle sensor (x-axis). In [C & D] plots, bifurcation points appears at (sp1) -0.598, (sp2) 
-0.486, (sp3) 0.047, (sp4) -0.025, and (sn1) -0.013 angle values. Plots indicate that the trajectory of the 
CUE0(N) controller, when driven by the agent’s sensor (angle), is itself influenced by the circuit’s 
effectors. The inner dynamical cycle that arises from the coupled system is observed to switch between 
stable trajectories toward sp2 and sp4 stable points (see [A & C] and [B & D] plots overlapped).  
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Figure 7.9 – Bifurcation diagram for the analysed CUE0(N) controller autonomous dynamics in [A]. 
Two-dimensional slices in [B] of the six-dimension bifurcation space (five neurons and the sensor). Axes 
represent the activities of neuron y2 (fwd), y3 (bwd) and the leg angle sensor. Trajectory depicts the 
stable cycle for -0.013 sensor angle value obtained after finding and following the branch of limit cycles 
emanating from the Hopf point. Plots represent the local internal transient trajectory that affects the 
global coupled dynamics between stable trajectories toward sp2 and sp4 stable points in Figure 7.8-C & 
D. 
Figure 7.10-C & D and Figure 7.11-C & D show the asymptotic behaviour of CUE1(N) and 
CUE3(N) controllers relative to the incoming sensory signal (see bifurcation diagrams). In the 
former case, we can see five saddle-node bifurcations (F) at -0.652, -0.778, -0.183, -0.092 and 
0.094 sensor angle values. In the following case, these bifurcations appear at -0.502, -0.209,           
-0.213 and -0.067 values. We then can conjecture that the Hopf bifurcation could be used for 
walking behaviour in the CUE0(N) strategy, but the presence of such type of bifurcation is not 
compulsory required by the task because it does not appear for the analysed CUE1(N) and 
CUE3(N) controllers. 
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Figure 7.10 – Bifurcation diagram for the analysed CUE1(N) controller in [C & D] and agent coupled 
dynamics in [A & B]. Note that a great part of the cycle in [A & B] is produced inside dashed lines. 
Bifurcation diagrams represent only two-dimensional slices of the six-dimensional bifurcation space (five 
neurons and the sensor). The agent-environment coupled trajectories stand for two slices of the non-
autonomous controller dynamics. Axes stand for the activities of effector neurons y2 (fwd), y3 (bwd) at 
y-axis and the leg angle sensor (x-axis). In [C & D] plots, bifurcation points appears at (sp1) -0.652, (sp2) 
-0.778, (sp3) -0.183, (sp4) -0.092 and (sp5) 0.094 angle values. Plots indicate that the trajectory of the 
CUE1(N) controller, when driven by the agent’s sensor (angle), is itself influenced by the circuit’s 
effectors. The inner dynamical cycle that arises from the coupled system is observed to switch between 
stable trajectories toward sp2 and sp4 stable points (see [A & C] and [B & D] plots overlapped).  
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Figure 7.11 – Bifurcation diagram for the analysed CUE3(N) controller in [C & D] and agent coupled 
dynamics in [A & B]. Note that a great part of the cycle in [A & B] is produced outside dashed lines. 
Bifurcation diagrams represent only two-dimensional slices of the six-dimensional bifurcation space (five 
neurons and the sensor). The agent-environment coupled trajectories stand for two slices of the non-
autonomous controller dynamics. Axes stand for the activities of effector neurons y2 (fwd), y3 (bwd) at 
y-axis and the leg angle sensor (x-axis). In [C & D] plots, bifurcation points appears at (sp1) -0.502, (sp2) 
-0.209, (sp3) -0.213 and (sp4) -0.067 angle values. Plots indicate that the trajectory of the CUE3(N) 
controller, when driven by the agent’s sensor (angle), is itself influenced by the circuit’s effectors. The 
inner dynamical cycle that arises from the coupled system is observed to switch between stable 
trajectories toward sp1 and sp2 stable points (see [A & C] and [B & D] plots overlapped).  
In the analysed bifurcation diagrams, the size of dynamical zones that are not used to sustain 
walking motion varies (x-axis). Dashed lines in [C & D] plots in Figure 7.8, Figure 7.10 and 
Figure 7.11 represent these zones. In particular, we obtain that CUE0(N) and CUE1(N) cover 
1.5715 and 1.8917 times more angle range (x-axis) than in the CUE3(N) case. The wider range of 
bifurcations in CUE0(N) and CUE1(N) compared with CUE3(N) case, suggests that the latter 
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agent has lower probability to reach non-functional bifurcations induced by sensory perturbations 
than the CUE0(N) and CUE1(N) cases. As we described in Figure 7.5, when perturbing the 
sensory feedback, we increase the probability that neurocontroller dynamics exhibit non-
functional bifurcations. This difference in the covered angle range could explain in principle the 
relation between behavioural robustness to sensory perturbation and signal dependency that we 
have discussed in section 7.3.3. 
The avoidance of non-functional zones suggests a shared dynamical strategy in the analysed 
CUE0(N), CUE1(N) and CUE3(N) controllers: the dynamics that produce walking behaviour is 
mostly based on two non-simultaneous stable points in the state space of the agent’s autonomous 
dynamics (outside dashed lines), working far from non-functional bifurcations (inside dashed 
lines). In other words, dynamics inside these regions chiefly exhibit bifurcations with the potential 
to break walking motion. The rest of the dynamical zones (those outside dotted lines), which are 
used during moving, are mostly linear (represented as one stable point branch each in the 
controller’s autonomous dynamics governing leg’s movements). In this respect, we can infer why 
Figure 7.5-D shows that CUE1(N) agents suddenly decay in mean fitness when decreasing the 
sensory signal, while CUE0(N) and CUE3(N) agents remain with better mean fitness. Despite the 
higher probability for non-functional dynamical bifurcations, how can the CUE0(N) agent exhibit 
better robustness to sensory perturbations than CUE3(N)? We try to answer this question in the 
next section. 
7.3.6 Analysis of the coupled agent-environment dynamics  
Plots [A & B] in Figure 7.8, Figure 7.10 and Figure 7.11 show the dynamic trajectories of 
CUE0(N), CUE1(N) and CUE3(N) controllers when they are driven by the agent’s sensor (x-
axis). These dynamics depend on the self-influence of the controller effectors and sensory changes 
produced by agent movement. Contrasting these trajectories to the projections of the controller 
autonomous dynamics (plots C & D in Figure 7.8, Figure 7.10 and Figure 7.11), we can 
understand the dynamical differences in coupling between the three types of controllers. Note first 
that trajectories for pairs (y2; angle) and (y3; angle) in plot C & D of these figures follow counter-
clockwise and clockwise directions, respectively. This reflects the antagonistic forward and 
backward forces necessary to produce the alternation of the leg phases [Izquierdo & Bührmann, 
2008].  
We realize that the coupled dynamics of the agent controllers do not seem to reach any stable 
attractor. Only when we cut the sensory incoming (autonomous system), does the dynamics 
converge toward the leftward attractor branch in each plot (i.e. sp2, sp2 and sp1 for CUE0(N), 
CUE1(N) and CUE3(N) agents, respectively), at which point agents will remain in the stance-
down leg phase. During the walking behaviour of the CUE0(N) controller, for example, internal 
transient dynamics between stable branches control leg dynamics between sp2 and sp4 in Figure 
7.8. A similar observation also holds for the CUE1(N) and CUE3(N) agents. By superimposing 
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top and bottom plots from Figure 7.8 (as well as for Figure 7.10 and Figure 7.11 independently), 
we can see that the coupled dynamics is constantly switching between two autonomous attractors. 
The CUE0(N) dynamics approaches the rightward stable attractor sp4 (angle range [0.025, 1]) 
when swinging the leg forward (phase 1), moving the foot down (phase 2), approaching the 
leftward attractor sp2 (angle range [-1, -0.486]) during the stance power (phase 3) and then 
producing leg stance coast (phase 4). The inner-system’s dynamics approaches close enough to 
the rightward attractor sp4 during the leg stance power, but the dynamics ends up relatively far 
form such attractor. The CUE0(N) controller finally depicts a trajectory toward the leftward 
attractor sp2. The last part of such leftward trajectory is directed toward the saddle bifurcation at -
0.486 angle value. The trajectory however follows a shorter internal transient toward the sp4 
branch. This transient involves dynamics that are initially affected by the vicinity of the stable 
limit circle loop near the region where the Hopf bifurcation terminates (Figure 7.9). The transient 
trajectory arising from the CUE0(N) coupled dynamics, pass close the described limit cycle 
indeed.  
The presence of a stable dynamical cycle emanating from the Hopf point in CUE0(N) controller 
(Figure 7.9) help to ‘push out’ the controller dynamics far from non-functional bifurcations in 
presence of sensory perturbation. This explains how CUE0(N) shows further behavioural 
robustness to reductions of sensory feedback in comparison to CUE1(N) and CUE3(N) agents. 
The later two agents do not have a similar stable cycle in their neurocontroller dynamics as we 
described in this section – i.e. saddle bifurcation at -0.486 angle instead, as seen in Figure 7.9.  
We conclude then that the whole cyclic trajectory of the CUE0(N) coupled dynamics does not 
solely depend on the described limit cycle in the controller’s autonomous dynamics, or other 
autonomous dynamic trajectories around a single basin of attraction. The transient dynamic 
between attractors produces the completely sensory-dependant system-cyclic trajectory. The 
combination of controller and coupled dynamics also holds for CUE1(N) and CUE3(N) studied 
agents. Additional future tests may demonstrate in more detail the association between 
behavioural robustness to sensory perturbations and reduced dynamical zones exhibiting 
bifurcations. This could imply an analysis of the phase portrait of neurocontrollers. Nevertheless, 
phase portraits and dynamic flows of higher-dimensional systems as the implemented 6D 
controller cannot be compared in many ways. We can only analyse whether two- or three-
dimensional slices of the entire phase portrait exhibit direct or indirect trajectories near or toward 
stable points. 
7.4 Discussion: the effect of sensorial adjustments in behavioural 
robustness 
This chapter has mainly explored how one-legged agents use their experience to adjust their 
sensory mechanisms to produce motion under sensory noise and noiseless conditions. Initially, we 
have analysed different sets of agents to understand the effects of sensory offsets on coupled 
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behaviour. We divide our study into three main groups of agents. The first set senses the 
environment directly and the signals provided by the agent’s leg sensor are input directly into their 
controllers. The second set of agents has a single evolvable sensory offset transforming the signal 
provided by the sensor according to agent’s experience. The third set has controllers with multiple 
sensory offsets for the defined sensor. Interestingly, our observations suggest a positive role of 
sensory offsets on behavioural robustness in the presence of mutational perturbations, but require 
certain types of environmental complexity during evolution (Figure 7.4). We have induced such 
complexity as sensory noise that agents should process in order to accomplish walking behaviour. 
Results indicate that agents sensing the environment directly in a noiseless environment evolve 
controllers that are highly independent to sensory stimuli. These agents are not easily perturbed by 
reductions of the incoming feedback. In particular for a studied CUE0(N) agent, only a relatively 
low sensory feedback (<0.3) enables the agent dynamics to leave the state of the stance-coast leg 
phase and initiate the swing phase. Studies around CUE1(N) and CUE3(N) agents indicate that 
they have a considerable dependence on sensor readings, which means that they are easily 
perturbed by reductions of sensory feedback. The general lesson from these experiments is that all 
studied agents (i.e. one agent from each CUE0(N), CUE1(N) and CUE3(N) sets) undergo sensory-
induced bifurcations in tests with sensory reductions, which cause behavioural degradation if too 
often encountered (again, see section 7.3.5). Furthermore, we have evidenced that the coupled 
dynamics of neurocontrollers remain functional toward autonomous attractors in the presence of 
sensory perturbations by avoiding non-functional bifurcations, where the size of described non-
functional regions may affect robustness (regions between dotted lines in Figure 7.8, Figure 7.10, 
and Figure 7.11). 
In the introduction of this chapter, it is indicated that by evolving with sensory offsets agents 
would engage more with the environment. Reported experiments with reductions of sensory 
capacity (section 7.3.3) have shown that agents using offsets develop neurocontrollers with 
considerable dependency to incoming feedback. The interactions between the controller, agent’s 
body, and environment give then sufficient conditions to exploit distinct regions of autonomous 
internal-transient dynamics for solving the one-leg walking task. Walking behaviour is 
consequently not the result of the decoupled internal dynamics of the controller, attributed to an 
attractor, or attained to a basin of attraction in the agent’s internal milieu. In fact, for our study, it 
emerges because of the interactions between multiple attractors and basins of attraction in a 
sensor-dependant coupled dynamics. Results in this chapter lead us to suggest a dynamical 
systems perspective on behavioural robustness that goes beyond attractors of controller phase 
space. In particular, the behaviour of agents that are evolved with sensory offsets depends not only 
on where in neural space the state of the neural system operates, but also on the transients to which 
the internal-control-system was being driven by sensory signals from its interactions with the 
environment, nervous system, and agent body. 
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CHAPTER 8 EVOLVING FUNCTIONAL DEPENDENCIES FOR ROBUST 
BEHAVIOUR IN SITUATED AGENTS  
 
 
 “No system adapts to the changing: it can adapt only to what is constant.” 
 
W. Ross Ashby, 1981 
 
 
 
 
In previous experimental chapters, we analyse behavioural mechanisms that emerged from agent-
environment coupling and agent interaction experience. In this chapter, we explore the role of a 
similar dynamical process but in a historically dependent task under sensorimotor perturbations. 
We propose a mobile object-tracking task (also known as two-agent interaction [Froese & Di 
Paolo, 2008]) and tests for behavioural robustness in two kinds of model agents (see section 
8.2.3). Our analysis in section 8.3 indicates that agents’ coupled dynamics must remain in internal 
transients to maintain the expected tracking behaviour. The results also indicate that a highly 
distributed realization of behaviour can be (i) detrimental, if it is mostly based on factors that are 
‘necessary’ for the behaviour, or (ii) beneficial, if it is chiefly rooted on factors that are ‘sufficient’ 
for the behaviour. This difference depends on the effects of perturbations on such a set of factors 
(e.g. the presence or absence of responsive partners). To be clear, case (i) stands for the effects of 
perturbations (e.g. movement inaccuracy and imprecision) on factors required for two-agents 
interaction (e.g. the presence of a partner) that negatively affects the two-agent interaction as we 
will see in section 8.3.3. Case (ii) represents the situation where these factors are not compulsory 
for two-agent interaction in that a change in them does not negatively affect the production of 
interaction (e.g. when we change a responsive agent for a recorded version of it). 
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Accordingly, we suggest in section 8.4 that future discussions of distributed cognition should 
take into account that there are at least two possible modes of interpreting distributed behaviour 
and that these have a qualitatively different effect on behavioural robustness. Section 8.5 finally 
provides some implications of our study suggesting a metastable understanding of behavioural 
robustness. Here the distribution criterion refers to the type of dynamical dependence shown for 
the two-agent engagement, where environmental dependence is further induced via relatively 
stable to noise but sensitive to stimuli internal (heteroclinic) dynamics. This chapter is based on 
work reported in [Fernandez-Leon & Froese, 2010] and submitted to [Fernandez-Leon, sub. 
2010c]. 
8.1 Introduction 
The idea that cognitive behaviour emerges out of the non-linear dynamics of a brain-body-
environment system has become widely accepted in the fields of situated robotics and enactive AI 
[Beer, 2003][Froese & Ziemke, 2009]. Related debates about the ‘extended mind’ and ‘distributed 
cognition’ have also been spreading through the cognitive sciences, e.g. [Clark, 2008][Hutchins, 
1995] (section 3.3). More recently, it has even been argued that the essential organization defining 
the identity of a living organism, should itself be conceived as extended across the boundary of 
living tissue (see [Di Paolo, 2009]).  
If the mechanisms underlying life and mind were indeed most commonly realized in such a 
distributed manner, then we would expect this arrangement to be generally beneficial to an agent’s 
chances of survival. One way this benefit could be expressed is in terms of increased behavioural 
robustness. However, in the field of systems biology, where the mathematical formulation of a 
theory of biological robustness remains a key challenge, the focus has so far been on internal, 
often modular, control mechanisms alone (Chapter 2). Accordingly, it would be mutually 
beneficial for the cognitive sciences and systems biology to better understand the kind of 
consequences that a distributed realization of behaviour can have in terms of robustness. Our aim 
in this chapter is to present some modelling work that continues together with other experimental 
chapters in this thesis to investigate this outstanding issue. 
In terms of methodology, we use an ER technique and the minimally cognitive behaviour (or 
‘brain-body-environment’) approach as developed by Beer (2003) and others (section 3.2). We 
base our model on a recent piece of work by Froese and Di Paolo (2008) in which two embodied-
embedded agents are evolved to coordinate their directions of movement in the presence of 
sensorimotor noise and under minimal conditions. The agents are placed facing each other in an 
otherwise empty 1D environment and are equipped with nothing but a single binary touch sensor.  
Froese and Di Paolo have showed that this coordinated behaviour breaks down when one agent 
is challenged to move with a non-responsive ‘partner’ (consisting of playback of previously 
recorded movements). In our case, we evolve model agents on the same task, but are especially 
interested in those agents which can also spontaneously follow the mobile object in the second, 
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novel scenario (i.e. where the other agent has been replaced by a ‘playback’ dummy) without 
being specifically evolved to do so. Since this would be an example of more robust object-tracking 
behaviour, it would provide us with an opportunity to investigate how this type of behavioural 
robustness is realized by the dynamics of the underlying brain-body-environment system against 
unexpected environmental changes.  
Interestingly, we have found that the relatively more robust agent of this particular kind is more 
easily evolved when additional constraints were placed on the neurocontroller during the 
optimization process. These constraints increase the chances that the controller operates in 
transient regions of its state space. An extensive dynamical and behavioural analysis of one such 
evolved agent indicates that, even though the target behaviour is realized by an integrated brain-
body-environment system, the internal transients make the integrated system as a whole less 
reliant upon any one particular environmental factor in realising its behaviour. Next section 
describes the methodology for evolving agents in this chapter. 
8.2 Methods 
We adapt a simulation model used in previous work [Froese & Di Paolo, 2008][Iizuka & Di 
Paolo, 2007a] for our investigation. The basic setup can be described as follows: two structurally 
identical agents face each other in a 1-D circular environment, in which they can move left or right 
and detect each other by means of a single touch sensor placed at the centre of their body. The task 
of the agents is to move in the same direction together for as far as possible while continually 
interacting with each other. This task is made non-trivial by the fact that each agent has to locate 
the other, coordinate a common direction of movement, and then to move in the same direction, 
while having minimal sensory input and being perturbed by sensorimotor noise. The model and its 
implementation are described in more detail below. 
8.2.1 Agent and structure of the environment 
Following [Froese & Di Paolo, 2008], touch sensors are placed in the center of agents that are 20 
arbitrary units long (Figure 8.1). When the centers of the agents are less than 20 units apart from 
each other, the sensor is turned on (1); otherwise, it is off (0). The simulated body of the agent is 
controlled by a CTRNN (section 4.3.1), consisting of three nodes including two motor neurons. 
The difference between motor neuron’s outputs drives the leftward or rightward movements of the 
agent. All neurons receive weighted binary sensory stimuli during the task.  
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agent 1
agent 2 h
d  
Figure 8.1 – A schematic representation to the two-agent interaction task. The two identical agents are 
only able to move horizontally facing each other in an unlimited continuous 1-D simulated space. Agents 
are equipped with a single on/off sensor at the center of their simulated bodies.  
We introduce Gaussian noise in effector motor neurons and a random switch of the binary 
sensor of both agents. The use of random initial activations, motor noise, and sensory switches 
induce the agents to break the symmetry of their initial movements since their CTRNN controllers 
are structurally identical. This helps the agents to converge on a common direction of movement. 
Furthermore, the presence of noise and sensory switches during evolution increases the probability 
that non-recorded agents can cope with playback situations (non-interactive agents), and increases 
the ability of interacting agents to behave robustly in the presence of sensorimotor noise. We 
follow [Froese & Di Paolo, 2008] in optimising agents for highly fit coordination behaviour. In 
contrast to [Iizuka & Di Paolo, 2007a], the agents are not explicitly evolved to break off 
interaction when detecting that the other agent is a non-responsive copy. 
8.2.2 Agent’s controller definition 
Three fully interconnected CTRNN nodes with self-connections, as defined by the following 
equations, control an agent: 
∑ ++−= nj ijjiiii gsIzwydtdy .τ  (8.1) 
( )jjj yz θσ +=  (8.2) 
)1(1)( xex −+=σ  
 
(8.3) 
 
where yi is the activation of the i-th neuron (e.g. the state or ‘membrane potential’); τi is its time 
constant in range [1, 100]; wji is the strength of the connection from the j-th to the i-th neuron in 
range [-8, 8]; θj is a bias term in range [-3, 3]; σ(x) is the standard logistic activation function; Ii 
represents an external input; and n is the number of neurons in the network. All nodes receive the 
same sensory input, namely the sensor state multiplied by input gain gs with range [1, 100]. The 
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overall agent velocity is calculated as the difference between left and right effector neurons by 
mapping the outputs of these neurons onto the range [-1, 1] and multiplying them by an output 
gain parameter in range [1, 50]. We calculate the neuron activations forward through time by 
straightforward time-slicing using Euler integration with a time-step of 0.1.  
8.2.3 The implemented network topologies  
We obtain two different sets of controllers. First, we acquire a set of 10 standard three-node 
CTRNN controllers obtained as explained in section 8.2.5. For the second set (also of size 10) we 
introduce some additional constraints into the artificial evolution of the controllers every agent in 
both sets is the best-fit agent obtained in one independent evolutionary run (after 1000 generations 
each). The idea is to induce local (structural) instability into the CTRNNs by explicitly requiring 
that all nodes have excitatory self-connections, while connections between nodes must be 
inhibitory. The weights of all self-connections (wii) have an identical magnitude. Other synaptic 
strengths (wij) are constrained as follows: w12 = w23 = w31 = β1 < 0 and w21 = w32 = w13 = β2 < 0, 
where β1, β2, and wii are parameters under evolution.  
The indicated structural restrictions are a way of obtaining heteroclinic dynamics that might 
facilitate the emergence of behavioural robustness as suggested in [Rabinovich et al., 2006]. 
Mostly using a 3-node small network to illustrate the use of a Lotka-Volterra model for neuron 
activity, Rabinovich et al. indicate that heteroclinic trajectories of neural systems can be obtained 
via non-autonomous transient dynamics receiving external stimuli and exhibiting sequential 
switching among temporal ‘winners’ (i.e. saddle nodes). This competition between nodes in a 
small neural system can be evidenced as an open chain of saddle nodes connected by one-
dimensional separatrices that retain nearby trajectories in its vicinity. In the phase space of the 
network, such switching dynamics are represented by a heteroclinic sequence, which consists of 
several saddle equilibria or saddle cycles and several heteroclinic orbits connecting them, i.e., 
many separatrices [Strogatz, 1994]. The sequence can serve as an attracting set if every semistable 
set has only one unstable direction. To account for the existence of a heteroclinic trajectory, we 
can verify the eigenvalues of the Jacobian around one specific point in state space verifying that 
one eigenvalue has a negative and the other two have positive real and complementary imaginary 
parts (see section 8.3.1 for an example rooted in our experiments). 
Imposing structural restrictions into CTRNN controllers is not a common practice, but some of 
our exploratory investigations (experiments no reported here) have revealed that we thereby 
increase the chances of evolving agents with robust internal transient trajectories (i.e. heteroclinic 
trajectories [Strogatz, 1994]), at least in their decoupled dynamics. These dynamics are relatively 
stable against high frequency perturbations (e.g. environmental noise of the overall spatio-
temporal network), while simultaneously retaining high sensitivity to low frequency change (e.g. 
the same dynamical pattern may become different over time) [Rabinovich et al., 2006]. The 
addition of our constraints is a necessary but not sufficient precondition for inducing such 
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transient dynamics. This is because the evolutionary process can still lead to a variety of 
dynamical strategies to produce behaviours in our model (e.g. using multiple fixed-point attractors 
at neurocontroller level). For a detailed discussion of the conditions for generating heteroclinic 
dynamics see [Strogatz, 1994]. 
8.2.4 Artificial evolution settings 
We evolve the biases, time-constants, and synaptic connections using a version of the microbial 
genetic algorithm proposed by Harvey (2001) coding real valued genotypes over the range [0, 1]. 
Genes are linearly mapped to network parameters in their respective phenotypic ranges. The 
offspring of microbial tournaments replaces the loser. We define the creation of offspring of 
microbial tournaments as a mutation of the winner genotype with a probability of 0.6 of 
recombination at each locus. The gene mutation is implemented as a random displacement on 
every gene drawn uniformly from a Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and variance 0.2. We 
forced each gene to be in the range [0, 1] during evolution, reflecting back any excess at the gene 
boundaries. We define a probability of 0.05 for mutating each locus of the genotype.  
8.2.5 Experimental procedure  
For each type of controller, we evolve populations composed of 40 genotypes. The number of 
trials, trial duration, and number of generations are set to 25, 500 and 1000, respectively. Because 
we use a microbial genetic algorithm, a generation represents the iterations it takes to generate the 
same number of new individuals or a new population. Each trial run consists of 50 units of time 
(500 Euler time steps). At the start of each trial, agents have their internal neural activations set to 
small random values drawn from a standard uniform distribution in range [-0.1, 0.1]. For each 
Euler time step, we define a probability of 0.05 for switching the current sensory state into its 
opposite state. In other words, sensory nodes stay switched for a particular time step only if a 
randomly generated, uniformly distributed variable in range [0, 1] is lower or equal to 0.05 value. 
This procedure is repeated for every time step and it holds for all experiments reported in this 
chapter (otherwise specified in each section). 
The initial distance between the agents is a control parameter in our simulations, where agent 
‘down’ (or agent 2) always is placed at position 0 and agent ‘up’ (or agent 1) starts at a different 
position for each trial (25 randomly distributed different position across range [-30, 30]). Since the 
two agents are started in opposite orientation (‘up’ and ‘down’), it is not possible for the 
evolutionary algorithm to ‘hard code’ any trivial solution such as having the agents always move 
to the same direction. We also added a small perturbation to the motor outputs at each time step 
drawn from a Gaussian distribution with 0 mean and deviation 0.05. The motor noise is applied to 
the outputs of motor neurons before calculating the difference between them, and before the 
application of motor gains.  
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For every trial, we compute the fitness as the distance the agents manage to travel together by 
comparing the location of their final tactile contact with their starting position. The overall fitness 
for a solution is set to the smallest score obtained for any of the trial runs during the evaluation. In 
other words, in order to increase the agents’ behavioural robustness against motor noise, sensory 
switches, and the variations in initial conditions, only the lowest score achieved in any of the trials 
is chosen as the overall score.  
8.3 Results 
We obtain 10 best neurocontrollers for each type (set) of network topology in 10 different 
evolutionary experiments. Considering a randomly selected starting position in range [-15, 15], the 
mean fitness in tests after evolution for the normal and the structurally constrained CTRNN sets 
obtain an average performance higher than 95% over 100 experiments. These two sets are then 
extensively tested, where agent ‘down’ (agent 2) is always placed at position 0 and agent ‘up’ 
(agent 1) starts at a different position in arena for each trial (randomly placed agent 1 at 25 
positions with normal distribution across range [-30, 30]). We repeat each trial 100 times. The 
mean fitness score across initial conditions indicates that agents in both sets satisfactorily sustain 
the two-agent interaction task when both agents are responsive to interactions. The mean fitness 
score for agent 1 is plotted in Figure 8.2 for (left) the control case and (right) the structurally 
restricted case sets. Agents of both types are able to maintain the required interaction behaviour 
well in the range that they were originally evolved to interact, namely range [-20, 20]. Beyond this 
range, the fitness score is in general low for both sets. The movements of agent 2 during 
interaction starting at position ‘-11’ are recorded for future tests with a playback, non-responsive 
agent 2. 
We also ran a series of behavioural tests with perturbations relating to experimental conditions 
that the agents has not encountered during the optimization process. We call these situations 
‘extreme perturbations’. We test the behaviour of agent 1 that evolves to interact with responsive 
agents during evolution with a non-interactive, ‘playback’ agent 2. The playback agent represent 
the movements of an interactive agent 2 obtained from the original tests for each individual in 
both sets. The agents in the constrained CTRNN case are able to cope with non-responsive agents. 
However, agents in the control case set are not able to produce the required behaviour in the non-
interactive condition (Figure 8.3).  
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Figure 8.2 – Mean fitness performance for tests after evolution with a responsive agent 2. Results are 
shown starting the agent 1 from various initial positions in range [-30, 30]. From left to right, plots 
represent the mean score by ten fittest agents for the control case and structurally restricted case sets, 
respectively. Vertical bars represent standard deviations. Plots indicate that agents in both sets are able to 
maintain the required interaction behaviour well in the range that they were originally evolved to interact, 
namely range [-20, 20]. 
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Figure 8.3 – Mean fitness performance for tests with perturbations after evolution with a non-responsive 
(recorded) agent 2. Results are shown starting the agent 1 from various initial positions in range [-30, 30] 
and for 100 independent tests per controller. The recorded agent represents the movements of an 
interactive agent 2 obtained from the original tests for each controller of both sets. Vertical bars represent 
standard deviations. From left to right, plots stand for the mean score by ten fittest agents for the control 
case and structurally restricted case sets, respectively. Plots indicate that agents in the control case set 
(left) are not able to produce the required behaviour in the non-interactive situation. 
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8.3.1 Phase portrait analysis using decoupled controllers 
We study the decoupled dynamics of two randomly selected neurocontrollers from each set, 
namely C1 from the standard CTRNN set and E2 from the constrained case. Decoupled dynamics 
occur when the controller receives a fixed incoming signal from its sensor rather than a time-
varying sensory input. We intend to observe the controller’s asymptotic behaviour and finally its 
autonomous (decoupled) system dynamics. This first study will help us to better understand the 
behavioural and dynamic strategies in both agents. Since the sensory input is a binary incoming 
signal, for which it can be treated as a fixed parameter during this analysis. We focus on the 
outputs of motor neurons o2 and o3 in relation to input changes.  
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Figure 8.4 – Example of phase portraits for two-dimensional slices of the 4D phase portraits (3 neuron + 
sensor) of the two motor neuron outputs o2 (leftward) and o3 (rightward) of the C1 (top row) and E2 
(bottom row) controllers. Axes represent motor outputs. Left column (A & C) represents phase portraits 
with Ii=0 and right column (B & D) depicts portraits for Ii=1. Labels sp represent stable points and sn 
saddle-node.  
We fix the sensor to Ii = 0 or Ii = 1, and analyse the geometric representation of the typical 
trajectories in the state space of controllers (phase plane) based on motor outputs o2 and o3. For 
controller C1, the two-dimensional slices of the phase portrait show direct and slightly converged 
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trajectories toward one autonomous attractor (Figure 8.4-A & B). Interestingly, for the E2 
controller with Ii = 0 (Figure 8.4-C), the dynamic flow does not connect the two stable attractors 
sp0a and sp0b with the saddle node between them (sn0). An analysis of E2’s stability matrix of 
the sn0 point (Figure 8.4-C) reveals the presence of a heteroclinic trajectory around sn0, where the 
eigenvalues of the Jacobian are one negative (-0.1972) and the other two are positive valued in 
their real parts and complementary in their imaginary parts (0.0765 ± 0.0561i) (see [Strogatz, 
1994] for technical details). This analysis confirms the existence of a heteroclinic trajectory as 
described in section 8.2.3. 
8.3.2 The coupled agent-environment system 
Both the C1 and the E2 controller can enable an agent to coordinate and sustain an interactive 
behaviour with another responsive agent. However, the two controllers differ in their response to a 
non-reactive playback ‘partner’. Only the E2 controller can sustain an interaction with the moving 
object under these conditions. Because we are here interested in behavioural robustness (rather 
than on the ability of discrimination), we will concentrate on how E2 sustains the interaction in 
both situations. For comparative purposes, we will also identify the mechanism that enables C1 to 
discriminate agency.  
Figure 8.5 shows an example of the spatial trajectories of C1 and E2 agents with an interactive 
and non-interactive agent (see legends). Agent 1 and agent 2 of both types interact when they 
cross each other trying to maintain actively contact within a relative distance of 20 units (arbitrary 
units). Agents move to one direction and appropriately control their leftward- and rightward 
velocities. Typically, the C1 agent 1 places as ‘top agent’ keeping its position on the positive side 
of the environment maintaining at the left side of agent 2 (Figure 8.5-A). E2 agent 1 all the time 
behaves as a ‘down agent’ interacting with the agent 2 from the right side (Figure 8.5-B). In 
particular, if the E2 agent 1 receives sensory stimulation Ii=1, it moves rightward going far agent 
2’s position. After this movement, the E2 agent 1 starts a curve leftwards when it stops to receive 
stimuli from agent 2 (Ii=0). This ongoing change of stimulation and direction enables the 
interaction behaviour. Both agents maintain their relative position at the boundary of the defined 
interaction range for making sensor contact, namely around 20 units of distance to each other. 
We observe that for the C1 agent 1 case, the interaction with a recorded agent 2 is initially 
possible (time step < 20), but from time step 20 onwards it breaks (Figure 8.5-A). The E2’s 
behaviour distinguishes from the C1’s behaviour in that the former performs slow and large 
rightward and leftward movements when agents start interacting (range [45, 110] in Figure 8.5-B). 
In the later controller, only fast right and left movements are observed in the overall behaviour 
(Figure 8.5-A). Although there are significant differences in the early stages of interaction, both 
agents move constantly going far from the initial position when interacting with a responsive 
agent 2. However, as we previously introduced, eventually the C1 agent 1 moves away when it 
interacts with a non-responsive agent 2 (imprint plot in Figure 8.5-A). This breakdown of 
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interaction happens despite the fact that trials with interactive and non-interactive agents both start 
from the same initial conditions of internal and body states, though they differ in the applied motor 
noise and sensory switches.  
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Figure 8.5 – Example of C1 and E2 trajectories (agent 1) with an interactive and non-interactive agent 
(agent 2). Solid lines show the results of coordinated behaviours starting from position -11 under the 
interactive situation. The dashed line in each figure represents the trajectories of a C1 (A) and E2 (B) 
agent 1 interacting with a recorded agent 2 (see captions). Tests include sensory switches (0.05) and 
motor noise (5%). Plots indicate that the ongoing interaction in C1’s case breaks because of 
accumulation of sensory switches and motor noise. This break is less probable for the E2 case. 
We can thus hypothesize that the ongoing interaction in C1’s case with a recorded partner 
breaks because of accumulation of sensory switches and motor noise. Noise would normally be 
addressed by mutual coordination, but in this case, it appears to eventually overwhelm the single 
C1 agent 1, thereby generating the differentiation of behaviours when it drifts away. This 
conclusion is based on tests not shown in this chapter (see also [Froese & Di Paolo, 2008][Iizuka 
& Di Paolo, 2007a]). It is worth noting that if agents separate too much, the trial fails as the 
accumulation of error, which in turn produces agent separation, leads to the agents becoming non-
functional (i.e. agents are not capable of actively sustain two-agent interaction). However, this 
hypothesis does not explain how the E2 agent is able to maintain its interaction in both of these 
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scenarios. What dynamic mechanism enables its behavioural robustness against such 
perturbations? How does it relate to the motor noise and sensory switches? 
8.3.3 Tests without sensor and motor noise 
Figure 8.6 shows the effect of the absence of sensory switches and motor noise for both agents 
with similar experimental conditions than for Figure 8.5 but for different positions of agent 1 
(range [-20; 20]). In the case of the E2 controller, Figure 8.6-D shows that without sensory 
switches (NS) the (median) interaction performance with a recorded agent decays considerably in 
comparison to the control case situation (C), while the absence of motor noise (NM) does not 
produce decay in performance. This indicates that the E2 agent 1 can make use of the sensory 
switches for performing the interaction task in the non-interactive case (because of random 
deviations in agent’s internal dynamics produced by sensor switches). Furthermore, in Figure 8.6-
A, we can see that the absence of sensorimotor perturbations (NS&NM) leads to a low, but 
significant increase in the median performance of the C1 agent 1. This shows that the C1 agent 
does not use the effect of perturbations for the interaction task. It is worth noting in Figure 8.6 that 
notches display the variability of the medians between samples, and the width of a notch is 
computed so that box plots whose notches do not overlap have a 95% confidence that the true 
medians differentiate. 
Accordingly, we conclude that the E2 agent’s strategy of coping with a non-responsive agent 
actually makes use of the random sensory switches to produce its interactive behaviour. This 
strategy is not seriously affected by the accumulation of motor noise. As shown in Figure 8.6-C, 
the C1 controller cannot make use of sensory switching in this manner. Only the E2 agent exploits 
the presence of sensory switches to interact with a non-interactive partner, while C1 necessarily 
depends on the stimulation of a responsive agent in order to produce interactive behaviour. In 
sum, whereas for C1 the responsive partner agent forms a necessary and sufficient environmental 
condition for sustaining its tracking behaviour, for E2 the presence of a responsive partner is 
sufficient but not necessary because the sensory switching is also sufficient for interaction. 
However, how does the E2 agent use the effects of sensory switches to create the mobile object-
tracking behaviour in both of these situations, even though the non-responsive condition had not 
been encountered during the evolutionary process? What are the underlying dynamics of this 
increased behavioural robustness? This topic is the focus of discussion in the rest of this chapter. 
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Figure 8.6 – Experiments in the absence of sensory switches and motor noise for the C1 and E2 agents. 
Whisker plots (25% to 75% quartiles and outliers as points) comparing the median fitness achieved by 
agents under each situation. X-axis in each plot refers to (C) control case with sensory switches and 
motor noise, (NS) non-existence of sensory and (NM) motor perturbations, and (NS&NM) the absence of 
both perturbations. Plots indicate that whereas for C1 the responsive partner agent forms a necessary and 
sufficient environmental condition for sustaining its tracking behaviour, for E2 the presence of a 
responsive partner is sufficient but not necessary because the sensory switching is also sufficient to 
maintain the interaction with a recorded partner. 
8.3.4 Analysis of the coupled dynamics 
Figure 8.7 and Figure 8.8 show examples of the neural dynamics of the motor neuron output for 
the C1 and E2 agents respectively during 200 units of time. Plots in the right column of these 
figures represent neural outputs across the time. Plots in the left column indicate the motor neuron 
state-space dynamics of the coupled agent-environment system for two-agent mutual interaction 
(top row) and the playback condition (bottom row). For ease of reference, the attractors and 
dynamics for the decoupled controller are also shown; namely, when the input is forced to be 
constantly activated (1) or deactivated (0). In both controllers, the globally attracting stable points 
are placed at A (Ii=0) and B (Ii=1). Results are obtained with sensory switches (0.05) and motor 
noise (5%).  
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Figure 8.7 – Example of the motor neuron output (σi) trajectories for the C1 agent 1 during 200 units of 
time under normal noisy conditions. Agent 1 starts from position -11. The plots represent the coupled 
agent-environment dynamics of the C1 agent 1 in terms of the state space of its two motor neurons (left 
column), and the temporal progression of neural activities for the controller (right column). Activity is 
shown for the normal case when the other agent is responsive (top row) and when it is a non-responsive 
‘playback’ object (bottom row). The globally attracting stable points are placed at labels A (Ii=0) and B 
(Ii=1). Left side plots also show motor neuron outputs working in transient and finally falling into one 
stable transit (C region). Plots indicate that the breakdown in interaction that occurs for the C1 agent 
when a non-responsive partner faces it is clearly visible in terms of the drastic difference in its internal 
dynamic pattern.  
Figure 8.7 and Figure 8.8 indicate that C1 and E2 agents, in the long run, use the edges of 
motor neural outputs to produce interactive behaviour. The dynamics of the coupled motor 
neurons initially stays between the autonomous attractors and suddenly changes in direction. 
These changes indicate that the neural output of motors work as a discrete inner-system mainly 
because of the binary sensory stimuli. Note that the frequent changes of motor neurons’ dynamics 
suggest the presence of fast responses to sensory switches that is more evident for the C1 agent 
than for the E2 one. Only during the final part of the interaction with an interactive agent (and for 
E2 interactions with a non-interactive one), do the dynamics of motor neurons reach a stable state 
but remaining in transient near C when the input changes (cf. Figure 8.7 and Figure 8.8). In fact, in 
this case the situatedness and embodiment of the agents during the ongoing interaction produces 
an inner-system with dynamics working in a transient between autonomous attractors. In other 
words, the dynamics of both agents remain between the autonomous fixed points (when Ii=0 and 
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Ii=1), and the leftward/rightward behaviour of analysed agents is caused by the fixed point shifting 
as the sensory input changes. A decoupled controller, in contrast, would fall into one global 
attractor and remain there without change. 
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Figure 8.8 – Example of the motor neuron output (σi) trajectories for the E2 agent 1 during 200 units of 
time under normal conditions. Agent 1 starts from position -11. The plots represent the coupled agent-
environment dynamics of the C1 agent 1 in terms of the state space of its two motor neurons (left 
column), and the temporal progression of neural activities for the controller (right column). Activity is 
shown for the normal case when the other agent is responsive (top row) and when it is a non-responsive 
‘playback’ object (bottom row). The globally attracting stable points are placed at labels A (Ii=0) and B 
(Ii=1). Left side plots also show motor neuron outputs working in internal transient and finally falling 
into one stable transit (C region). Plots indicate that the dynamic pattern of the E2 agent remains 
qualitatively the same under responsive and non-responsive conditions, as expected from its more robust 
behavioural performance.  
Note also that the breakdown in interaction that occurs for the C1 agent when a non-responsive 
partner faces it is clearly visible in terms of the drastic difference in its internal dynamic pattern 
(compare Figure 8.7 top and bottom rows). However, the dynamic pattern of the E2 agent, on the 
other hand, remains qualitatively the same under responsive and non-responsive conditions, as 
expected from its more robust behavioural performance (see Figure 8.8 top and bottom rows). 
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What we still do not know is how sensory stimuli modulate the transient dynamics of C1 and E2 
differently, so as to enable the E2 controllers to maintain their dynamic pattern under both of these 
conditions.  
8.3.5 Study of the input frequency effect and conditions for coupling behaviour 
In order to get an idea of how changes in sensory input modulate the activity of the two controllers 
we report in this section the effects of input frequency on neurocontrollers decoupled dynamics 
(Figure 8.9). When either of the controllers receives inputs that have a similar frequency to the one 
found during the normal coupled agent-environment situation, we can observe somewhat similar 
dynamics as those presented in the coupled conditions of first-row plots in Figure 8.7 and Figure 
8.8.  
More specifically, we follow test descriptions in [Iizuka & Di Paolo, 2007a], for instance by 
changing the length of the stimulations of the sensory input (D) and increasing the gaps between 
stimuli (W) (Figure 8.9). Indeed, this generates similar motor neuron outputs working in transient 
between autonomous attractors and finally falling into one stable transit regime at C dynamical 
regions as in Figure 8.7 and Figure 8.8. These ‘C regions’ represent areas in the motor activities of 
controllers where the speed through motor output space is lower compared to the high frequency 
of induced (or interactive) sensory switches. Consequently, C regions are those generated from the 
interaction process, rather than being produced by a concrete dynamical structure at controller 
state space (e.g. a quasi-periodic dynamical trajectory or a limit circle). A similar, but more 
intuitive scenario can be represented as follows: avoiding the idea that two ping-pong players can 
commit a mistake during a game, we have more chance to see the ping-pong ball in a common 
region (i.e. in the middle point between the position of players) if the speed of interaction of these 
two persons increases over time. This common region in our simple example represents an 
analogy to C regions in our model as being generated by the frequency of sensory input during 
two-agent interaction. 
We further observe that for the C1 agent 1 dynamics a sufficient low W and D length of the 
consecutive stimulus (e.g. (2; 2)) produces fast change in the agent internal dynamics settling it 
around the top-left corner of Figure 8.9-left. Increasing twice the length of the stimulations D over 
the temporal gaps between stimuli W (e.g. (20; 10)) also generates a dynamical tendency toward 
such state region but the agent’s dynamics converges slower. We observe then that these 
combinations of (D; W) approximate relatively well to the dynamics in Figure 8.7-top row, 
indicating that these input frequencies induce similar motor dynamics.  
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Figure 8.9 – Example of the motor neuron output (σi) of C1 (left) and E2 (right) agents corresponding to 
different sensory (periodic) stimulus (see labels). The length (D) and the gap (W) between activations 
and deactivations of the controlled sensory stimuli represent different sensory patterns. Tests lasted for 
200 time steps. Labels sp0a, sp0b, and sp1 indicate autonomous stable points with Ii=0 and Ii=1, 
respectively; sn0 stands for a saddle node for the Ii=0 case. See main text for a description. 
Contrarily, in our attempt to replicate the E2 coupled dynamics (Figure 8.9-right) in a similar 
manner, we find that it is not possible to accomplish this while using only a single combination of 
(D; W). Interestingly, we have to approximate the normal interaction’s long-term dynamics by 
(stable transient regime at C zone) applying two different styles of stimulation one after the other 
(e.g. (86; 128) and (30; 25) in Figure 8.9-right). This suggests that there may be two different, 
clearly differentiated dynamical regimes underlying the behaviour of the E2 agent, both of which 
are required for the long-term interaction. For the C1 agent such a difference between dynamical 
regimens is not apparent. This potential difference between C1 and E2 analysed agents is further 
supported by the trajectories shown in Figure 8.5 in that a clear initial high and a final low 
oscillatory behaviour is observed for the E2 agent, while for the C1 one this behavioural 
differentiation is not clear. 
For the C1 agent, the results in Figure 8.9 indicate that the controller requires a relatively long 
duration of the sensory stimulus (D) in relation to the gap between stimuli (W) in order to produce 
the necessary dynamics of interaction. In the opposite situation, namely with a relatively high W 
over D (e.g. (20; 54)), the agent’s dynamics are more akin to those of the decoupled system when 
Ii = 0, which are far removed from the required dynamics of interaction. This evidence indicates 
that when the C1 agent 1 does not receive appropriate stimulation from the environment (or its 
partner), it will tend to remain around the Ii = 0 attractor.  
In order to determine more precisely how sensitive the C1 and E2 controllers are to different 
input frequencies, we have investigated a systematic test across a range of sensory conditions. 
Figure 8.10 presents results testing the C1 and E2 neurocontrollers as a function of W and D in the 
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range [1, 200]. Dots in the plots stand for particular (D; W) combinations that resulted in the long-
term dynamics of the agents converging in a pre-defined box of dynamical interest resembling the 
C zone in top rows of Figure 8.7 and Figure 8.8. This box represents whether the coupled o2 and 
o3 motor outputs reach a certain range [0.0, 0.2] and [0.8, 1.0], respectively, after 200 units of 
time. Under normal, coupled agent-environment condition, the motor nodes would generally be in 
this range. 
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Figure 8.10 – Systematic study of the impact of stimulus duration (D) and the temporal gap (W) between 
activations. Dots represent values of D and W for which the output of motor nodes o2 and o3 ends up in 
the range of [0.0, 0.2] and [0.8, 1.0], respectively. These ranges are chosen to resemble the normal motor 
activities required to produce interactive behaviour. Each test lasts for 200 time steps. Plots [A] and [B] 
represent results without sensory switches, and [C] and [D] results with sensory switches (0.05 
probability) for controllers C1 (left column) and E2 (right column). Labels ‘nz’ stands for the number of 
observations. Plots suggest that even the C1 controller makes some use of the random sensory switching 
in order to reach its operating regime. In addition, C1 controller is even more reliant for this test (rather 
than in the ongoing interaction) on the random sensory input than the E2 controller, as indicated by the 
comparatively small number of successful combinations shown in [A]. 
Chapter 8. Evolving functional dependencies for robust behaviour in situated agents 152 
 
Figure 8.10-A shows the C1 experiments without sensory switches, indicating that the C1 
controller reaches the target range of outputs only with 260 combinations of (D; W) values         
(D ∈ [1, 50]; W ∈ [1, 50]). Contrarily, Figure 8.10-B shows that the E2 controller reaches the 
dynamical box with 1654 combinations of (D; W). These results suggest that the E2 controller has 
an appropriate response to a wider range of sensory patterns in comparison to the C1 controller 
enabling long-term dynamics necessary for interactive behaviour as shown in Figure 8.8-first row. 
Interestingly, in further tests that include sensory switches (0.05 probability) under otherwise 
identical situations, we can observe that significantly more combinations of (D; W) induce the 
inner-systems to reach the target range of activation (1831 and 2562 cases for C1 and E2, 
respectively; cf. Figure 8.10-C&D). This strongly suggests that even the C1 controller makes 
some use of the random sensory switching in order to reach its operating regime. In fact, it seems 
that in some respects the C1 controller is even more reliant for this test (rather than in ongoing 
interaction) on the random sensory input than the E2 controller, as indicated by the comparatively 
small number of successful combinations shown in Figure 8.10-A.  
However, this still leaves it unexplained as to why the E2 controller is more robust in general. It 
does have ca. 1.4 more combinations of (D; W) which would certainly help, and it might have 
something to do with the slightly different distribution of viable (D; W) combinations. Comparing 
to Figure 8.10-C and Figure 8.10-D, for instance, we can notice that the E2 controller is better at 
coping with longer durations of activation (D) when there is little gap between contacts (W). The 
C1 controller, on the other hand, appears to be generally better at dealing with short amounts of 
stimulation. How does this difference in sensitivity relate to the underlying dynamics? 
8.3.6 Transient effects based on agent-environment interactions 
Finally, we investigate here why it is that when the decoupled controllers are integrated into 
coupled agent-environment systems, their otherwise attractor-based dynamics are transformed into 
internal transient trajectories. Figure 8.11 shows plots representing the two-dimensional slices of 
the 4D phase portraits (3 nodes + sensor) for the two motor neurons of the C1 (left) and E2 (right) 
controllers. The x- and y-axes stand for the output of o2 (leftward) and o3 (rightward) motor 
neurons, respectively. The labels sp0a, sp0b, and sp1 indicate the locations of stable points of the 
decoupled inner-systems when Ii = 0 and Ii = 1, respectively; sn0 represents a saddle node for the   
Ii = 0 case for the E2 controller; C indicates an approximation of the region in which the coupled 
dynamics normally operate.  
Note first that the engagement between two-embodied and situated agents can induce the 
controllers to remain far from their autonomous attractors. By analysing the dynamical flow that 
agents generate when their input switches between Ii = 1 and Ii = 0, we aim to get a better 
understanding of what produces these inner-transients dynamics. A high frequency change of 
sensory stimuli as we previously discussed will push the inner-system’s dynamics toward a 
‘common’ region (labelled as ‘C’ in Figure 8.11) along the flow of dynamical trajectories that 
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connect the autonomous attractors as if they co-existed in one state space. This effect happens 
despite that the initial dynamical state of the agents starts in the proximity of one of the 
autonomous attractors.  
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Figure 8.11 – Example of the hypothetical situation of dynamical flow with the transient state C that 
appear when inputs switches between Ii=0 and Ii=1. Axes represent motor neuron outputs (oi) of the 
controller C1 (left) and E2 (right). See description in text for further details. Plots indicate the inner-
system’s dynamics region labelled as ‘C’ along the flow of dynamical trajectories that connect the 
autonomous attractors as if they co-existed in one state space. 
We are now in a position to explain why the C1 agent cannot sustain the interaction with a non-
interactive partner, because without the appropriate pattern of sensory stimuli the dynamics easily 
will fall in the sp0 attractor (Ii = 0). This is because the C zone for the C1 agent’s state space is 
highly connected through transient flows between sp0 and sp1 autonomous attractors (Figure 
8.11-left). There will be a strong and quickly activated tendency to converge on sp0 when agents 
are not in contact with each other and the agent is not able to receive appropriate stimulation. 
Contrarily, the flow of the simultaneous E2 autonomous attractors (Figure 8.11-right) show us in 
dynamical terms why this agent is initially slower than C1 agents to produce interaction behaviour 
(Figure 8.5-B). It turns out that the E2 controller’s transient flows toward these attractors are 
neither directly nor highly connected with the C zone. In fact, these flows follow much longer 
transient trajectories toward C, which provides a certain amount of shielding against the effects of 
unexpected perturbation. In other words, the relatively reduced forms of connectivity between 
region C and the autonomous attractors of the E2 agent suggest why it does not discriminate 
between the responsive and non-responsive conditions. Essentially, it requires a much longer 
dynamical trajectory to reach sp0a or sp0b attractors in the initial stage of interaction, and after the 
preferred operating region C has been reached, the E2 agent no longer easily falls into the sp0a or 
sp0b attractors that do not provide the right conditions for interactive movements. 
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8.4 Discussion: the effect of perturbing functional conditions in 
behavioural robustness 
In this chapter, we have conducted a preliminary investigation into the relationship between 
distributed mechanisms of cognitive behaviour and behavioural robustness in terms of a detailed 
dynamical analysis of two kinds of model agents. One of the lessons is that the benefit of having 
cognitive behaviour realized in a distributed manner depends on the specific role played by the 
environmental conditions. Some strategies of environmental distribution lead to more robust 
behaviour than others. In particular, if a brain-body-environment system necessarily depends on a 
set of specific environmental factors to sustain its behaviour, then it will be more vulnerable to 
environmental perturbations of this set than an inner-system for which several environmental 
factors are equally sufficient (see explanations for Figure 8.6). In other words, our results indicate 
that not all distribution is equal for robustness, and that an agent’s dependence on a variety of 
sufficient conditions is more beneficial for its behavioural robustness than dependence on 
environmental factors that are necessary. 
However, this is not to say that the role of the environment is diminished in the more robust 
system. On the contrary, these results support the idea that the amount of behavioural robustness 
cannot be deduced directly from properties of the controller by itself, but must be conceived in 
terms of the coupled brain-body-environment system. For instance, the analysed agents make use 
of context-dependent feedback to shape the different transients properties of their state space, and 
this reciprocal feedback loop is tightly integrated into the way they realize their behavioural 
strategies. What these results are point to is a potential range of different modes of cognitive 
integration, from strict task commitment to flexible behaviour. It would be of great interest to 
investigate possible dynamical mechanisms that would allow an embodied agent to adaptively 
regulate its own dependencies to switch between different modes of engagement (see also [Di 
Paolo & Iizuka, 2008]). 
As we indicate in section 8.3.2, once more, we are here interested in behavioural robustness 
rather than on the ability of discrimination in agents. Whether behaviours are robust depends 
entirely on the behaviour that we want to study. Our analysis could be restated exactly opposite if 
we redefined our goal to be tracking only active agents (in the presence of sensorimotor 
perturbations), an in this case distribution is still ‘better’. This issue is important to be 
acknowledged since it is a major point we are trying to make about distributed mechanisms for 
robust behaviour.  
Finally, it is worth noting that the additional constraints placed on the CTRNN controller 
(section 8.2.3) made the evolution of agents that are more behaviourally robust against 
environmental perturbations easier. Future work could therefore investigate more closely the 
relationship between the role of local instability as indicated in section 8.2.3 and inner-transient 
dynamics in the generation of more flexible behavioural strategies. It would also be of interest to 
investigate the robustness of this type of controller against internal structural perturbations, in 
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comparison with standard CTRNN controllers. Finally, further investigations and theoretical 
discussions can concentrate on the relation between the dynamical and behavioural effects of the 
reported evolutionary constraints (section 8.2.3) and a similar (but poorly inspired) idea of how 
biological neurons remain far from attractors. For example, neurons can be maintained away from 
their fixed state by ion pumps and incoming signals from the rest of neurons in a network, 
generating necessary incoming stimuli for neural activity (e.g. neural spikes). This analogy can be 
associated to the frequency required for interaction in our model agent. Some of the consequences 
of the reported model have been addressed in this chapter, but the whole set of implications should 
be more fully investigated in future work based on this thesis. 
8.5 Toward a metastable understanding of behavioural robustness 
The experimental discussions given in this thesis consistently show that behaviours in our agent 
models associate with transient dynamics at neurocontroller level during coupling. These 
dynamics emerge from a distributed and functional organization that internal control uses to 
enable coherent and cognitive actions. We extensively discussed that at neurocontroller level the 
environmental coupled dynamics does not ‘settle down’ but showing an ongoing change marked 
only by transient interactive coordination, rather than being produced by a concrete dynamical 
structure at controller state space (e.g. a quasi-periodic dynamical trajectory or a limit circle in 
experiments in this chapter).  
In other words, the dynamical attractors that emerge from agent-environment coupling vary (or 
move) in state space owing to activity-dependent changes of neurons and environmental 
modulations in the face of incoming sensing (see explanations around Figure 6.9 for an example 
of this point). Agents’ simulated nervous systems operate in transient dynamics towards an (or 
several) attractor(s) that continuously moves, appears or disappears, in the phase space where the 
attractor landscape remains unchanged. In this respect, Varela et al. (2001) tell us that “the 
transient nature of associated to coherence behaviour is central to the entire idea of large-scale 
[neural] synchrony, as it underscores the fact that the system does not behave dynamically as 
having stable attractors, but rather metastable patterns.” By metastable patterns, Varela et al. refer 
to a succession of self-limiting recurrent patterns (see [Kelso, 1995] and [Afraimovich et al., 
2008] for further explanations about metastability).  
Clear examples of metastable dynamical patterns at internal control level are given for the one 
leg-walking agent (Chapter 7) and the two agents interaction task (Chapter 8). For instance, 
analyses of walking agents working with evolvable sensory offsets and sensory noise emphasize 
that motion dynamics work transiently among autonomous attractors. If the noise disappears 
during tests after evolution in these agents, neurocontrollers’ dynamics would be ‘trapped’ among 
autonomous attractors, where two attractors alternate because of coupling but are fixed in phase 
space. Another example is the mobile-object tracking task detailed in Chapter 8, where ‘C regions’ 
representing metastable transient dynamics are generated because the nature of the interaction 
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model, rather than being produced by a concrete dynamical structure at controller state space (e.g. 
a quasi-periodic dynamical trajectory or a limit circle). Therefore, we can say that these agent 
models reach behavioural robustness by means of metastability at coupled dynamical level in 
whatever form the evolution of agents has come up with (e.g. cyclic dynamics resembling CPGs 
or RPGs as in Chapter 7, or common dynamical regions between autonomous attractors as in 
Chapter 8). 
Although a common mechanism at controller (neural) level promoting behavioural robustness 
is still unknown for brain-based agents, we argue that the most plausible candidate for increasing 
behavioural robustness is ‘dynamical integration rooted on internal-control, body and environment 
dynamics’. As shown in this thesis, this integration can be obtained via inducing distribution of 
behavioural mechanisms in systems that evolve, where such an integration constitutes the basis for 
several broader considerations about brain dynamics as coordinated spatio-temporal patterns (see 
[Kelso, 1995] and [Varela et al., 2001] among other works). There are however different ways to 
induce such a distribution of behavioural mechanisms, which this thesis has discussed; that is, 
through:  
(a) the use of external factors for behaviours, where environmental dependence is further 
developed by means of limited neurocontroller dynamics (Chapter 6);  
(b) the exploit of feedback from the agents’ body that is processed at neurocontroller level, 
where such a distribution is enlarged using sensory offsets and sensorimotor noise 
(Chapter 7);  
(c) the development of different dynamical dependences for the two-agent engagement, 
where environmental dependence is further induced via relatively stable to noise, but 
sensitive to stimuli, internal (heteroclinic) dynamics (Chapter 8). 
Under the vision promoted in this thesis (i.e. behavioural robustness is better understood in 
terms of distributed behavioural mechanisms), the internal nervous system of situated, embodied 
and dynamical agents appears as a resourceful complex system that satisfies simultaneously 
exogenous and endogenous constraints. These constraints arise by transiently settling in a globally 
consistent system state, where such a transient remains functional (robust) despite induced 
perturbations. By exogenous we mean constraints imposed from outside an internal control system 
(e.g. dynamical limitations imposed by agents bodies), in contrast to endogenous meaning 
constraints generated from within the system (e.g. the dynamics created by the topology of the 
network of neurons).  
The relatively novel views on how ‘brain’-based (minimal) agents reach robust behaviour by 
exploiting transient dynamics might throw light on the emergent principles that link neuron and 
network dynamics (and eventually mind), as the large-scale integration of internal control activity 
coupled with the environment (including body) during ongoing tasks. 
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 “No great discovery was ever made without a bold guess.” 
 
Isaac Newton 
 
 
 
 
Many of the observations that we describe here are not completely new. Often they have existed 
previously in some form or another, but have not been presented together in a coherent fashion. 
The combined interpretation of pre-existing ideas with our experimental observations is reported 
in this final chapter, and we believe the contribution is a relatively novel and satisfying approach 
to systemic robustness. We hope that this thesis motivates the reader to see distributed 
functionality as emulating behaviourally robust systems instead of robustness being entirely 
determined ‘from inside’. 
9.1 Systemic robustness as a distributed property 
As we have discussed in previous chapters, there is a growing trend in the cognitive and 
neurosciences fields to view cognitive behaviour as distributed across an extended, multi-level 
system. Our aim in this thesis is to present some theoretical and modelling work that investigates 
this outstanding issue. We have analysed formal dynamical agents placed in a variety of 
environments to address the hypothesis that behavioural robustness is better understood as a 
property grounded on dynamical relations among an agent’s nervous system (brain), its body, and 
its environment. The ER technique is employed to synthesize embodied and situated agents with 
neurocontrollers as ‘nervous systems’. These neurocontrollers produce dynamics that sustain 
different behavioural modes to accomplish our modelled tasks. Dynamical systems theory and 
statistical analyses are used to support conclusions given in this work.  
Chapter 9. Concluding remarks 158 
 
Our lessons complements the common belief in literature that robustness is solely ensured by 
internal mechanisms (Figure 1.1-A). The coupled dynamics of the brain-body-environment system 
is also part of, and perhaps an essential component to, the agent’s ability to generate 
environmental actions despite perturbations. However, the agents’ internal control systems in our 
experiments do not have a priori mechanisms ensuring robustness, such as functional modularity 
and redundancy (see [Kitano, 2004a]). Evolution must instead find mechanisms to produce robust 
behaviours using coupled dynamics in given different experimental scenarios. The scope of 
experiments varied from situated (phototaxis and mobile object tracking task in Chapter 5 and 
Chapter 8, respectively), embodied (one-leg walking task, Chapter 7), to minimal cognitive agents 
(categorical perception task, Chapter 6). Perturbations in our experiments were both genetic 
(mutational variation) and non-genetic (e.g. environmental, sensorimotor, and structural 
perturbations). We succeeded in artificially evolving agents that show robustness in all of those 
situations.  
Most experiments demonstrate a tendency toward robust traits in agents with more distribution 
of their behavioural mechanisms — those agents showing further dependence on conditions in 
‘nervous system’, body, and environment. Experimental evidence in this thesis reinforces the idea 
that the distribution of behavioural mechanisms is a significant factor for further behavioural 
robustness. However, this thesis reports that diverse types and magnitudes of perturbations cause 
performance to differ given different mechanistic distributions, depending on whether 
perturbations affect the functional dependencies of control systems to body and environment 
dynamics and whether these dependencies are necessary or sufficient to sustain behaviours (see 
results in Chapter 8 and Chapter 6). To our knowledge, this observation has not been previously 
discussed in associated literature (see Chapter 2 for a survey). 
The next sections contain a summary of the results from this thesis. Sections 9.2 and 9.3 discuss 
some contributions and implications of our work. These sections extend arguments supporting our 
conclusions that behavioural robustness spans both the dynamics of internal mechanisms and 
dynamical interactions of the whole system. In particular, section 9.2.1 summarizes the main 
lessons of this work and conclusions from experiments. Section 9.2.2 proposes some derived 
observations. Section 9.5 gives new research questions raised by the work in this thesis. Finally, 
section 9.6 presents some closing comments. 
9.2 Contributions 
Using ER techniques, we have studied the emergence of behavioural robustness across a broad 
class of dynamical systems and a variety of perturbations (e.g. mutational and sensorimotor). Our 
experimental motivations are based on the fact that works in ER have so far paid relatively little 
attention to distributed cognition [Ziemke et al., 2004] and behavioural robustness [Silverman & 
Ikegami, 2010] in environmentally coupled agents. In particular, our work addresses current 
discussions on cognitive distribution as central to the emergence of cognitive processes and robust 
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behaviours in ER (see [Fernandez-Leon, 2011][Fernandez-Leon & Froese, 2010] for recent 
examples).  
The promoted holistic view of behavioural robustness however raises difficulties for future 
experimental studies: the dynamical mechanisms that produce robustness cannot be studied as 
isolated parts in most biological systems. Taking the dynamics of the environment (including 
body) into account generally makes the study of robustness a hard problem, even more difficult. 
Because of this, we have concentrated on minimal models and analyse dynamically contributions 
of systemic components (agent-environment) to robust and adaptive behaviour.  
The general observations proposed in this thesis are listed as follows. Behavioural robustness as 
a dynamical process emerges from the coupled brain-body-environment system, rather than from 
isolated mechanisms inside the brain (or in our case neurocontrollers). Not all dynamical strategies 
or behavioural mechanisms are equally robust to certain perturbations; much certainly depends on 
the effects of the perturbation on an agent’s functional dependencies (typically sensory 
information, but not exclusively). Functional dependencies, as prerequisites for particular 
behavioural mechanisms, emerge from the exploitation of environmental opportunities developed 
during the ER evolutionary stage. Next sections give further details of these observations. 
9.2.1 Main lessons from experimental chapters 
The following descriptions summarize the main observations of the experimental chapters (see 
also section 1.4 and section 2.5 for other remarks). 
 
Not all distribution of agents’ cognitive mechanisms are equally helpful in ensuring behavioural 
robustness.  
 
Experiments in Chapter 8 showed us that analysed agents (one dynamically restricted and other 
non-restricted, section 8.2.5) presented behavioural mechanisms distributed differently among 
the brain-body-environment. Both agents require sensory signals to sustain interaction 
behaviour despite sensorimotor perturbations. However, the dynamically restricted agent 
exhibits less dependence to responsive partners in comparison to a non-restricted agent. 
In the presence of sensorimotor and environmental perturbations affecting brain-body-
environment interdependencies, a wider distribution (further systemic dependencies) of the 
behavioural mechanisms seems to be beneficial for robust behaviour. This is observed only if 
not all of the necessary conditions to produce behaviours are affected by significant levels of 
perturbation. We have analysed a non-restricted agent in Chapter 8 that necessitates the 
presence of a responsive partner to produce interaction, but does not require other factors to 
sustain interactive behaviour (e.g. sensory or motor noise). Importantly, we conclude that it is 
not the wider distribution, as such, which is beneficial for behavioural robustness, it is the 
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particular kind of distribution — a collection of individually sufficient conditions (rather than 
necessary ones) — that produces agent’s vulnerability to sensory perturbations.  
The observation of particular types of environmental dependencies also applies to the 
monostable agent analysed in Chapter 6. The agent shows a necessary dependence on objects in 
the environment to produce categorical perception behaviour. The requirement of an object in 
the environment is enforced conceptually: monostable agents cannot produce the necessary 
internal dynamics without the continuous stimuli from objects in the environment. This stimulus 
enables monostable agents to work far from their unique autonomous attractor to produce 
controls to catch or avoid falling objects. The comparison to bistable agents has showed us that 
monostable agents are slightly but significantly more robust to a wide set of sensorimotor, 
morphological, and mutational perturbations. This is mainly because perturbations can affect the 
‘internal state’ that bistable agent’s neurocontrollers are evolved to maintain after sensing the 
environment. Chapter 6 finally discuss that the maintenance of an internal state produces more 
behavioural autonomy in relation to the environmental state in bistable agents than in the 
monostable case, which is not certainly beneficial for behavioural robustness in analysed cases. 
An example of such autonomy is the maintenance of agent’s movements when the agent is not 
currently sensing an object. 
 
The relative increase in internal complexity of small agents has both virtues and disadvantages 
for exhibiting coherent behaviours under perturbations.  
 
A long these same lines, the autonomy that encompasses behaviours in bistable agents — those 
actions that do not require the continuous presence/absence of certain object in the environment— 
manifests as ultimately ‘wrong decisions’ when the state of the agent is affected by 
perturbations. Analysed mono- and bistable agents in Chapter 6 both respond to cues from the 
environment, but when the internal state of bistable agents is perturbed their relative dynamical 
richness (i.e. having more internal attractors) is not necessarily an advantage in producing the 
‘right behaviour’. When perturbations are big enough to produce a change in the agent-internal’s 
state, the bistable agent can shows approaching rather than avoiding behaviour in the presence of 
avoiding objects. This indicates behaviour being affected by the effects of perturbations on 
dynamical trajectories in the analysed bistable agent’s internal milieu. When perturbations are 
small enough, both reported agents maintain their current states by ‘tolerating’ perturbations. The 
important lesson from those results is that systemic robustness can be also manifested as requiring 
a robust transition to an appropriate (internal) steady state in order to exhibit coherent behaviours.  
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The tuning of sensory mechanisms based on agent-environment interactions is not always 
beneficial for behavioural robustness, which depends on the complexity of incoming signals.  
 
In Chapter 7, we demonstrate that the fine-tuning of sensory mechanisms through the evolution of 
sensory offsets has some negative and positive influence on agent’s behavioural robustness: it 
depends on the complexity of incoming signals that agents should process and the effects of 
perturbations on internal dynamics. When evolving with multiple sensory offsets, we observe that 
agents perform a relatively more robust one-leg walking behaviour with noisy signals than agents 
evolved with one or zero sensory offsets. For example, results demonstrate that the use of a simple 
(one) sensory offset creates internal dynamical control in agents that necessarily depend on 
sensory feedback from a leg’s angle in noiseless environments. In turn, perturbations in sensory 
feedback generate a considerable decay in performance. Robust behaviour also emerges after 
inducing a relatively low degree of mutational perturbations in medium or highly noisy 
environments. 
The lesson from experiments in Chapter 7 is that agents show robustness by using the 
experience of interacting with the environment to tune their sensory mechanisms, but the level 
depends on the effects of perturbations on the feedback from agent’s leg. Agents’ sensory 
capacities of self-tuning their body senses are thus not always beneficial for sustaining one-leg 
walking behaviour, because the effect of sensorimotor perturbations on these dependencies. The 
importance of results in Chapter 7 is that such a demonstration, because of the simplicity, lays the 
foundation for further work on agent environmental dependency to exhibit behaviours. 
 
From an evolutionary perspective, neural noise seems to bias selection toward neural systems 
that are resistant to the effects of bifurcations during internal transient dynamics.  
 
In experiments described in Chapter 5, the analysed agents have dynamic landscapes that 
remain functionally the same during coupled dynamics (phototaxis behaviour) in the presence of 
sensorimotor and structural perturbations. Robust behaviours arise in agents as a combination of 
locating the neurocontroller’s dynamics in regions of parameter space where bifurcations 
produced by neural noise are unlikely to occur and where, if bifurcations occurred, they remain 
in functional balance. Our findings suggest that robustness to perturbations in the face of neural 
noise may be a by-product of locating such regions of parameter space. In presence of certain 
systematic variations of parameters, the evolutionary process guarantees behavioural robustness 
to these variations, but it cannot ensure robustness to variations that were not given during 
evolution.  
In Chapter 5, we also discuss that the evolution of agents under certain levels of neural noise 
produces robustness to this condition. Under the right parameter definition, every tested agent 
evolved in a minimal scenario, and in the presence of certain level of additive neural noise has 
Chapter 9. Concluding remarks 162 
 
the capacity to succeed at goal approaching. Evolutionarily emerged robustness is a necessary 
property of agents if they are to overcome the failings of induced neural noise and perturbations 
during lifetime (which agrees with Jakobi’s (1998a) seminal work in ER on behavioural 
robustness). Our last observation confirms Jakobi’s proposal in how to induce the emergence of 
behavioural robustness in artificial agents. Results indicate that noise ‘forces’ evolution to this 
type of robustness in whatever form evolution cares to come up with. However, when agents 
evolved with certain level of neural noise are evaluated with higher levels of it during tests after 
evolution, agents show a decay in performance (Chapter 5). If the level of neural noise was lower 
during evolution, agents instead exhibit at least similar fitness than after evolution.  
9.2.2 Further observations from experimental results 
An integral observation from the discussions in this chapter is that robust behaviour emerges 
because of continuous interaction between the neurocontroller, the body, and the environment 
under certain types and levels of perturbations given thorough evolution. Consequently, credit 
cannot be assigned for robust behaviour to any one isolated part of the coupled system. In 
particular, our experimental observations lead us to suggest a dynamical systems perspective on 
robust but adaptive behaviour that does not rely solely on attractors, but takes into account 
transient coupled dynamics as well3. There are several important implications of this broader, 
systemic view of behaviour robustness. The following comments are some consequences from 
the observations given in this section. 
 
Unexpected behavioural features can emerge from an agent-environment coupled system. 
 
In Chapter 8, two agents produce mobile-tracking behaviour despite sensorimotor perturbations, 
where agent interactions depend both on agents’ own internal dynamics and the changing walking 
behaviour of the other agent. Each agent does not support interactive behaviour by itself without 
some level of stimuli from another agent (e.g. the presence of a responsive or a non-responsive 
agent). The emergence of internal dynamics working in transient in robust agents, and the relative 
independence to a responsive partner for producing interactive behaviour, were not expected 
before experimentation. 
 
Internal-control dynamical strategies seem to be particularly useful for behavioural robustness 
in a task requiring repetitive behaviour in noiseless environments.  
 
Experiments in Chapter 7 indicate that an agent directly sensing its environment (when no sensory 
offsets are available) emerges with an ‘internal’ dynamical mechanism that can help to sustain 
                                                     
3 General idea based on personal communications with Dr. Takashi Ikegami in 2007 and 2008. 
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behaviours despite reductions in the agent’s sensing capacity. In noiseless environments, such 
dynamics emerge in one-legged agents using local bifurcation in which a fixed point of the 
analysed neurocontroller’s dynamics loses stability and a small amplitude limit cycle emerges 
from a fixed-point attractor (i.e. a Hopf bifurcation [Strogatz, 1994]). This is evidence therefore 
that evolution can generate controllers with an internal dynamical strategy that agents use to 
sustain behaviours during coupling. Our observations and those given in section 9.2.1, again, 
reinforce the idea that behavioural robustness cannot be deduced directly from the properties of 
the controller alone (inside agents); it mainly arises from emergent behavioural properties of the 
coupled brain-body-environment system as a whole.  
9.3 Have we obtained biologically plausible robustness? 
The experimental models presented in this thesis are far from emulating realistic examples of 
biological robustness. However, they provide theoretical evidence toward particular kinds of 
robust behaviours that may exist in the biological world (e.g. categorical perception, goal seeking, 
and walking behaviours). The key assumption is that biological organisms have evolved in 
coupled, controller-body-environment conditions. Simulated models of biological mechanisms 
with this coupling allow systematic tests that are not currently amenable to experimental 
techniques. The methods proposed in this thesis are taken as a starting point to develop such work.  
Even in minimal cases, it is not trivial to evaluate the robustness of coupled systems, at least in 
an absolute sense. However, we can always ask: ‘robustness as compared to what?’ and ‘how 
does it emerge?’ in order to investigate the idea of robustness in any particular context. From an 
experimental viewpoint, a more interesting formulation of the study of robustness is: ‘Is there a 
common dynamical mechanism producing behavioural robustness in a set of related bio-inspired 
models?’ A universal mechanism is difficult to conceive fully-formed4. Unfortunately, heuristic 
answers to these questions are not enough because discussions around systems dynamics require 
no less than analysis of mathematical models. For this reason, we base this thesis on concrete 
experimental scenarios proposing comparisons that relate to each other. We suspect that additional 
theoretical directions will come from studies of behavioural robustness in connected, but different 
domains.  
9.4 Lifetime robustness, but evolutionarily constrained 
We have based this thesis mostly on a minimal evolutionary technique (ER), and our systematic 
analyses of the emerged mechanisms approximate many dynamical aspects of relatively simple 
living forms (e.g. adaptation and habituation processes [Ashby, 1958a, 1960]). Adaptation via 
evolution is observed in the dynamical analysis of behaviours in our models, where the concept of 
                                                     
4 Conclusion based on a personal communication with Dr. Randall Beer in 05/2010 (see also [Beer, 2005]). 
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habituation to perturbations is also reflected in our definition of robustness in section 2.4 (in the 
face of an historical process). This thesis has defined robustness as a historical systemic property 
(agent-environment) that enables functionality in the presence of internal and external 
perturbations. Again, the introduced definition implies discussions on systemic robustness in (i) a 
system with a history of interactions with the environment, (ii) perturbations throughout the 
history of an agent-environment system, and (ii) a (internal) systemic function (or a set of them) 
that should ‘actively’ be maintained (by tolerance or adaptivity [Di Paolo, 2005]; see also [Carlson 
& Doyle, 2000, 2002]). Our definition covers a wide range of perturbations during an agent’s 
lifetime (e.g. internal, environmental, and mutational), a range of systems (e.g. embodied, situated, 
and minimally cognitive), and a set of systemic functions (e.g. sensory and motor capacities).  
All behaviours emerging in models for this thesis come from an evolutionary process. Those 
agents showing better performance during evolution will continue and create other agents 
inheriting similar behavioural mechanisms with robust properties. An example of this process is 
given in Chapter 5, where robustness to neural noise emerges in agents after their evolution. In 
contrast, changes in the features of the organism due to adaptation during its lifetime cannot 
propagate back into the genes. The relationship between evolution and robustness, however, 
requires further investigation mainly because this thesis does not propose studies on the 
development of agents.  
Robust behaviour can (sometimes) increase evolutionary fitness, especially if the selection 
method implies lots of uncertainty and noise like in Jakobi’s (1998a, 1998b) experiments. 
However, this does not always mean that the explanation of robustness is evolutionary. This is in 
account to a common question: “What historical process produced this robust behaviour?” 
Nevertheless, one can answer instead: “Why is the system robust in this way and to these 
perturbations and not others?” The behavioural mechanisms arise in our models both 
evolutionarily and dynamically during lifetime. We can ask consequently, what is required for 
robust and adaptive behaviours after evolution in our experiments?  
Ashby (1960, p. 223) has proposed that the existence of genetic-defined, inborn regulatory 
mechanisms in animal nervous systems can demonstrate adaptive and robust behaviours during 
lifetime, which can guide further discussions as follows. Genetically defined behavioural 
mechanisms can involve indirect means to adapt to or tolerate unforeseeable perturbations. For 
example, general mechanisms like structural (synaptic) plasticity in the brain can provide 
adaptation and learning during an organism’s lifetime after morphological perturbations [Di Paolo, 
2000, 2003]. Through interactions with the environment, the organism fine-tunes its gene-based 
mechanisms to exhibit precise behaviours. What Ashby have suggested is that gene-patterns allow 
the organism to form its own behavioural adaptation, guided in detail by the environment (see 
‘ancillary regulation’ in [Ashby, 1960]). In this respect, experiments described in Chapter 7 
exemplify sensory (body signals) regulations that agents use to exhibit behaviours. 
Whether genetically defined mechanisms can indirectly produce behavioural robustness in 
biological organisms is hard to support using the evidence given in this thesis. This is because our 
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interest is on robustness during organism lifetime rather than studying the emergence of 
mechanisms during evolution supporting behavioural robustness. However, as we previously 
discussed, we observe that simple mechanisms in our experiments come from indirect genetic 
regulation in the face of functional dependencies to brain, body, and environment. Any 
explanation of these behavioural mechanisms is in any case certainly incomplete if we do not 
focus on associated brain-body-environment dynamics.  
9.5 Future work 
The work presented in this thesis has aimed to understand robustness using a systemic and 
algorithmic perspective. This goal is ambitious in a bio-inspired research field without a widely 
accepted theory of biological robustness. Kitano (2007) has recently proposed a preliminary 
version of such a theory, based on studies of some biological systems with complex dynamics 
(e.g. immune and cancer systems [Kitano, 2004b, 2006]). The focus of Kitano’s work is in the 
identification of mechanisms ensuring robustness (e.g. modularity, redundancy, decoupling, 
among others) that facilitate evolution and where evolution favours robust traits.  
The most obvious next step of this thesis is to study robustness in complex adaptive systems 
(see [Ahmed et al., 2005]). In this context, the production of robust behaviours will not only be 
generated as actions after sensing external cues, but can be the result of internal self-organized 
processes that are used by an organism to regulate or adjust a high-level environmental coupling 
(rooted on internal or ‘self-imposed’ restrictions). In fact, the conceptual difference of adaptive 
biological organisms and the agents implemented in this thesis is in that the former type is 
governed by self-organized dynamics during agent lifetime, while the latter type emerges from an 
evolutionary process (as we have discussed in section 9.4). Despite that cells are far from being 
simple systems (see protocells as an example [Mavellini et al., 2008][Munteanu & Solé, 
2006][Solé et al., 2007]), an possible line of research might focus on the effect of perturbations on 
cell-like systems, and how they remains functional after internal malfunction and external 
perturbations (see [Kaneko, 2006]).  
Another future direction might also be to study how cell-like systems can lose cognitive 
capacity and associated functionality under perturbations (see [Beer, 2004a, 2004b] for examples). 
In fact, the connection between minimalist cognitive science and biologically inspired models 
with robust properties is largely unexplored. The study of internally regulated agents in particular 
could be an interesting next step, where the environment does not determine but affects future 
actions. Our intuition is that in biological systems the connection to the environment varies over 
time (as a distributed process) and allows the agent-environment interface be modified by the 
organism itself (see [Di Paolo & Iizuka, 2008]). Agents could be studied with internal 
requirements like homeostasis, allostasis, or avoiding ‘death’ based on ‘their metabolic 
definitions’, which drives changes in the agent-environment interface. Through these 
requirements, agents may potentially emerge with dynamics being affected by internal norms (e.g. 
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homeostatic requirements [Di Paolo, 2002a, 2002b]), and exhibiting robust and adaptive 
behaviours as well. The evolution of these agents by means of Darwinian selection is also a 
feasible continuation of this thesis. 
The work proposed by Furusawa and Kaneko (1998, 2001) is a tentative research direction 
based on the ‘chaos hypothesis’ in stem cell systems. Stem cells are defined as cells that are 
capable of proliferation, self-maintenance of their population, production of differentiated cells, 
and regeneration of the tissue in concern [Potten & Loeffer, 1990]. Furusawa’s and Kaneko’s 
observations suggest that the behaviour of these ‘undifferentiated cells’ can change flexibly 
according to environmental cues, while ‘differentiated cells’ have no such flexibility. This idea 
points out that stem cells can respond to environmental changes adaptively without pre-
programmed internal mechanisms, but based on external regulations (e.g. cell-cell regulations that 
keep internal dynamics stable with respect to changes in environmental factors). Their 
observations agree with our discussion of distributed mechanisms for behavioural robustness and 
therefore warrant further investigation. 
9.6 Final remarks 
Experimental evidence and theoretical discussions in this thesis demonstrate the importance of 
understanding behavioural robustness as a dynamical and systemic process. This work supports 
the idea that robustness cannot be understood solely from mechanisms in an agent’s internal 
milieu. We show that the evolution of minimal models produce agents that can perform robust 
traits in different scenarios without explicit internal mechanisms ensuring behavioural robustness.  
The prime motivation for this thesis can be expressed as a search for the simplest interpretation 
of what affects to systemic robustness in terms of an interface between the internal and external 
world of organisms. Aside from the practicality of finding such an interface in biological 
organisms, by understanding emergent dynamics at an organism-to-environment systemic level, 
this thesis serves as a baseline from which to understand the causally connected interplay between 
structure and behaviour in organisms. We demonstrate clearly that such a dynamical interface is 
possible, as distributed processes in a brain-body-environment coupled system. Nevertheless, after 
this experience it seems likely that even more elegant and useful interpretations can be developed 
with further work. The theoretical perspective on systemic robustness provided in this thesis can 
effectively guide the understanding of robust phenomena in the real realm (where the holistic 
study is often impractical). The work in this thesis is a small contribution toward that ambitious 
goal, through the creation of a theoretical and algorithmic bridge between dynamics and 
robustness at coupled system level. 
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This appendix gives some details of the neurocontrollers and the analyses described in this thesis, 
and contains only some details and basic descriptions. Full justification and explanations can be 
found in each experimental chapter.  
A.1. Chapter 5: structural description of studied neurocontrollers 
Table A.1 shows the parameters of NC#9 and NC#3 neurocontrollers analysed in Chapter 5.  
 
 
parameter  NC#9 NC#3 
w (2;4) -5.879421 0.4761854  
w (3;4) 7.96813  0.0074078  
w (3;5) -5.82751  -7.969773  
w (2;5) -5.71487  4.795505  
w (4;5) -2.07358  2.631955  
w (5;4) -4.4690  4.28801  
w (5;1) 2.59092  8.511997  
w (5;0) -6.18280 0.4603699  
w (4;1) -8.592732 -0.815977  
w (4;0) -3.745095  -2.467590  
w (0;1) 9.806875 -4.513274  
w (1;0) -8.25163  6.378496  
w (1;1) 7.62216  -3.69554  
w (0;0) 6.838076 -1.31772  
τ (0) 8.11 5.27 
τ (1) 5.18 1.19 
τ (4) 0.53 4.28 
τ (5) 1.36 7.43 
Table A.1. Parameter values for the analysed NC#9 and NC#3 controllers in Chapter 5. Parameters are 
neuron time constant (τ) for interneurons (neurons 4 and 5) and motor neurons (neurons 0 and 1), and w(j;i) 
is the strength of the connection from the j-th to the i-th neuron (where neurons 2 and 3 represent sensors).  
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A.2. Chapter 6: structural description of studied neurocontrollers 
This section presents a brief description with some structural details of the analysed mono- and 
bistable neurocontrollers studied in Chapter 6.  
 
 
 τ θ g 
input nodes 1 -5.113288 3.4534759 
interneurons 
1.3999523 -3.65526 1.46661995 
1.6748580  -1.8287704 -2.97110 
1.491153 1.23616067 -3.47452020 
motor neurons 1.177145 -1.88478603 0.84192602 
Table A.2. Parameter values for the analysed bistable controller in Chapter 6. Parameters are neuron time 
constant (τ), bias term (θ), and gain (g) for sensors, interneurons and motor neurons.  
 
 τ θ g 
input nodes 1  -3.05446216 1.2003586 
interneurons 
1.2522383 -4.908101  -0.6872947 
1.44578375  2.248604 3.245322 
1.93729866 4.6994562 -0.442940216 
motor neurons 1.89983936  -1.28420002  -0.8616882 
Table A.3. Parameter values for the analysed monostable controller in Chapter 6. Parameters are neuron 
time constant (τ), bias term (θ), and gain (g) for sensors, interneurons and motor neurons. 
 
The sensory inputs for the analysed mono- and bistable controllers respectively inhibit 50% and 
30% of internodes. Sensory gains are 18.77% higher and the output motor gain is 19.66% higher 
for the bistable controller. Inhibitory self-connections in the hidden layer are the same in both 
controllers (33.3%). The magnitude of excitatory self-connections for the bistable controller in 
relation to its mean is 10.67% higher than for the monostable controller, and 47.82% higher for 
inhibitory self-connection in the monostable case. For the rest of synapses (i.e. hidden-hidden and 
hidden-output connections), the proportion of inhibitory relations are 40% for mono- and 46.67% 
for the bistable cases, in this order. Descriptions of neurocontrollers in Table A.2 and Table A.3 
use to τ(i) as the i-th neuron time constant, θ(i) as a bias term, and g(i) is a gain. The multiplicative 
output factors for the bistable and monostable case are 9.411341 and 7.8651156, respectively. 
Synaptic connections for both neurocontrollers are given in Table A.4 where w(j;i) is the strength 
of the connection from the j-th to the i-th neuron. 
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Synaptic connection 
Synaptic strength (weight) 
Bistable controller Monostable controller 
w (7;8) w (6,11) -1.1350246  -2.8306862  
w (0;8) w (6,10) 0.4590694  1.816273920  
w (0;9) w (6,9) 2.75194655  -1.487287632  
w (0;10) w (6;8) 1.99533618  -1.49479370  
w (0;11) w (6;7) 2.22800900  -0.03968038  
w (1;7) w (5;11) 2.67058211  2.93358006  
w (1;8) w (5;10) 4.03330822  0.31438768  
w (1;9) w (5;9) -3.471269970 4.87091577  
w (1;10) w (5;8) 1.81638780 3.06964367  
w (1;11) w (5;7) 0.583812639  0.845049525  
w (2;7) w(4;11) -3.37899945  -2.48139349  
w (2;8) w (4;10) -0.2549976  4.59213775  
w (2;9) w (4;9) 1.03743165  1.3362475  
w (2;10) w (4;8) -1.1628953  -3.1542865  
w (2;11) w (4;7) 4.0419153  -3.33080908  
w (3;7) w (3;11) 0.41824655  -3.2530546  
w (3;8) w (3;10) -0.30582314  -2.7786978638  
w (3;9)  2.31644254 1.273289142 
w (7;7) w (11;11) 3.8598409  2.097115279  
w (7;8) w (11;10) -3.5211957  1.4062679493  
w (7;9) w (11;9) 2.3674840  -4.97434786  
w (7;10) w (11;8) 3.70729360  0.446909383 
w (7;11) w (11;7) 1.7403904  4.78665459  
w (8;7) w (10;11) 4.7659135  2.138113079  
w (8;8) w (10;10) -1.3299419  -2.78104572  
w (8;9) w (10;9) 3.2041375  -2.27983025  
w (8;10) w (10;8) -0.0049854 1.509471188  
w (8;11) w (10;7) -2.6927443  3.193746067  
w (9;7) w (9;11) -0.2792409  1.28254231  
w (9;8) w (9;10) -4.877590  -0.59442662  
w (9;9)  4.0590038  3.06616899  
w (7;12) w (11;13) -0.4683591  1.309800199  
w (7;13) w (11;12) 3.5020927  -0.6958523  
w (8;12) w (10;13) 1.6299242  -3.45325280  
w (8;13) w (10;12) 0.32376588  3.20156433  
w (9;12) w (9;13) -2.035150892  -3.38806928  
Table A.4. The synaptic connection strengths of the analysed neurocontrollers in Chapter 6. w(j;i) is the 
strength of the connection from the j-th to the i-th neuron. 
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A.3. Chapter 6: statistical comparison between sets of agents 
This appendix describes a brief analysis that supports the experimental comparisons between sets 
of mono- and bistable agents given in this chapter. This analysis illustrates the similarity of fitness 
distributions obtained with both sets that are generated with slightly different fitness functions as 
specified in sections 6.3.3 and 6.3.4 using (a=1/3; b=10) and (a=2; b=4) parameter values. The 
following descriptions only contain some of the main details and results of this validation. See 
please [Minium et al., 1998] to extend the discussions about related statistical method proof. 
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Figure A.1 – Different statistical comparisons between the mono- and bistable sets of agents. Plots 
describe the [A] density of probability of fitness value, [B] probability of cumulative fitness value, and 
[C] the probability of fitness value for each set (20 neurocontrollers each). The Mann–Whitney U-test 
suggests that we can compare the two (mono- and bistable) fitness distributions with equal medians at 
5% significance level (95% confidence level) based on our parametrical settings. Imprints in each plot 
indicate the significance level (p) and the acceptance of the null hypothesis (h=0), namely that we cannot 
reject that both sets are equally distributed (sig. 5%). 
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Figure A.1 indicates that the lifetime fitness of mono- and bistable sets of agents are made on 
identical distributions with equal medians. These fitness distributions are obtained for the 
experimental configuration given in section 6.3.5 during lifetime tests (tests after evolution). The 
statistical analysis in Figure A.1 is made against the alternative that fitness distributions do not 
have equal medians. The analysis indicates that both sets of agents follow a ‘Generalized Pareto’ 
distribution. Since the distribution of fitness, the use of t-test to tell if there is a significant 
difference between samples is not appropriate.  
After applying a non-parametric significance tests on the fitness distributions obtained with the 
two sets of agents, the Mann–Whitney U-test [Mann & Whitney, 1947] (also known as Wilcoxon 
rank sum test [Gibbons, 1985][Hollander & Wolfe, 1999]) suggests that we can compare both 
distributions with equal medians at 5% significance level (95% confidence level). The applied 
Mann–Whitney U-test consequently demonstrates statistically that both sets of 20 best-fit mono- 
and bistable agents produce similar distributions of fitness with (a=1/3; b=10) and (a=2; b=4) 
values, which enable us to compare both sets of agents. 
A.4. Chapter 7: structural description of studied neurocontrollers 
This section briefly describes the selected neurocontrollers in Chapter 7 with some structural 
detail. The number of inhibitory synaptic connections for CUE0(N), CUE1(N) and CUE3(N) are 
44%, 40% and 68%, where 60%, 60% and 100% of the self-connections are also inhibitory, 
respectively. The time constant average is 6.2848 (std: 4.0816), 3.2555 (std: 2.8635) and 5.1455 
(std: 3.8290), and the average of biases is -0.9872 (std: 8.2211), 2.2717 (std: 6.4479) and -3.8639 
(std: 9.7061), in that order. The sensory offset for the single valued CUE1(N) is -0.183700, and 
for the multi valued CUE3(N) is 0.332600 (neuron 1), 0.477600 (neuron 2), and 0.523600 (neuron 
3). The given percentages indicate that there are no significant differences in the structure of 
CUE0(N) and CUE1(N) controllers in terms of inhibitory connections, but CUE3(N) has a 
relatively high number. This may allow CUE3(N) to behave more in a stable way than the other 
controllers (see Chapter 7). Table A.5 shows the parameters of the studied controllers. 
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Studied neurocontrollers 
CUE0(N) CUE1(N) CUE3(N) 
w (1;1)  4.115200 w (1;1)  20.000000  w (1;1)  -0.644000  
w (2;1)  15.342900 w (2;1)  20.000000  w (2;1)  15.389800  
w (3;1)  4.670600  w (3;1)  14.581900  w (3;1)  5.811400  
w (4;1)  19.029200  w (4;1)  -16.257300  w (4;1)  -19.727600  
w (5;1)  -20.000000  w (5;1)  -1.939400  w (5;1)  -0.869200  
w (1;2)  20.000000  w (1;2)  20.000000  w (1;2)  20.000000   
w (2;2)  -3.724600  w (2;2)  -8.445500  w (2;2)  -4.660300  
w (3;2)  4.254400  w (3;2)  6.440300  w (3;2)  1.821400  
w (4;2)  2.813800  w (4;2)  10.286000  w (4;2)  14.194300  
w (5;2)  -0.907400  w (5;2)  -20.000000  w (5;2)  14.188000  
w (1;3)  -14.189600  w (1;3)  -20.000000  w (1;3)  -20.000000  
w (2;3)  -20.000000  w (2;3)  -15.517900  w (2;3)  -20.000000  
w (3;3)  -15.695500  w (3;3)  -2.950900  w (3;3)  -3.080200  
w (4;3)  -1.381300  w (4;3)  10.833400  w (4;3)  17.713500  
w (5;3)  20.000000  w (5;3)  -1.449000  w (5;3)  -14.707000  
w (1;4)  16.558700  w (1;4)  18.312300  w (1;4)  -20.000000  
w (2;4)  11.729000  w (2;4)  9.960900  w (2;4)  -20.000000  
w (3;4)  -12.379200  w (3;4)  13.938500  w (3;4)  0.402800  
w (4;4)  -19.800400  w (4;4)  0.845100  w (4;4)  -15.837400  
w (5;4)  -16.181700  w (5;4)  0.353500  w (5;4)  -9.345400  
w (1;5)  0.386200  w (1;5)  20.000000 w (1;5)  -13.955800  
w (2;5)  2.180100  w (2;5)  -8.105300  w (2;5)  -18.368600  
w (3;5)  -20.000000  w (3;5)  -8.370500  w (3;5)  -6.073300  
w (4;5)  1.282000  w (4;5)  5.430000  w (4;5)  -20.000000  
w (5;5)  9.696400  w (5;5)  10.556800  w (5;5)  -8.818400  
θ (1)  0.888800  θ (1)  -4.194600  θ (1)  -5.512600  
θ (2)  -5.338900  θ (2)  4.674300  θ (2)  -8.606000  
θ (3)  12.101300  θ (3)  5.441400  θ (3)  15.000000  
θ (4)  -9.476600  θ (4)  -4.638900  θ (4)  -7.216800  
θ (5)  -3.110400  θ (5)  10.076300  θ (5)  -4.165900  
g (1)  1.000000  g (1)  1.000000  g (1)  1.000000  
g (2)  1.000000  g (2)  1.000000  g (2)  1.000000   
g (3)  1.000000  g (3)  1.000000  g (3)  1.000000  
g (4)  1.000000  g (4)  1.000000  g (4)  1.000000  
g (5)  1.000000  g (5)  1.000000  g (5)  1.000000  
τ (1)  9.917800  τ (1)  2.023500  τ (1)  9.517500  
τ (2)  0.185900  τ (2)  4.185700  τ (2)  1.938600  
τ (3)  4.749300  τ (3)  0.370100  τ (3)  0.422100  
τ (4)  6.571000  τ (4)  1.932700  τ (4)  7.474400  
τ (5)  10.000000  τ (5)  7.765600  τ (5)  6.374700  
  CUE (1)  -0.183700  CUE (1)  0.332600  
    CUE (2)  0.477600  
    CUE (3)  0.523600 
Table A.5. Parameter values of the analysed neurocontrollers in Chapter 7. Where τ(i) is the i-th neuron time 
constant, w(j;i) is the strength of the connection from the j-th to the i-th neuron, θ(i) is a bias term, and g(i) is 
a gain; CUE (i) represents the sensory offset of the i-the neuron. 
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A.5. Chapter 8: structural description of studied neurocontrollers 
This section briefly describes the structure of the C1 (non-structurally restricted) and E2 
(structurally restricted) neurocontrollers that we have studied in Chapter 8 (see Table A.6). The 
number of inhibitory synaptic connections for C1 and E2 are 44.44% and 66.67%, respectively. In 
these controllers all self-connections are excitatory. The time constant averages 1.2393 (std.: 
0.3034) and 16.2495 (std.: 9.4701), and the average of biases are 1.5568 (std.: 2.0724) and 0.3492 
(std.: 1.0210), in that order. There is a significant difference in the mean of time constants and 
biases in the studied controllers; i.e. E2 has a tendency to behave in a slower way because of these 
high time constants. Chapter 8 also discuss this observation. 
 
Parameters 
Strength of parameters 
C1 E2 
w (1;1) 3.3031301 4.266944  
w (1;2) -3.6604936 -8.000000 
w (1;3) -5.8026167 -3.355536 
w (2;1) 0.64409778 -3.355536 
w (2;2) 1.04792498 4.266944 
w (2;3) -5.7682838 -8.000000 
w (3;1) 0.20528219 -8.000000 
w (3;2) -7.92000914 -3.355536 
w (3;3) 2.3348314 4.266944 
θ (1) -0.8270765 0.690450 
θ (2) 2.56716915 1.155906 
θ (3) 2.93021439 -0.798660 
τ (1) 1.0 20.113732 
τ (2) 1.58057124 5.458366 
τ (3) 1.13741345 23.176495 
Winput 10.8612781 11.923363 
rightMotor 43.512342 48.738291 
leftmotor 29.334830 4.478747 
Table A.6. Parameter values of the analysed neurocontrollers in Chapter 8. Where τ(i) is the i-th neuron time 
constant, w(j;i) is the strength of the connection from the j-th to the i-th neuron, and θ(i) is a bias term. 
Winput, rightMotor, and leftmotor represent the magnitude of the connection between the sensor and 
neurons, the right and the left motor strength, respectively. 
 

   
Bibliography 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
 
 
 
Acosta, G., Fernandez-Leon, J.A., & Mayosky, M. (2010). Artificial immune system behaviour 
coordination for autonomous mobile robot trajectory generation. Proceedings of the 2010 
IEEE World Congress on Computational Intelligence. July, 18-23, 2010 - CCIB, Barcelona, 
Spain. IEEE Society, 1204-1209. 
Afraimovich, V., Rabinovich, M., & Varona, P. (2004). Heteroclinic Contours in Neural 
Ensembles and the Winnerless Competition Principle. International Journal of Bifurcation 
and Chaos 14(4), 1195-1208. 
Afraimovich, V., Rabinovich, M., Huerta, R., & Varona, P. (2008). Transient Cognitive 
Dynamics, Metastability, and Decision Making. PLOS Computational Biology 04, 05: 1–9. 
Ahmed, E., Elgazzar, A., & Hegazi, A. (2005). An overview of complex adaptive systems. 
Mansoura Journal of Mathematics, 3(11). 
Alon, U. (2006). An Introduction to Systems Biology: Design Principles of Biological Circuits. 
Mathematical & Computational Biology. Chapman & Hall. 
Alon, U., Surette, M., Barkai, N., & Leibler, S. (1999). Robustness in bacterial chemotaxis. 
Nature 397, 168–171. 
Amit, D. (1989). Modeling Brain Function. The World of Attractor Neural Networks. Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Anderson, C. (2002). Self-organization in relation ot several similar concepts: are the boundaries 
to self-organization indistinct? Biological Bulletin 202, 247-255. 
Arbib, M. (Ed.) (1995). The Handbook of Brain Theory and Neural Networks. The MIT Press. 
Ascher, U., & Petzold, L. (1998). Computer Methods for Ordinary Differential Equations and 
Differential-Algebraic Equations. Philadelphia, PA: Society for Industrial and Applied 
Mathematics (SIAM). 
Ashby, W. (1940). Adaptiveness and equilibrium. Journal of Mental Science 86, 478. 
Ashby, W. (1956). An introduction to cybernetics. London, UK: Chapman & May. 
Bibliography       176 
 
 
Ashby, W. (1958a). The mechanism of habituation. In Mechanization of Thought Processes. 
Proceedings of the National Physical Laboratory Symposium, S4-4 (pp. 1-21). London, UK: 
Her Majesty's Stationary Office. 
Ashby, W. (1958b). Requisite Variety and its implications for the control of complex systems. 
Cybernetica (Namur), Vol 1, No 2.  
Ashby, W. (1960). Design for a brain. 2nd ed. NY: Wiley. 
Ashby, W. (1981). Mechanisms of Intelligence: Ashbys Writings on Cybernetics (edited by Roger 
Conant). Intersystems Publications. 
Azevedo, F., Carvalho, L., Grinberg, L., Farfel, J., Ferretti, R., Leite, R., Jacob Filho, W., Lent, R., 
& Herculano-Houzel, S. (2009). Equal numbers of neuronal and non-neuronal cells make the 
human brain an isometrically scaled-up primate brain. Journal Comp. Neurol. 513(5), 532-41. 
Bäck, T. (1996). Evolutionary Algorithms in Theory and Practice: Evolution Strategies, 
Evolutionary Programming, Genetic Algorithms. Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press. 
Bäck, T., Fogel, D., & Michalewicz, Z. (1997). Handbook of Evolutionary Computation. Oxford, 
UK: Oxford Univ. Press. 
Balaban, N., Merrin, J., Chait, R., Kowalik, L., & Leibler, S. (2004). Bacterial persistence as a 
phenotypic switch. Science 305, 1622–1625. 
Barandiaran, X. (2004). Behavioral adaptive autonomy: a milestone in Alife route to AI? 
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Artificial Life (pp. 514-521). Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press. 
Bays, P., & Wolpert, D. (2007). Computational principles of sensorimotor control that minimize 
uncertainty and variability. The Journal of Physiology 578 (2), 387–396. 
Beer, R. (1990). Intelligence as Adaptive Behavior, An Experiment in Computational 
Neuroethology. New York: Academic Press. 
Beer, R. (1995a). A dynamical systems perspective on agent-environment interaction. Artificial 
Intelligence 72, 173–215. 
Beer, R. (1995b). On the dynamics of small continuous-time recurrent neural networks. Adaptive 
Behavior 3(4), 469–509. 
Beer, R. (1996). Toward the evolution of dynamical neural networks for minimally cognitive 
behavior. From animals to animats 4: Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on 
Simulation of Adaptive Behavior (pp. 421-429). MA: In P. Maes, M. Mataric, J. Meyer, J. 
Pollack and S. Wilson (Eds.), MIT Press. 
Beer, R. (1997). The dynamics of adaptive behavior: A research program. Robotics and 
Autonomous Systems 20, 257-289. 
Beer, R. (1998). Framing the debate between computational and dynamical approaches to 
cognitive science. Commentary to van Gelder: The dynamical hypothesis. Behavioral and 
Brain Sciences 21(5), 630. 
Beer, R. (2000). Dynamical approaches to cognitive science. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4(3), 
91-99. 
Bibliography       177 
 
 
Beer, R. (2003). The dynamics of active categorical perception in an evolved model agent. 
Adaptive Behavior 11(4), 209–243. 
Beer, R. (2004a). Autopoiesis and cognition in the game of Life. Artificial Life 10(3), 309-326. 
Beer, R. (2004b). Autopoiesis and cognition. Artificial Life 10, 325-345. 
Beer, R. (2006). Parameter space structure of continuous-time recurrent neural networks. Neural 
Computation 18, 3009-3051. 
Beer, R. (2008). Dynamical systems and embedded cognition. In K. Frankish, & W. Ramsey, The 
Cambridge Handbook of Artificial Intelligence. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Beer, R. (2009). Beyond control: The dynamics of brain-body-environment interaction in motor 
systems. In D. Sternad (Ed.), Progress in Motor Control V: A Multidisciplinary Perspective 
(pp. 7-24). Springer. 
Beer, R. (in press). Dynamical analysis of evolved agents: a premier. In P. Vargas, E. Di Paolo, I. 
Harvey, & P. Husbands, The Horizons for Evolutionary Robotics. MIT Press. 
Beer, R., & Chiel, H. (1990). Neural implementation of motivated behavior: Feeding in an 
artificial insect. In D.S. Touretzky (Ed.), Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 
2 (pp. 44-51). Morgan Kaufmann. 
Beer, R., & Gallagher, J. (1992). Evolving dynamical neural networks for adaptive behaviour. 
Adaptive Behavior 1(1), 91–122. 
Beer, R., Chiel, H., & Gallagher, J. (1999). Evolution and analysis of model CPGs for walking: II. 
General principles and individual variability. Journal of Computational Neuroscience 7, 119–
147. 
Blanchard, P., Devaney, R., & Hall, G. (2006). Differential Equations. Thompson. 
Bleeker, M., Smid, H., Steidle, J., Kruidhof, H., Van Loon, J., & Vet, L. (2006). Differences in 
memory dynamics between two closely related parasitoid wasp species. Animal Behaviour 
71(6), Elsevier, 1343-1350. 
Boden, M. (1999). Is Metabolism Necessary? British Journal of Philosophy and Science, Oxford 
University Press, 231. 
Borisuk, M., & Tyson, J. (1998). Bifurcation analysis of a model of mitotic control in frog eggs. 
Journal of Theoretical Biology 195, 69–85. 
Braitenberg, V. (1986). Vehicles: Experiments in Synthetic Psychology. Bradford Book. 
Brooks, R. (1986). A robust layered control system for a mobile robot. IEEE Journal Robotics 
Autom. RA-2, 14–23. 
Brooks, R. (1989). A robot that walks: Emergent behaviors from a carefully evolved network. 
Neural Computation 1(2), 253–262. 
Brooks, R. (1990). Elephants don’t play chess. Robotics and Autonomous Systems 6, 3–15. 
Brooks, R. (1991a). Integrated systems based on behaviors. SIGART Bull. 2(4), 46–50. 
Brooks, R. (1991b). Intelligence without reason. In Myopoulos, J. and Reiter, R., editors, 
Proceedings of the 12th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-91), 
Sydney, Australia (pp. 569–595). San Mateo, CA: Morgan Kaufmann Publishers Inc. 
Bibliography       178 
 
 
Brooks, R. (1991c). Intelligence without representation. In A. R. Meyer, J. V. Guttag, R. L. 
Rivest, & P. Szolovits, Research Directions in Computer Science: An MIT Perspective (pp. 
249–276). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Brooks, R. (1991d). New approaches to robotics. Science 253 (5025), 1227–1232. 
Brooks, R. (1992). Artificial life and real robots. In Varela, F. and Bourgine, P., editors, Towards 
a Practice of Autonomous Systems: Proceedings of the First European Conference on 
Artificial Life, (pp. 3–10). 
Brooks, R. (1997). From earwigs to humans. Robotics and Autonomous Systems 20 (2-4), 291–
304. 
Brooks, R., & Flynn, A. (1989). Fast, cheap and out of control: A robot invasion of the solar 
system. Journal of the British Interplanetary Society 42 (10), 478–485. 
Buckley, C., Fine, P., Bullock, S., & Di Paolo, E. (2008). Monostable controllers for adaptive 
behaviour. From Animals to Animats 10: Proceedings of the Tenth International Conference 
on Simulation of Adaptive Behavior (pp. 103-112). Springer. 
Burch, C., & Chao, L. (2000). Evolvability of an RNA virus is determined by its mutational 
neighbourhood. Nature 406, 625-628. 
Calabretta, R., Nolfi, S., Parisi, D., & Wagner, G. (1998). Emergence of functional modularity in 
robots. In From Animals to Animats, (ed. R. Pfeifer B. Blumberg J.-A. Meyer and S. W. 
Wilson), 497-504. Cambridge, Mass. 
Calcott, B. (2010). Wimsatt and the robustness family: Review of Wimsatt’s Re-engineering 
Philosophy for Limited Beings. Journal Biology and Philosophy: Review Essay, Springer 
Netherlands. DOI 10.1007/s10539-010-9202-x. 
Calvitti, A., & Beer, R. (2000). Analysis of a distributed model of leg coordination. I. Individual 
coordination mechanisms. Biological Cybernetics 82, 197-206. 
Camazine, S., Deneubourg, J., Franks, N., Sneyd, J., Theraulaz, G., & Bonabeau, E. (2001). Self-
Organization in Biological Systems. Princeton University Press. 
Cannon, W. (1939). The Wisdom of the Body. London: Norton. 
Carlson, J., & Doyle, J. (2000). Highly optimized tolerance: Robustness and tolerance in complex 
systems. Physical Review Letters 84, 2529-2532. 
Carlson, J., & Doyle, J. (2002). Complexity and robustness. Proceedings National Academy of 
Sciences USA 99 (Suppl. 1), (pp. 2538–2545). 
Chandrasekharan, S., & Stewart, T. (2004) Reactive agents learn to add epistemic structures to the 
world. In Proceedings of the 26th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society 
(Mahwah NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum). 
Chiel, H., & Beer, R. (1997). The brain has a body: Adaptive behavior emerges from interactions 
of nervous system, body and environment. Trends in Neurosciences 20, 553-557. 
Chiel, H., Ting, L., Ekeberg, Ö., & Hartmann, M. (2009). The Brain in Its Body: Motor Control 
and Sensing in a Biomechanical Context. Journal of Neuroscience 29(41):12807-12814. 
Clark, A. (1997). Being There. Cambridge MA: MIT Press. 
Bibliography       179 
 
 
Clark, A. (2008). Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension. NY: 
Oxford University Press. 
Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. (1998). The extended mind. Analysis 58 (1), 7-19. 
Cliff, D. (1991). Computational neuroethology: A provisional manifesto. Meyer, J.-A. and 
Wilson, S.W., editors, From Animals to Animats: First International Conference on 
Simulation of Adaptive Behavior (pp. 29–39). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Cliff, D. (1993). General visual robot controller networks via artificial evolution. Casasent, D., 
editor, Proceedings of the Society of Photo-optical Instrumentation Engineers Conference 
(SPIE93), Session on Intelligent Robots and Computer Vision XII: Algorithms and 
Techniques, (pp. 271–282). 
Cliff, D., Harvey, I., & Husbands, P. (1993). Explorations in evolutionary robotics. Adaptive 
Behavior 2(1), 73–110. 
Cogan, B. (2006). Computing Robustness in Biology. Scientific Computing World, 20-21. 
Cole, M., & Griffin, P. (1980). Cultural amplifiers reconsidered. In D. Olson, The social 
foundations of language and thought. NY: Norton. 
Collette, C., Micaelli, A., Andriot, C., & Lemerle, P. (2007). Dynamic Balance Control of 
Humanoids for Multiple Grasps and non Coplanar Frictional Contacts. IEEE-RAS 7th 
International Conference on Humanoid Robots, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Volume 
4841/2007 (pp. 734-744). Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer. 
Collette, C., Micaelli, A., Andriot, C., & Lemerle, P. (2008). Robust balance optimization control 
of humanoid robots with multiple non coplanar grasps and frictional contacts. IEEE 
International Conference on Robotics and Automation, ICRA 2008, (pp. 3187-3193). 
Csete, M., & Doyle, J. (2002). Reverse engineering of biological complexity. Science 295, 1664–
1669. 
Csete, M., & Doyle, J. (2004). Bow ties, metabolism and disease. Trends Biotechnol 22, 446–450. 
Cybenko, G. (1989). Approximation by superpositions of a sigmoidal function. Mathematics of 
Control, Signals, and Systems (MCSS) 2(4), 303–314. 
de Visser, J., Hermisson, J., Wagner, G., & others. (2003). Evolution and detection of genetic 
robustness. Evolution 57, 1959–1972. 
Demongeot, J., Morvan, M., & Sene, S. (2008). Robustness of dynamical systems attraction 
basins against state perturbations: a theoretical protocol and application in systems biology. 
Proc. Int. Conf. on Complex, Intelligent and Software Intensive Systems (pp. 675-681). IEEE 
Computer Society. 
Descartes, R. (1637). Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason and Seeking for 
Truth in the Sciences. Cambridge University Press, edited Haldane and Ross. 
Di Paolo, E. (2000). Homeostatic adaptation to inversion of the visual field and other sensorimotor 
disruptions. From Animals to Animals, Proc. of the Sixth International Conference on the 
Simulation of Adaptive Behavior, SAB'2000, J-A. Meyer, A. Berthoz, D. Floreano, H. Roitblat 
and S W. Wilson (eds), (pp. 440-449). MIT Press. 
Bibliography       180 
 
 
Di Paolo, E. (2001). Artificial life and historical processes. Advances in Artificial life, Proc. 
ECAL'2001, Prague, J. Kelemen, P. Sosik (eds) (pp. 649-658). Springer-Verlag, LNAI 2159. 
Di Paolo, E. (2002a). Evolving robust robots using homeostatic oscillators. Cognitive Science 
Research Paper 548, School of Cognitive and Computing Sciences. Brighton, UK: University 
of Sussex. 
Di Paolo, E. (2002b). Fast homeostatic oscillators induce radical robustness in robot performance. 
B. Hallam, D. Floreano, J. Hallam, G. Hayes, and J-A. Meyer, From Animals to Animats 7, 
Proceedings of the Seventh International Conference on Simulation of Adaptive Behavior (pp. 
303-305). MIT Press. 
Di Paolo, E. (2003). Evolving spike-timing dependent plasticity for single-trial learning in robots. 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, A 361, 2299 - 2319. 
Di Paolo, E. (2005). Autopoiesis, adaptivity, teleology, agency. Phenomenology and the Cognitive 
Sciences 4(4), 429-452. 
Di Paolo, E. (2009). Extended Life. Topoi 28, 9-21. 
Di Paolo, E., & Harvey, I. (2004). Decisions and noise: the scope of evolutionary synthesis and 
dynamical analysis. Adaptive Behavior 11 (4), 284-288. 
Di Paolo, E., & Iizuka, H. (2008). How (not) to model autonomous behaviour. BioSystems 91, 
Special issue on Modelling Autonomy, 409-423. 
Diacu, F., & Holmes, P. (1996). Celestial Encounters. Princeton University Press. 
Edelman, G., & Gally, J. (2001). Degeneracy and complexity in biological systems. Proceedings 
of the National Academy of Sciences USA 98, 13, 763–768.  
Elena, S., & Sanjuán, R. (2003). Climb every mountain? Science 302, 2074-2075. 
Espenschied, K., Quinn, R., Beer, R., & Chiel, H. (1996). Biologically based distributed control 
and local reflexes improve rough terrain locomotion in a hexapod robot. Robotics and 
Autonomous Systems 18 (1-2), 59-64. 
Faisal, A., Selen, L., & Wolpert, D. (2008). Noise in the nervous system. Nature Reviews 
Neuroscience 9 (4), 292-303. 
Farah, M. (1994). Neuropsychological inference with an interactive brain: A critique of the 
“locality” assumption. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1), 43–61. 
Félix, M., & Wagner, A. (2008). Robustness and evolution: concepts, insights and challenges 
from a developmental model system. Heredity 100, 132–140. 
Fernandez, P., & Solé, R. (2004). The role of computation in complex regulatory networks. In E. 
V. Koonin, Y. I. Wolf, & E. G. P. Karev, Power Laws, Scale-Free Networks and Genome 
Biology. Landes Bioscience. 
Fernandez-Leon, J.A. (2006). Study of evolutionary neurocontrollers for autonomous robot 
navigation. Master Thesis in Systems Engineering (in Spanish). Tandil, Argentina: UNCPBA. 
Fernandez-Leon, J.A. (2011). Evolving experience-dependent robust behaviour in embodied 
agents. BioSystems 103, Elsevier, 45-56. DOI: 10.1016/j.biosystems.2010.09.010 
Bibliography       181 
 
 
Fernandez-Leon, J.A. (sub. 2010a). Evolving cognitive‐behavioural dependencies in situated 
agents for behavioural robustness. Artificial Life Journal, MIT Press. (Submitted August 
2010). 
Fernandez-Leon, J.A. (sub. 2010b). Non-Localizable Robustness: Behavioral Robustness and the 
Distributed Mechanisms Hypothesis. International Journal of Bio-Inspired Computation 
(IJBIC), InderScience Publishers. (Submitted November 2010). 
Fernandez-Leon, J.A. (sub. 2010c). Behavioural robustness: a link between distributed 
mechanisms and coupled transient dynamics. BioSystems, Elsevier. (Submitted December 
2010). 
Fernandez-Leon, J.A., & Di Paolo, E. (2007). Neural Uncertainty and Sensorimotor Robustness. 
Almeida e Costa, F., Rocha, L.M., Costa, E., Harvey, I. and Coutinho, A., editors, Advances 
in Artificial Life. Proceedings of the 9th European Conference on Artificial life ECAL 2007 
(pp. 786-795). Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer. 
Fernandez-Leon, J.A., & Di Paolo, E. (2008). Neural noise induces the evolution of robust 
behaviour by avoiding non-functional bifurcations. Asada, M., Hallam, J.C.T., Meyer, J.-A. 
and Tani, J., editors, From Animals to Animats 10. 10th International Conference on the 
Simulation of Adaptive Behavior (pp. 32-41). Springer. 
Fernandez-Leon, J.A., & Froese, T. (2010). What is the relationship between behavioral 
robustness and distributed mechanisms of cognitive behaviour? Special Session on 
Evolutionary Robotics. Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE World Congress on Computational 
Intelligence. July, 18-23, 2010 - CCIB, Barcelona, Spain. IEEE Society, 4645-4652. 
Fernandez-Leon, J.A., Acosta, G., & Mayosky, M. (2009). Behavioral control through 
evolutionary neurocontrollers for autonomous mobile robot navigation. Journal of Robotics & 
Autonomous Systems, Vol. 57, Issue 4, Elsevier, 411-419. 
Fernandez-Leon, J.A., Tosini, M., & Acosta, G. (2004). Evolutionary Reactive Behaviour for 
Mobile Robots Navigation. IEEE Conference on Cybernetics and Intelligent Systems (IEEE 
CIS), Proceedings of the 2004 IEEE CIS. (pp. 532-537). IEEE Society. 
Fine, P., Di Paolo, E., & Izquierdo, E. (2007). Adapting to your body. Almeida e Costa, F., Rocha, 
L.M., Costa, E., Harvey, I. and Coutinho, A., editors, Proceedings of the 9th European 
Conference on Artificial Life (pp. 203-212). Springer. 
Floreano, D., & Mondada, F. (1996). Evolution of homing navigation in a real mobile robot. IEEE 
Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics – Part B Cybernetics 26 (3), 396-407. 
Floreano, D., & Mondada, F. (1998). Evolutionary neurocontrollers for autonomous mobile 
robots. Neural Networks 11, 1461–1478. 
Floreano, D., & Urzelai, J. (2000). Evolutionary Robots with on-line self-organization and 
behavioral fitness. Neural Networks 13, 431-443. 
Freilich, S., Kreimer, A., Borenstein, E., Gophna, U., Sharan, R., & Ruppin, E. (2010). 
Decoupling environment-dependet and independent genetic robustness across bacterial 
species. PLoS Computational Biology 2 (6), e1000690. 
Bibliography       182 
 
 
Friedman, G. (1996). The Space Studies Institute View on Self-Replication. The Assembler: 
Newsletter of the Molecular Manufacturing Shortcut Group of the National Space Society 4:4. 
Froese, T., & Di Paolo, E. (2008). Stability of coordination requires mutuality of interaction in a 
model of embodied agents. M. Asada, J. C. T. Hallam, J.-A. Meyer & J. Tani (eds.), From 
Animals to Animats 10: Proc. of the 10th Int. Conf. on Simulation of Adaptive Behavior (pp. 
52-61). Berlin, Germany: Springer-Verlag. 
Froese, T., & Ziemke, T. (2009). Enactive Artificial Intelligence: Investigating the systemic 
organization of life and mind. Artificial Intelligence 173 (3-4), 366-500. 
Funahashi, K., & Nakamura, Y. (1993). Approximation of dynamical systems by continuous time 
recurrent neural networks. Neural Networks 6(6), 801–806. 
Furusawa, C., & Kaneko, K. (1998). Emergence of rules in cell society: differentiation, hierarchy, 
and stability. Bulletin of Mathematical Biology 60, 659-687. Article No. bu970034. 
Furusawa, C., & Kaneko, K. (2001). Theory of robustness of irreversible differentiation in a stem 
cell system: Chaos hypothesis. Journal of Theoretical Biology 209, 395-416. 
Gallagher, J. (2001). Evolution and analysis of nonautonomous neural networks for walking: 
reflexive pattern generators, Proceedings of the Congress on Evolutionary Computation 2001. 
(397-402). 
Gallagher, J., Beer, R., Espenschied, K., & Quinn, R. (1996). Application of evolved locomotion 
controllers to a hexapod robot. Robotics and Autonomous Systems 19, 95-103. 
Gallagher, S. (2005). How the Body Shapes the Mind. NY: Oxford University Press. 
Gibbons, J. (1985). Nonparametric Statistical Inference. NY: Marcel Dekker. 
Gigliotta, O., & Nolfi, E. (2008). On the Coupling Between Agent Internal and Agent/ 
Environmental Dynamics: Development of Spatial Representations in Evolving Autonomous 
Robots. Adaptive Behavior, Vol. 16, No. 2-3, 148-165. 
Godzik, N., Schoenauer, M., & Sebag, M. (2004). Robustness in the long run: Auto-teaching vs. 
Anticipation in Evolutionary Robotics. Proceedings of PPSN - Parallel Problem Solving from 
Nature - PPSN VIII (pp. 932-941). Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer. 
Goldstone, R., & Roberts, M. (2006). Self-organized trail systems in groups of humans. 
Complexity 11, 43-50. 
Grossberg, S. (1988). Nonlinear neural networks: Principles, mechanisms, and architectures. 
Neural Networks 1, 17–61. 
Hagen, E., & Hammerstein, P. (2005). Evolutionary biology and the strategic view of ontogeny: 
Robustness versus flexibility in the life course. Research in Human Development 2, 83-97. 
Hansen, T. (2006). The origins of Robustness. Evolution 60(2), The society for the Study of 
Evolution. Book review of Wagner (2005): Robustness and Evolvability in Living Systems, 
418-420. 
Harvey, I. (1992). The SAGA cross: The mechanics of recombination for species with variable 
length genotypes. Manner, R. and Manderick, B., editors, Parallel problem solving from 
nature 2, (pp. 269–278). Amsterdam. North-Holland. 
Bibliography       183 
 
 
Harvey, I. (1994). Evolutionary robotics and SAGA: the case for hill crawling and tournament 
selection. C. Langton (ed.), Artificial Life III, Santa Fe Institute Studies in the Sciences of 
Complexity, Proc. Vol. XVI (pp. 299-326). Addison Wesley. 
Harvey, I. (1995). The Artificial Evolution of Adaptive Behaviour. Ph.D. Thesis, COGS. 
Brighton, UK: University of Sussex. 
Harvey, I. (2001). Artificial evolution: a continuing SAGA. Gomi, T. (Ed.), Evolutionary robotics: 
From intelligent robots to artificial life, Vol. 2217 of Lecture notes in computer science (pp. 
94–109). Berlin: Springer-Verlag. 
Harvey, I., Di Paolo, E., Wood, R., Quinn, M., & Tuci, E. (2005). Evolutionary robotics: A new 
scientific tool for studying cognition. Artificial Life 11(1–2), 79–98. 
Harvey, I., Husbands, P., & Cliff, D. (1992). Issues in evolutionary robotics. J-A. Meyer, H. 
Roitblat, and S. Wilson, editors, From Animals to Animats 2: Proc. of the Second Intl. Conf. 
on Simulation of Adaptive Behavior (SAB92) (pp. 364–373). Cambridge MA: MIT 
Press/Bradford Books. 
Harvey, I., Husbands, P., Cliff, D., Thompson, A., & Jakobi, N. (1996). Evolutionary Robotics: 
the Sussex Approach. Robotics and Autonomous Systems 20, 205-224. 
Hashimoto, K., & Ikegami, T. (2001). Heteroclinic Chaos, Chaotic Itinerancy and Neutral 
Attractors in Symmetrical Replicator Equations with Mutations. Journal Phys. Soc. Japan 70, 
349-352. 
Haugeland, J. (1985). Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Haykin, S. (1999). Neural Networks: A comprehensive Foundation. Second Edition. Prentice Hall. 
Healey, M. (1975). Principles of automatic control. Third edition (first edition 1967). The English 
Universities Press Limited. 
Helbing, D., Keltsh, J., & Molnar, P. (1997). Modelling the evolution of human trail systems. 
Nature 388, 45-50. 
Hobbs, J., Husbands, P., & Harvey, I. (1996). Achieving Improved Mission Robustness. Proc. of 
4th ESA Workshop on Advanced Space Technologies for Robotic Applications, ASTRA 96. 
European Space Agency. 
Holland, J. (1975). Adaptation in Natural and Artificial Systems. The University of Michigan 
Press, Ann Arbor. 
Hollander, M., & Wolfe, D. (1999). Nonparametric Statistical Methods. Hoboken, N.J.: John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
Horowitz, P., & Hill, W. (1989). The art of electronics (Second Edition ed.). Cambridge, MA: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Hubert, J., Matsuda, E., Silverman, E., & Ikegami, T. (2009). A Robotic Approach to 
Understanding Robustness. The 3rd International Symposium on Mobiligence, (pp. 361-366). 
Hunter, P. (2009). Robust yet flexible. EMBO reports: Science and Society 10, 949–952. 
Hurst, L., & Randerson, J. (2000). Dosage, deletions and dominance: simple models of the 
evolution of gene expression. Journal of Theoretical Biology 205, 641–647. 
Bibliography       184 
 
 
Husbands, P., & Harvey, I. (1992). Evolution vs. design: controlling autonomous mobile robots. 
In Integrating Perception, Planning and Action: Proceedings of 3rd Annual Conference on 
Artificial Intelligence, Simulation and Planning. IEEE Computer Society Press, 139-146. 
Husbands, P., Harvey, I., Cliff, D., & Miller, G. (1997). Artificial evolution: A new path for 
artificial intelligence? Brain and Cognition 34, 130–159. 
Husbands, P., Smith, T., O’Shea, M., Jakobi, N., Anderson, J., & Philippides, A. (1998). Brains, 
Gases and Robots. Niklasson, N. et al. (editors). Proceedings of the 8th International 
Conference on Artificial Neural Networks: ICANN98 (pp. 51-64). Springer. 
Hutchins, E. (1995). Cognition in the wild. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
Hutchins, E. (2000). Distributed cognition. University of Columbia: IESBC. 
Iizuka, H., & Di Paolo, E. (2007a). Minimal Agency Detection of Embodied Agents. F. Almeida e 
Costa, L. M. Rocha, E. Costa, I. Harvey & A. Coutinho (eds.), Advances in Artificial Life: 
Proc. of the 9th Euro. Conf. on Artificial Life (pp. 485-494). Berlin, Germany: Springer-
Verlag. 
Ikegami, I., & Tani, J. (2001). Chaotic itinerancy needs embodied cognition to explain memory 
dynamics. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5), 818-819. 
Izquierdo, E. (2008). The dynamics of learning behaviour: A situated, embodied, and dynamical 
systems approach. Ph.D. Thesis. Brighton, UK: University of Sussex. 
Izquierdo, E., & Bührmann, T. (2008). Analysis of a dynamical recurrent neural network evolved 
for two qualitatively different tasks: Walking and chemotaxis. S. Bullock, J. Noble, R. A. 
Watson, and M. A. Bedau (Eds.), Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on 
Artificial Life (pp. 257-264). MIT Press. 
Jakobi, N. (1998a). Evolutionary robotics and the radical envelope of noise hypothesis. Adaptive 
Behavior 6(2), 325–368. 
Jakobi, N. (1998b). Minimal simulations for evolutionary robotics. Ph.D. Thesis. Brighton, UK: 
University of Sussex. 
Jakobi, N., Husbands, P., & Harvey, I. (1995). Noise and the Reality Gap: The Use of Simulation 
in Evolutionary Robotics. Third European Conf. on Artificial Life (ECAL95), Advances in 
Artificial Life (pp. 704-720). Springer. 
Jen, E. (2003). Stable or robust? What's the difference? Complexity 8 (3), Wiley InterScience, 12-
18. 
Jen, E. (2005). Robust Design. A repertoire of biological, ecological, and engineering case studies. 
Santa Fe Institute Studies in the Sciences of Complexity: Oxford University Press. 
Jones, L., Fontanini, A., Sadacca, B., & Katz, D. (2007). Natural stimuli evoke analysis dynamic 
sequences of states in sensory cortical ensembles. Proceedings of National. Acad. Sciences, 
USA, 104, (pp. 18772-18777). 
Kaneko, K. (2006). Life: An Introduction to Complex Systems Biology. Springer. 
Keinan, A. (2005). Localization of function via multi-perturbation analysis: theory and 
applications for the analysis of neural networks. PhD Thesis. Tel Aviv University, Israel.  
Bibliography       185 
 
 
Kelso, J. (1995). Dynamics patterns: the self-organization of brain and behaviour. MIT Press: 
Cambridge. 
Kepler, T., & Elston, T. (2001). Stochasticity in transcriptional regulation: origins, consequences, 
and mathematical representations. Biophys. J. 81, 3116–3136. 
Kien, J., & Altman, J. (1995). Modelling the generation of long-term neuronal activity underlying 
behaviour. Prog. Neurobiol. 45 (4), 361-372. 
Kirsh, D. (1991). Today the earwig, tomorrow man? Artificial Intelligence 47, 161–184. 
Kitano, H. (2002). Systems Biology: a brief overview. Science 295, 1662-1664. 
Kitano, H. (2004a). Biological Robustness. Nature Reviews: Genetics 5, Nature Publishing 
Group, 826-837. 
Kitano, H. (2004b). Cancer as a robust system: implications for anticancer therapy. Nat. Rev. 
Cancer 4, 227–235. 
Kitano, H. (2006). Robustness from top to bottom. Book review of Wagner (2005): Robustness 
and Evolvability in Living Systems. Nature Genetics 38, 133. 
Kitano, H. (2007). Towards a theory of biological robustness. Molecular Systems Biology 3:137. 
EMBO and Nature Publishing Group. 
Koch, C., & Segev, I. (1989). Methods in Neuronal Modeling: From Synapses to Networks. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Kondo, T. (2007). Evolutionary design and behavior analysis of neuromodulatory neural networks 
for mobile robots control. Applied Soft Computing archive 7(1), 189-202. 
Kondo, T., Ishiguro, A., Tokura, S., & Uchikawa, Y. (1999). Realization of Robust Controllers in 
Evolutionary Robotics: A Dynamically-Rearranging Neural Network Approach. Proceedings 
of the 1999 Congress on Evolutionary Computation (CEC'99), Vol.1, (pp. 366-373). 
Krakauer, D. (2005). Robustness in biological systems: a provisional taxonomy. T.S. Deisboeck 
and Y. Kresh, Editors, Complex Systems Science in Biomedicine, Plenum, (pp. 185–207). 
Krakauer, D., & Plotkin, J. (2005). Principles and parameters of molecular robustness. In E. Jen, 
Robust design: a repertoire for Biology, Ecology and Engineering. Oxford University Press. 
Lehner, B. (2010). Genes Confer Similar Robustness to Environmental, Stochastic, and Genetic 
Perturbations in Yeast. PLoS ONE 5(2), e9035. 
Lesne, A. (2008). Biological robustness: what do we learn from (mathematical) physics? Paper 
based on A. Lesne (2008), Robustness: confronting lessons from physics and biology. 
Biological Reviews 83, 509-532. 
Machamer, P., Darden, L., & Craver, C. (2000). Thinking About Mechanisms. Philosophy of 
Science 67 (1), 1-25. 
Macía, J., & Solé, R. (2008). Distributed robustness in cellular networks: insights from evolved 
digital circuits. Journal of the Royal Society Interface 442, 259-264. 
Macinnes, I. (2001). An evolutionary framework for the exploration of perceptual embodiment 
and other aspects of embodied cognition. Master’s thesis, School of Cognitive and Computing 
Sciences. Brighton, UK: University of Sussex. 
Bibliography       186 
 
 
Macinnes, I. (2007). The evolving functional circle hypothesis: a study of autonomous robots with 
evolvable morphologies. Ph.D. Thesis. Brighton, UK: University of Sussex. 
Macinnes, I., & Di Paolo, E. (2006). The advantages of evolving perceptual cues. Adaptive 
Behavior 14(2), 147–156. 
Mann, H., & Whitney, D. (1947). On a test of whether one of two random variables is 
stochastically larger than the other. Annals of Mathematical Statistics 18, 50–60. 
Marder, E., & Calabrese, R. (1996). Principles of rhythmic motor pattern production, 
Physiological Reviews 76, 687–717. 
Mathayomchan, B., & Beer, R. (2002). Center-crossing recurrent neural networks for the 
evolution of rhythmic behavior. Neural Computation 14, 2043–2051. 
Maturana, H., & Varela, F. (1987). Autopoiesis and cognition: the realization of the living. 
Boston, MA: Reidel. 
Maturana, H., & Varela, F. (1992). The Tree of Knowledge: The biological roots of human 
understanding (revised edition). First edition: 1980. Boston\London: Shamabala. 
Mavellini, F., Lerario, M., & Ruiz-Mirazo, K. (2008). A stochastic simulation platform to study 
protocell Dynamics. Proceedings of the International Conference on Bioinformatics & 
Computational Biology, H. R. Arabnia et al (eds.) (pp. 934-941). CSREA Press. 
Mazor, O., & Laurent, G. (2005). Transient dynamics vs. fixed points in odor representations by 
locust antennal lobe projection neurons, Neuron 48(4), 661-673. 
McClelland, J. (1989). Parallel distributed processing: Implications for cognition and 
development. Morris, R. (Ed)., Parallel distributed processing: Implications for psychology 
and neurobiology (pp. 8-45). NY: Oxford University Press. 
Michalewicz, Z., & Fogel, D. (2004). How To Solve It: Modern Heuristics. Springer. 
Miglino, O., Lund, H., & Nolfi, S. (1996). Evolving mobile robots in simulated and real 
environments. Artificial Life 2(4), 417–434. 
Minium, E., Clarke, E., & Coladarci, T. (1998). Elements of Statistical Reasoning. 2nd Revised 
edition. John Wiley and Sons Publishers. 
Mitchell, M. (1998). An Introduction to Genetic Algorithms. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Munteanu, A., & Solé, R. (2006). Phenotypic Diversity and Chaos in Protocell Dynamics. Journal 
of Theoretical Biology 240, 434-442. 
Nolfi, S. (1997). Using emergent modularity to develop control system for mobile roots. Adaptive 
Behavior 5, 343–364. 
Nolfi, S. (1998). Evolutionary Robotics: Exploiting the Full Power of Self-Organisation. 
Connection Science 10, 167-183. 
Nolfi, S., & Floreano, D. (2000). Evolutionary Robotics. The Biology, Technoloy, and Intelligence 
of Self-Organizing Machines. MIT Press. 
Nolfi, S., Floreano, D., Miglino, O., & Mondada, F. (1994). How to evolve autonomous robots: 
Different approaches in evolutionary robotics. Brooks, R. and Maes, P., editors, Artificial Life 
IV Proceedings (pp. 190–197). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Bibliography       187 
 
 
Norman, D. (1993). Things that make us smart. Addison-Wesley. 
Nyquist, H. (1932). Regeneration Theory. Bell Systems Technical Journal, vol. 2, 126-147. 
Patla, A. (1991). Understanding the control of human locomotion: a prologue. In: Patla, A. (ed.) 
Adaptability of human gait: implications for the control of locomotion. Advances in 
psychology 78, 3-17. Elsevier, Amsterdam. 
Pfeifer, R. (1996). Building “fungus eaters” design principles of autonomous agents. Maes, P., 
Mataric, M., Meyer, J-A. Pollack, J., Roitblat, H., & Wilson, S. (Eds.), From Animals to 
Animats IV: Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Simulation of Adaptive 
Behavior (pp. 2–12). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Pfeifer, R., & Bongard, J. (2006). How the Body Shapes the Way We Think: A New View of 
Intelligence. Bradford Books, MIT Press. 
Pfeifer, R., & Scheier, C. (2001). Understanding Intelligence. MIT Press. 
Pfeifer, R., Iida, F., & Bongard, J. (2005). New Robotics: Design Principles for Intelligent 
Systems, Artificial Life, Special Issue on New Robotics, Evolution and Embodied Cognition, 
11(1-2), 99-120. 
Pfeifer, R., Lungarella, M., & Iida, F. (2007). Self-organization, embodiment, and biologically 
inspired robotics, Science 318, 1088-1093. 
Potten, C., & Loeffer, M. (1990). Stem cells: attributes, cycles, apirals, pitfalls and uncertainties. 
Development 110, 1001-1020. 
Price, T., Qvarnström, A., & Irwin, D. (2003). The role of phenotypic plasticity in driving genetic 
evolution. Proc. Biol. Sci. 270 (1523), 1433–1440. 
Rabinovich, M., Huerta, R., & Laurent, G. (2008). Transient Dynamics for Neural Processing. 
Neuroscience, vol. 321, Science. 
Rabinovich, M., Varona, P., Selverston, A., & Abarbanel, H. (2006). Dynamical principles in 
neuroscience. Reviews of Modern Physics 78, 1213-1265. 
Ram, A., Arkin, R., Boone, G., & Pearce, M. (1994). Using genetic algorithms to learn reactive 
control parameters for autonomous robotic navigation. Adaptive Behaviour 2 (3), 277-304. 
Rao, C., Kirby, J., & Arkin, A. (2004). Design and diversity in bacterial chemotaxis: a 
comparative study in Escherichia coli and Bacillus subtilis. PLoS Biololgy 2, e49. 
Rechenberg, I. (1973). Evolutionsstrategie: Optimierung technischer Systeme und Prinzipien der 
biologischen Evolution. Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog. 
Sayama, H. (1996). Von Neumann's Machine in the Shell: Enhancing the Robustness of Self-
Replication Processes. Proceedings of the eighth international conference on Artificial life 
(pp. 49–52). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Scheier, C., Pfeifer, R., & Kunyioshi, Y. (1998). Embedded neural networks: exploiting 
constraints. Neural Networks 11, 1551–1569. 
Seth, A, & Edelman, G. (2004). Environment and Behavior Influence the Complexity of Evolved 
Neural Networks. Adaptive Behavior 12 (5), 5-20. 
Bibliography       188 
 
 
Seth, A. (1998a). The evolution of complexity and the value of variability. Adami, C., Belew, R., 
Kitano, H., & Taylor, C. (Eds.), Artificial Life VI: Proceedings of the Sixth International 
Conference on the Simulation and Synthesis of Living Systems (pp. 209-221). Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press. 
Seth, A. (1998b). Noise and the pursuit of complexity: A study in evolutionary robotics. 
Husbands, P., & Meyer, J. (Eds.). Proceedings of the First European Workshop on 
Evolutionary Robotics (pp. 123-137). Berlin: Springer-Verlag. 
Seth, A. (2000). On the Relations between Behaviour, Mechanism, and Environment: 
Explorations in Artificial Evolution. Ph.D. Thesis. Brighton, UK: University of Sussex. 
Seth, A. (2005). Causal connectivity analysis of evolved neural networks during behavior. 
Network: Computation in Neural Systems 16, 35-55.  
Seth, A., & Edelman, G. (2007). Distinguishing causal interactions in neural populations. Neural 
Comput. 19(4): 910-933. 
Sherrington, C. (1898). Decerebrate rigidity and reflex coordination of movements. Journal 
Physo1. (Lond.) 22, 319-332. 
Silverman, E., & Ikegami, T. (2010). Robustness in Artificial Life, Int. J. Bio-Inspired 
Computation, Vol. 2, No. 3, 197–212. 
Simon, H. (1981). The sciences of the artificial. 2nd edition. USA: MIT Press. 
Slocum, A., Downey, D., & Beer, R. (2000). Further Experiments in the Evolution of Minimally 
Cognitive Behavior. From Perceiving Affordances to Selective Attention. Proceedings of the 
Sixth International Conference on Simulation of Adaptive Behavior (pp. 430-439). MIT Press. 
Solé, R., Munteanu, A., Rodriguez-Caso, C., & Macía, J. (2007). Synthetic protocell biology: 
from reproduction to computation. Phil. Trans. Roy. Soc. Lond. ser. B 362, 1727-1739. 
Stebbing, A. (2009). Interpreting ‘Dose-Response’ Curves Using Homeodynamic Data: With an 
Improved Explanation for Hormesis. Dose Response 7(3), 221–233. 
Stelling, J., Sauer, U., Szallasi, Z., Doyle III, F., & Doyle, J. (2004). Robustness of cellular 
functions. Cell 118, 675–685. 
Strogatz, S. (1994). Nonlinear Dynamics & Chaos (2000, First paperback printing). Reading, MA: 
Addison-Wesley. 
Tani, J., & Fukumura, N. (1997). Self-organising internal representation in learning navigation: A 
physical experiment by the mobile robot YAMABICO. Neural Networks, Vol. 10, No. 1, 153-
157. 
Teo, J. (2004). Robustness of Artificially Evolved Robots: What’s Beyond the Evolutionary 
Window? The 2nd International Conference on Artificial Intelligence in Engineering and 
Technology (ICAIET 2004), volume 1, (pp. 14-20). 
Thieme, M., & Ziemke, T. (2002). The road sign problem revisited: handling delayed response 
tasks with neural robot controllers. B. Hallam, D. Floreano, J. Hallam, G. Hayes and J.-A. 
Meyer (eds) From Animals to Animats 7: Proceedings of the Seventh International 
Conference on Simulation of Adaptive Behavior (pp. 228–229). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Bibliography       189 
 
 
Togelius, J. (2004). Evolution of a subsumption architecture neurocontroller. Journal of Intelligent 
and Fuzzy Systems 15 (1), 15–20. 
Tononi, G., Sporns, O., & Edelman, G. (1999). Measures of degeneracy and redundancy in 
biological networks. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 96, 3257–3262.  
Tsuda, I. (2001). Toward an interpretation of dynamic neural activity in terms of chaotic 
dynamical systems. Behavioral and Brain Science 24, 793–847. 
Uchida, N., & Mainen, Z. (2003). Speed and accuracy of olfactory discrimination in the rat. 
Nature Neuroscience 6, 1224–1229. 
Umpleby, S. (2009). Ross Ashby's general theory of adaptive systems. International Journal of 
General Systems, Volume 38, Issue 2, 231–238. 
Vandervert, L. (1988). Operational definitions made simple, useful, and lasting. In M. Ware & C. 
Brewer (Eds.), Handbook for teaching statistics and research methods (pp. 132-134). 
Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. (Original work published 1980). 
Varela, F., Lachaux, J.-P., Rodriguez, E., & Martinerie, J. (2001). The brainweb: phase 
synchronization and large-scale integration. Nature Reviews - Neuroscience 2, 229-239. 
Varela, F., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (1991). The embodied mind: Cognitive science and human 
experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Varmus, H., & Weinberg, R. (1993). Genes and the Biology of Cancer. San Francisco: W. H. 
Freeman and Company. Front picture from Chapter 6: W. Heath Robinson, Inventions, Gerald 
Duckworth & Co., Ltd, 1990. Colorization courtesy of Trends in Genetics (Elsevier Science 
Publishers).  
von Bertalanffy, L. (1968). General System Theory: Foundations, Development, Applications. 
George Braziller, Inc. Pub. 
von Neumann, J. (1951). The General and Logical Theory of Automata. In L. A. Jeffress, 
Cerebral Mechanisms in Behavior. The Hixon Symposium 1: 41. Originally presented in 
September, 1948. Also collected in Aspray, W., and Burks, A. W., eds., Papers of John von 
Neumann on Computing and Computer Theory, 391-431. 1987. NY: John Wiley. 
von Neumann, J. (1956). Probabilistic logics and the synthesis of reliable organisms from 
unreliable components. In E. C. Shannon and J. McCarthy, Automata Studies. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
von Neumann, J. (1966). Theory of Self-Reproducing Automata. Urbana, Edited and completed by 
A. W. Burks. IL: University of Illinois Press. 
von Uexküll, J. (1926). Theoretical Biology. (Transl. by D. L. MacKinnon. International Library 
of Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Method). London, UK: Kegan Paul, Trench, 
Trubner & Co. 
von Uexküll, J. (1957). A stroll through the worlds of animals and men: A picture book of 
invisible worlds. In C. Schiller, Instinctive Behaviour: The development of a modern concept 
(1957 edition, 1934. English Translation). NY: International Universities Press, Inc. 
Bibliography       190 
 
 
Wagner, A. (2005). Distributed robustness versus redundancy as causes of mutational robustness. 
BioEssays: news and reviews in molecular, cellular and developmental biology 27 (2), 176-
188. 
Wagner, A. (2007). Robustness and Evolvability in Living Systems. Princeton University Press. 
Walter, W. (1951). A machine that learns. Scientific American 182(5), 60-63. 
Walter, W. (1953). The living brain. Middlesex, UK: Penguin Books Ltd. 
Weisberg, M. (2005). Robustness analysis. Philosophy of Science 73, 730-742. 
Westerhoff, H., Groen, A., & Wanders, R. (1984). Modern theories of metabolic control and their 
applications (review). Biosci. Rep. 4, 1–22. 
Whitacre, J. (2010). Degeneracy: a link between evolvability, robustness and complexity in 
biological systems. Theoretical Biology and Medical Modelling 7:6. BioMed Central Ltd. 
Whitacre, J., & Bender, A. (2009). Networked buffering: a basic mechanism for distributed 
robustness in complex adaptive systems. Royal Society Interfaces, arXiv:0912.1961. 
Wilke, C., & Adami, C. (2003). Evolution of mutational robustness. Mutation Research 522, 3-11. 
Wilke, C., Wang, J., Ofria, C., Lenski, R., & Adami, C. (2001). Evolution of digital organisms at 
high mutation rates leads to survival of the flattest. Nature 412 (6844), pp. 331-333.  
Williams, P., & Beer, R. (2009). Evolving adaptive behavior that adapts: Flexible deployment of 
contingent motor resources in evolved model agents (abstract). The 10th European 
Conference on Artificial Life (ECAL’09), Program & Abstracts (p. 62). Springer Verlag. 
Williams, P., Beer, R., & Gasser, M. (2008). An embodied dynamical approach to relational 
categorization. B.C. Love, K. McRae and V.M. Sloutsky (Eds.), Proceedings of the 30th 
Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, (pp. 223-228). 
Wilson, M. (2002). Six views of embodied cognition. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 9(4), 625–
636. 
Wimsatt, W. (2007). Re-engineering philosophy for limited beings: piecewise approximations to 
reality. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Wischmann, S. (2007). Neural dynamics of social behavior: An evolutionary and mechanistic 
perspective on communication, cooperation, and competition among situated agents. Ph.D. 
thesis. Germany: Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universitat Bonn. 
Yamauchi, B., & Beer, R. (1994). Sequential behaviour and learning in evolved dynamic neural 
networks. Adaptive Behaviour, Vol. 2, 219-246. 
Yao, X., & Liu, Y. (1997). Fast evolution strategies. Angeline, P. J., Reynolds, R. G., Mc-
Donnell, J. R., & Eberhart, R. (Eds.), Evolutionary Programming VI (pp. 151–161). Berlin: 
Springer. 
Zagal, J., Ruiz-del-Solar, J., & Vallejos, P. (2005). Back to reality: crossing the reality gap in 
evolutionary robotics. Proceedings of the 5th IFAC Symposium on Intelligent Autonomous 
Vehicles, IAV 2004. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier. 
Bibliography       191 
 
 
Ziemke, T. (2001). Disentangling notions of embodiment. Pfeifer, R., Lungarella, M., & 
Westermann, G. (Eds.), Proceedings of Workshop on Developmental and Embodied 
Cognition, Edinburgh, UK, (pp. 4–8). 
Ziemke, T. (2003). What’s that thing called embodiment? Alterman, R., Kirsh, D. (Eds), 
Proceedings of the 25th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (pp. 1134-1139). 
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, Mahwah. 
Ziemke, T., & Sharkey, N. (2001). A stroll through the worlds of robots and animals: applying 
Jakob von Uexküll's theory of meaning to adaptive robots and artificial life. Semiotica, Vol. 
134 No. 1/4, 701-746. 
Ziemke, T., Bergfeldt, N., Buason, G., Susi, T., & Svensson, H. (2004). Evolving cognitive 
scaffolding and environment adaptation: a new research direction for evolutionary robotics. 
Connection Science 16 (4), 339-350. 
 
